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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the motives behind share buybacks in the UK, and examines 
this form of corporate payout in relation to dividends by extending traditional 
corporate dividend behaviour models to include payouts made through share 
repurchases. Using hand-collected data for 267 firms belonging to the FTSE 350 from 
2001 to 2004, we show that the motives of firms in the UK to repurchase their shares 
appear to be different from those of US firms, which we mainly attribute to 
differences in corporate governance between the two countries. We find that the most 
plausible motive behind share buybacks in the UK is the distribution of surplus cash 
to shareholders although, contrary to US findings, UK share buybacks are related 
primarily to expected rather than unexpected earnings. Indeed, share buybacks appear 
to be paid out of the same expected earnings component as are dividends, which 
suggests that repurchases may be substitutes for (at least part of) regular dividend 
payouts. When we use behavioural dividend models, such as Lintner (1956) and Fama 
& Babiak (1968), to determine whether they can be extended to estimate changes in 
total payouts as opposed to just dividends, we find that firms that repurchase their 
shares tend to have a smoother dividend policy, which lends support to the 
substitution hypothesis of share repurchases. Further, we develop modified versions 
of these models in which we assume that dividends or total payout changes are the 
result of a full adjustment to expected changes in earnings and a partial adjustment to 
unexpected changes in earnings. We show that these models appear to better reflect 
the changes in total payout policy that have occurred in recent years in the UK. 
The material contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted for a degree in 
this or any other university. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published without her prior consent and information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis examines the share repurchase behaviour of UK publicly listed companies. 
Whilst the UK is the largest market for share repurchases in Europe (Lasfer, 2000), 
corporate buybacks are actually a relatively new phenomenon for the UK and, to date, 
there has been very little systematic research into either the motivations of UK 
buyback firms or how their repurchase activities are related to other corporate policies 
such as dividend or capital structure decisions. There is, however, a substantial body 
of theoretical and empirical literature on US share repurchase behaviour. Most of this 
literature has adopted an agency theory perspective to repurchases, i.e., in the absence 
of shareholder monitoring and/or other control mechanisms, the managers of widely-
held firms can be expected to use their decision making discretion to further their 
own, rather than shareholders, interests. From this perspective, share repurchases are 
an alternative form of corporate payout to dividend payments, and as such may have 
the same potential as dividends to significantly alter the risks and incentives of all 
financial stakeholders. Dividend policies have, of course, long been at the centre of 
several spirited debates and academic 'quarrels'. 
Lintner (1951) produced one of the earliest and most significant pieces of work on 
corporate dividend behaviour. Lintner posited that firms paid great attention to 
preserving the stability of their dividend payouts, by conservatively, i.e., only 
partially, adjusting them to changes in earnings through a target payout ratio. An 
important aspect of Lintner's model is that, for corporate managers, dividends matter. 
In particular, because Lintner assumes that managers believe that shareholders would 
take an unreasonably negative view i f the firm reduced its dividends, firms can be 
expected to adopt dividend policies that minimise the probability that they might have 
to reduce dividends in the future. Lintner's model also allows for the possibility that 
managers may be willing to dissipate shareholders' wealth, i.e., incur unnecessarily 
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high costs, in order to avoid cutting dividends. For example, a firm faced with many 
profitable investment opportunities but insufficient retained funds may rather resort to 
costly external financing than to cut its dividends. The remarkably high explanatory 
power of Lintner's original model and empirical findings have been confirmed by 
many subsequent studies that have used a wide variety of empirical and survey-like 
methodologies (Fama & Babiak, 1968; Petit, 1972; Watts, 1973; Baker & Powel, 
2000; Brav et al., 2005). Even so, the irrelevancy theory of Miller &. Modigliani 
(1961) has fuelled the disagreement among financial theorists over the importance of 
dividends and the significance and relevance of Lintner's behavioural model has often 
been at the forefront of many market efficiency 'controversies'. 
Essentially, Miller & Modigliani (1961) show that in a perfect market, shareholders 
will be indifferent between returns in the form of dividends or capital gains. 
Arbitrage will ensure that a firm's dividend policy (how its earnings are distributed) 
will not affect its value (which is determined solely by the size and riskiness of the 
earnings stream). However, this conclusion is crucially dependent upon the 
assumption of a "perfect market". In practice, there are several fairly obvious market 
imperfections that could undermine this "dividend irrelevancy" theory, e.g., 
transaction costs, taxes, asymmetric information, incomplete markets and contracts 
(agency problems), and bankruptcy costs'. Thus, going back to our initial statement, it 
is clear that the types of issues central to agency theory have also been used 
extensively to explain why corporate payouts matter. For example, in their seminal 
paper that first set out the core propositions of agency theory, Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) suggested that one of the primary ways that managers of widely-held firms are 
' For a detailed survey of the literature on payout policy refer to: 
Allen, F . and R. Michaely (2003). Payout Policy, The Wharton Financial Institutions Centre. 
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able to generate agency costs, i.e., can act against the interests of shareholders, is via 
their control over the use of corporate cash flows. From this initial insight, there 
followed a stream of research papers on the agency costs of free cash-flow where it is 
argued that agency costs can be reduced simply by 'forcing' managers to pay all 
surplus cash to shareholders, thereby leaving managers with fewer resources to waste 
on unprofitable investments, amongst other things (Grossman & Hart, 1980; 
Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). 
Although dividends have traditionally been the main form of returning cash to 
shareholders, this has been changing over recent years, as share repurchases are 
becoming a more popular and non-negligible method of cash distribution. The United 
States (US), being the most documented and researched market in finance, has been 
the focus of several studies on share repurchases. Research interest in this topic 
began with studies that examined the price reaction to the announcement of share 
repurchases. Several studies found that share repurchase announcements were 
associated with significantly positive abnormal returns (Comment & Jarrell, 1991; 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok & Vermaelen, 1995; Grullon & Michaely, 2002) and this has 
led to the development of a body of literature concerned with understanding the 
reasons driving this positive price reaction and the more recent focus on firms' 
motivations for repurchasing their shares. 
Not surprisingly then, the literature on share repurchases draws many of its 
hypotheses from the dividend literature. For instance, one of the earliest theories put 
forward to explain why firms repurchase their shares is the signalling hypothesis, 
which focuses on information asymmetries that exist between managers (insiders) and 
the market. Thus, when managers perceive that their firm is undervalued they 
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repurchase in order to signal to the market this undervaluation, which results in a 
correction o f the share price. This share repurchase model is very similar to the 
signalling theory o f dividends, which also views dividends as a way o f signalling to 
the market the future prospects o f the firm. However, in both cases the signalling 
hypothesis faces many challenges. For example, in the case o f share repurchases it is 
argued that open market repurchases, which are the most common form of 
repurchases, are weak signals o f undervaluation (Comment & Jarrell, 1991; Dcenberry 
& Vemiealen, 1996; Lasfer, 2000; Rau & Vermaelen, 2002), while dividends, though 
presumed to signal future earnings, have been found to be rather poor in respect o f 
their ability to predict future earnings (Watts, 1973; Gonedes, 1978; Penman, 1983; 
Benartzi & Michaely, 1997). 
As mentioned earlier, both dividends and repurchase studies have often relied upon 
the same agency theory propositions. Dividends help alleviate the agency costs o f free 
cash-flow, in the sense that they l imit the amount o f cash in the hands o f managers, 
who would then have to be more disciplined in their investment choices. Similarly, 
share repurchases are clearly an alternative mechanism by which to distribute 
corporate free-cash flows (FCF), hence there is generally a positive price appreciation 
fol lowing their announcement. 
In a perfect market, dividends and buybacks ought to be perfect substitutes for 
returning cash to shareholders. Although some researchers have developed theories 
where share repurchases and dividends serve as interchangeable methods o f 
distributing FCF to shareholders (Bhattacharaya, 1979; Easterbrook, 1984; Mil ler & 
Rock, 1985; Jensen, 1986; Grullon & Michaely, 2002), most studies have assumed -
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or developed models - that the relationship between these two types o f corporate 
payout and particular components o f corporate FCF are different. Some studies have 
argued that while dividends are used to distribute sustainable earnings i.e. cash flows 
that the f i rm expects to continue to generate in the future, share repurchases are (or 
ought to be) used only to distribute "unexpected", temporary or otherwise 
"unsustainable" components o f current free cash flows (John & Williams, 1985; 
Bemhaim 1991, Allen, Bernardo, & Welch, 2000; DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Skinner, 
2000). 
In fact, the historical stability o f dividend payouts and evidence o f dividend 
smoothing form the basis o f the argument that repurchases are not generally used as 
substitutes for dividends. Nonetheless, several studies find some evidence o f a 
substitution effect, which is suggestive o f a change in how firms formulate their 
payout strategies. For instance, Fama & French (2001) find that over the 1978-1999 
period US firms have become much less prone to distribute dividends, but that this 
has coincided with a dramatic rise in share repurchases. For example, Grullon & 
Michaely (2002) report that the number o f repurchasing firms, as a percentage o f the 
total number o f firms distribufing cash to their shareholders, increased from 31 % in 
1972 to 80% in 2000, while the number o f firms only paying dividends decreased 
fi:om 69% in 1972 to 20% in 2000. Grullon & Michaely (2002) argue that since the 
number o f firms distributing cash has been almost constant overtime, this suggests 
that for some firms dividend payments have been replaced by share repurchases. 
Moreover, in a very recent study Hsieh & Wang (2006) find that payouts increased in 
proportion to corporate earnings during the 1972-2003 period. They argue that this 
10 
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reflects an increased concentration o f corporate payouts (dividends and repurchases) 
amongst the highest earners, and that a dramatic increase in share repurchases appears 
to be responsible for most o f the increase in the total payouts. 
Apart from the signalling and the FCF hypotheses, several other theories have been 
put forward in the literature to explain the recent surge in share buybacks. It has been 
suggested that repurchases are used as a takeover defence mechanism (Denis, 1990; 
Nohel & Tarhan, 1998), or that they are used to adjust the capital structure o f the firm. 
One o f the latest developments o f the repurchase literature, though, is that which links 
repurchases to employee stock options. Previous work such as that o f Jolls (1998), 
Fenn & Liang (1999), Kahle (2002) and Weisbenner (2000) provides evidence that 
managers have an incentive to cut dividends in order to protect the value o f their 
executive options. As dividend payments reduce share prices they also directly reduce 
the value o f any unexercised stock options and hence, the suggestion that share 
repurchases are preferred by managers who receive a substantial proportion o f their 
total remuneration in the form of stock options. It has also been argued that, especially 
fol lowing the exercise o f stock options, share repurchases have become a popular 
means o f restoring (or enhancing) reported corporate eamings-per-share. 
To recapitulate, the existing, largely US, literature suggests that share repurchases and 
dividends are two different, but often substitute, ways o f distributing cash to 
shareholders where there is currently a mismatch between corporate resources and 
managerial incentives to wisely utilise these resources for the benefit o f shareholders, 
i.e., in firms where agency costs are high. However, determining whether the choice 
of payout method has significant value consequences for some types o f firms presents 
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some diff icul t issues that are still largely unresolved. The first issue is that although 
the formulation o f the arguments is slightly different in each case, essentially identical 
agency problems provide similar firms with much the same motivations for increasing 
dividends or share repurchases. The second issue is that, with the exception o f the 
option dilution hypothesis, in most instances dividend and repurchase decisions have 
much the same financial/managerial incentive consequences. What precisely 
distinguishes dividend payments from share repurchases and in what circumstances 
might repurchases be preferred to dividends (or vice versa) are issues that have rarely 
been addressed. Hence, we have the situation whereby positive empirical support for 
identical agency-related hypothesis motivations have been found by many studies 
irrespective o f whether the focus has been upon dividends or repurchases. 
As we shall show in the literature review, the primary difference between dividends 
and share repurchases in the US stems from a combination o f perceived market 
expectations regarding the implied sustainability o f the two types of payout, the much 
greater decision and reporting "f lexibi l i ty" o f share repurchases vis-a-vis dividends 
and other minor differences in their regulatory and tax treatments. It w i l l be noted 
that both the existence o f a large pool o f firms with significant agency costs stemming 
ft-om entrenched managers and surplus cash flows and the conditions that give rise to 
value/managerial incentive differences between dividends and repurchases, are 
institutional characteristics that may be specific to the US. It is fairly self-evident that 
other developed countries have a variety o f corporate sectors, corporate governance 
and ownership systems, disclosure rules, taxes and other regulations and that these are 
often strikingly different from the US situation. The many studies that have reported 
empirical support for the various share repurchase motivations have overwhelmingly 
12 
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examined only US firms and hence these reported results may be applicable only to 
the US. This suggests that research in a non-US setting may produce significant gains 
in terms o f providing empirical confirmation or otherwise o f the main US findings on 
the relationships between agency costs and the various dividend and share repurchase 
payout hypotheses and whether any differences with the US appear to be related to 
country-specific differences in corporate contracting and governance environments. 
This thesis focuses on corporate payout policies in the UK. The U K constitutes an 
appropriate non-US context for evaluafing share repurchase behaviour. Firstly, due to 
comprehensive disclosure rules, share repurchases in the U K are directly observable 
and easily measurable. Contrary to the US, U K firms are required by law to state in 
their annual reports the number o f shares they repurchase and the cost o f the 
repurchase, together with their motivation(s) for undertaking such repurchases. This is 
a major advantage that helps us overcome some o f the problems that many US studies 
faced in compiling their repurchase data sets. It has been reported repeatedly that 
several o f the measures used in US studies for share repurchases are severely biased 
due to poor US disclosure rules (Stephens & Weisbach, 1998; Dittmar, 2000; 
Jagannathan et al., 2000; Oswald & Young, 2004), which eventually means that their 
results are open to question. 
Moreover, contrary to what is often suggested in the corporate governance literature^ 
the US and U K corporate governance systems are not that similar to one another, 
particularly in terms o f the market for corporate control, shareholder rights and their 
control over the board o f directors. In this thesis we argue that these differences in 
See for instance Convon and Murohv (2000. D. 6681 and Rennehooe & Trniannwski OOns n 
13 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
corporate governance between the US and U K imply that the types o f agency 
problems highlighted by the FCF and executive share opfion mofivations for 
repurchases are likely to be less important to the shareholders o f U K firms. However, 
despite the relative lack o f these high FCF/high executive options motivations, the 
U K is after the US, the world's second largest market for share repurchases. Hence, 
repurchases matter even for the U K and examining precisely why they still matter in 
this context may further our understanding o f their role in the US corporate context. 
Leaving aside the differences between the two countries in terms o f the relative 
importance o f agency-related motivations o f share repurchases, the UK ' s increased 
use o f repurchases and its large pool o f widely-held firms with long histories o f 
regular dividend payments, provides an excellent opportunity to examine hypotheses 
o f the relationship between share repurchases, dividends and earnings. With a U K 
dataset, we are able to examine issues such as the extent to which share buybacks in 
the U K are primarily a subsdtute for dividends, and what the primary addifional 
benefits o f repurchases over dividends are (e.g., do they provide firms with greater 
flexibil i ty to smooth dividend payments?) that might account for their increased 
popularity in the UK. 
Thus, while we analyse U K firms' motivations to repurchase their shares in a 
framework consistent with that o f previous US studies, we subsequently show that 
treating share repurchases as a component o f corporate payout policy much in the 
same way as we do dividends, can further our understanding o f both the motives 
behind share buybacks, and their impact on, and inter-relationship with dividends. 
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Indeed, we argue that since the popularity o f share repurchases seems to be 
increasing, it would only be natural for pracUdoners and academics alike to treat them 
as components o f corporate total payouts and as a consequence, to incorporate them 
alongside dividends in their modelling o f corporate payout behaviour. 
While there is a large body o f literature that is concerned with building models o f 
corporate dividend behaviour, starting with Lintner (1956) and Fama & Babiak 
(1968), nothing in this literature acknowledges the challenges that the increasing 
popularity o f buybacks may pose to such models. Likewise, although the body o f 
literature on share repurchases is growing and much o f it recognises that the market o f 
corporate payouts is changing, none o f these studies considers how these changes may 
impact on traditional dividend behaviour models or how share repurchases may be 
incorporated in such models. 
Perhaps the reason for this 'negligence' resides in the inherent flexibility o f share 
repurchases. Given that most o f the traditional dividend behaviour models, such as 
Lintner (1956), rely on the principle o f dividend smoothing, which results from 
managers' efforts to keep dividend payouts stable, it is perhaps believed that share 
repurchases would not withstand the assumptions o f these models. Nonetheless, one 
has to consider that these models were originally developed to reflect the realities o f 
corporate payouts at the time when they were designed. For instance, Lintner (1956) 
developed his model after carrying out extensive field investigations that revealed, 
amongst other things, that managers had a target payout ratio and that they were 
reluctant to cutting dividends. Nowadays, however, the fundamentals o f payout policy 
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have changed, and therefore so should the models that attempt to empirically evaluate 
corporate behaviour in this area. 
Given the gaps in the literature identified above, this thesis contributes to the current 
corporate payout literature generally, and the repurchase debate in particular, in two 
ways: 
• Firstly, this thesis provides a non US study o f the motivations o f share 
repurchases. By using the U K as its data source, this study avoids many o f the 
data biases o f previous studies, provides a new perspective on how differences 
in regulations and corporate governance affect firms' mofivations to 
repurchase, and attempts to overcome some o f the methodological weaknesses 
o f prior work. 
• Secondly, this thesis investigates the effect o f using share repurchases with 
dividends to form total payouts, on the functioning o f tradifional corporate 
'dividend' behaviour models, and suggests modifications to these models in 
order to reflect changes that have occurred in corporate payout policy over 
recent years. This investigation also helps determine whether share 
repurchases are increasingly being used by firms as a means to distribute cash 
flow that would have traditionally been distributed through dividends, by 
determining whether firms that repurchase their shares experience smoother 
dividend payouts than those that do not. 
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The structure o f this thesis is as follows. In chapter 2, we discuss the development o f 
share repurchases in the U K , undertake a review of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on share repurchases and provide an analysis o f the main differences in 
corporate governance between the US and U K that might affect firms' motivations to 
repurchase. This chapter only focuses on share repurchases as it forms the basis for 
the univariate and multivariate investigations o f the motives behind share buybacks in 
chapters three and four respectively. Dividends, on the other hand, are dealt with 
separately later on in the thesis. 
In chapter 3, we describe our data sources, collection methodology and provide some 
univariate descriptive statisfics relating to the data used in the subsequent empirical 
analyses. Essenfially, our data set is composed o f all the FTSE 350 firms excluding 
the financial sector that traded between 2001 and 2004. The list o f firms is fixed to 
Apri l 2004, and given that the FTSE 350 constitutes over 96% of the U K market 
capitalisation, our results are potenfially economically significant. The univariate 
analysis o f the sample reveals that significant differences exist between firms that 
repurchase and those that do not, and between firms that repurchase ft-equently and 
those that only make one-off buybacks. Effectively, it seems that re-purchasers, 
particularly frequent buyers, are larger, earn more, and pay significantly more 
dividends than non re-purchasers. 
In chapter 4 we expand on the findings o f the descripfive chapter by empirically 
investigating firms' motivations for repurchasing their shares. This analysis uses the 
findings of previous studies and the chapter 3 univariate analysis to guide our choice 
o f variables, though where relevant we take into account the differences in corporate 
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governance between the US and U K . We start by examining the sample o f firms that 
repurchased their shares at least once during the sample period, and then move on to 
examine the total sample with regard to the decision to repurchase, pay dividends, or 
retain earnings. For the first part o f the analysis we use OLS for panal data estimation, 
and for the second part we use logit regression estimations. We are able to 
demonstrate that differences between the US and U K do, indeed, affect firms' 
motivations to repurchase their shares, and that some theories that have found 
empirical support in the US have relatively weak explanatory power in the U K , which 
we attribute mainly to differences in corporate governance between the two countries. 
Overall, we find that the most likely motivation for U K firms to repurchase their 
shares is to return cash to their shareholders, though the finding in the US that this 
cash is only temporary does not seem to be the case for the U K , as we find that firms 
appear to use their expected income as well to fund share repurchases. This leads us to 
examine the extent to which the flexibility o f share repurchases is being used 
primarily for the purpose of dividend substitufion. 
In chapter 5 we examine the corporate payout behaviour o f our sample firms, we 
investigate the effect o f using total payouts instead o f just dividends on the predictive 
power o f traditional corporate dividend behaviour models. We use OLS for panel data 
to estimate models equivalent to Lintner (1956) and Fama & Babiak (1968), where we 
first model corporate dividend behaviour, and then total (dividends plus share 
repurchases) payout behaviour. We demonstrate that the use o f share repurchases 
helps firms smooth their dividend payouts so that these can be predicted mainly f rom 
their past values. This finding confirms to some extent our suspicion that there is 
some subsfitution taking place, since dividends are smoother for firms that repurchase 
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than for firms that do not. The fact that total corporate payouts have not fallen appears 
to indicate that firms are choosing to repurchase their shares rather than to increase 
dividends when earnings rise. Moreover, we demonstrate that by modifying the 
traditional corporate dividend behaviour models to reflect changes in payout policies 
that occurred in recent years we are able to obtain sharper results. We do this by using 
the individual earnings trends o f sample firms to estimate their expected and 
unexpected earnings, which we then use alongside lagged dividends and total payouts 
to estimate changes in dividends and changes in total payouts respectively. 
In chapter 6, the main findings o f the empirical analysis are summarised and 
contrasted with the previous (largely US) findings on share repurchases. The 
implications o f our U K results are discussed and interpreted in terms o f the main 
differences between the US and U K corporate governance systems and the light they 
shed on the various hypotheses regarding the motivations for corporate repurchase 
behaviour. Finally, we discuss some of the limitations o f our analysis and suggest 
areas for future research into this topic. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Over the past two decades, corporate payout policy in the US has undergone some 
dramatic changes as share repurchases have now become one o f the most important 
methods o f distributing cash to shareholders. In the US, for example, Grullon & 
Michaely (2002) report that from 1972 to 2000, the number o f repurchasing firms 
increased fi-om 31% to 80% o f total firms distributing cash to shareholders, and that 
firms initiating a cash distribution using only share repurchases rose fi-om less than 
27% to more than 84% o f the total firms inifiating a cash distribution. 
Share repurchase announcements have traditionally been accompanied by a 
significantly posifive price appreciafion o f the stock and have, justifiably, received 
much attention from finance and economic researchers. Several hypotheses have been 
advanced to explain the motivations behind share repurchases, such as the "signalling 
hypothesis", which views repurchase announcements as a positive signal to the 
market regarding the firm's future prospects and that this explains the generally 
positive price changes following repurchase announcements. The 'fi-ee cash-flow' 
(FCF) hypothesis also enjoys considerable support in the financial literature. The FCF 
model predicts that firms that are most likely to repurchase shares are those that hold 
excess-cash that would otherwise be invested in unprofitable projects. By distribufing 
this excess cash to shareholders, management are no longer exposed to this moral 
hazard which accounts for the positive reaction o f investors following repurchase 
announcements. 
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There are several other hypotheses found in the literature, the most recently developed 
is the stock option hypothesis, which argues that firms repurchase their shares in order 
to avoid the dilution o f their EPS caused by the exercise o f employee stock options, or 
to avoid the devaluafion o f execufive options that would occur i f dividends were used 
to distribute cash instead. According to Kahle (2002), the average number o f options 
outstanding and exercisable by executives has tripled during the period ranging from 
1992 to 1997. The plausibility o f this hypothesis is clearly strengthened by the fact 
that in the US the increased usage o f options has more-or-less coincided with the large 
increase in corporate repurchase activities. 
Several studies looking at the link between stock options and share repurchases have 
already been carried out using US data; JoUs (1998), Weisbenner (2000), Jong, Di jk 
& Veld (2000), Fenn & Liang (2001), Kahle (2002). A l l these studies have found 
support for either argument o f the stock option hypothesis to varying degrees. 
However, generalising the results o f all these studies to other countries is problematic, 
as there has not been much written on share repurchases outside the US. The U K has 
shown the next highest growth and absolute level o f repurchase announcements after 
the US, actually peaking in 1999 at over SlOObn compared with $60bn in 1998 
(Scholey, 2002). Nevertheless, the literature on share repurchases has been 
predominantly based on US data, which raises the question as to how general these 
results are since there is a large gap in our knowledge regarding share repurchase 
activity in the rest o f the world. In the U K , researchers are starting to show interest in 
the area with the recent papers o f Rau & Vermealen (2002) and Oswald & Young 
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(2004a). These have concentrated on the capital markets' reaction to share repurchase 
announcements and their effects on the announcing firms^. 
Given their obvious similarifies in terms o f legal tradifions and corporate governance, 
it might be thought that what applies to the US is likely to be also generally applicable 
to the UK, and therefore, that we should expect firms' motivations for repurchasing 
their shares in the U K to be much the same as those in the US. However, this is far 
from certain to be the case in regard to share repurchases. Firstly, because the 
regulatory environment and rules relating to share repurchases in the U K are different 
from those in the US, and also because in certain crucial respects corporate 
governance in the two countries is actually far more different than is often realised. In 
this chapter, we go over the main motivations o f share repurchases that have found 
support in the US, and we highlight how these motivations are likely to be affected by 
differences in corporate governance between the two countries. But first, we w i l l start 
with a brief introduction to the regulatory framework o f share repurchases in the UK. 
^ Rau & Vermaelen (2002) find that the total volume of U K share repurchase activity is tiny in 
comparison to that documented in the US, and that excess returns around the repurchase announcement 
date are smaller than the values reported in the US, with statistically significant average abnormal 
returns of only 1.14% in the 11-day window surrounding the announcement. They ascribe this result to 
tax considerations, which according to them have rendered share repurchases unattractive to pension 
funds, and to the U K regulatory system which makes it very difficult for firms to take advantage of an 
undervalued share price, thus, reduces the motive for open market share repurchases. 
On the other hand, Oswald & Young (2004a) re-examine Rau and Vermealen's (2002) findings by 
using a more comprehensive data set and find three and eleven day C A R s for first time authorisation 
announcements of 2.1% and 2.5% respectively, which are higher than the C A R s documented by R V . 
Nevertheless, while Oswald & Young's (2004a) results differ from Rau & Vermaelen (2002)'s in many 
respects, they also support the hypothesis that the share repurchase activity in the U K has been 
influenced by the tax regime. 
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2.2 Regulatory Framework of share repurchases in the UK 
The U K has traditionally had a company law system that has discouraged the 
repayment o f capital to shareholders. Prior to 1981, U K companies were unable to 
repurchase their shares unless the shares were redeemable preference shares. It was 
only in the early 1980s that U K company law was changed to permit companies to 
buyback their own shares and it has only been in the 1990s that a considerable 
number o f companies have actually started to do so (Shirley, 1997). 
In the U K the legalities o f this process are covered in sections 162 and 169 o f the 
Companies Act, 1985, which allows a company to make an equity repurchase as long 
as the amount does not include all its non redeemable shares, and provided that it is 
authorised by its articles to do so (Scholey, 2002). The U K law allows two types o f 
repurchases; market repurchases, and off-market repurchases. 
Market purchases: these involve repurchasing shares on the Stock Exchange; they 
are therefore limited to PLC's. Section 166 o f the Companies Act 1985 states that 
before a market purchase is made, an authorisation (conditional or unconditional) by 
ordinary resolution must be obtained that gives a general authority to purchase the 
company's own shares or be limited to shares o f a particular class or description. The 
authority lasts only for 18 months, and is usually passed at each AGM"*. 
Off-market purchases: These are any purchase o f shares other than through the Stock 
Exchange, including any buy-back by a private company. The statutory provisions are 
to be found in the Companies Act 1985, sec 162 - 170, which allows an off-market 
•* Annual general meeting 
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purchase to be made only i f the terms o f the contract of purchase are authorised 
before the company enters into the contract by a special resolution^. 
Section 263 o f the Companies Act limits the financing o f the repurchase only to 
"distributable profits" or the proceeds o f a fresh issue o f shares (made for the purpose 
of the repurchase). The legal restrictions o f share repurchases by the Companies Act 
1985 are reinforced by various other regulatory bodies such as the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE). 
The tax treatment o f cash payouts in the U K has undergone several changes in the 
past ten years. It is rather complicated due to the fact that the U K has an imputation 
system, which is meant to reduce the double taxation o f dividends and on the 
"distribution element"*" o f share buybacks. It is not so much the tax regime for 
individual investors that has been changed, but the tax regime for pension funds 
which has been amended twice in just less than two years; namely on the 7th o f 
October 1996, and the 1st o f July 1997. 
Shareholders' perception o f share buybacks is affected by their tax treatment; it makes 
a difference to the individual shareholder whether the repurchase is treated as a 
distribution and thus taxed as an income, or whether it is treated as a capital gain. 
This, in turn, depends on the repurchasing method- whether it is an on-market 
repurchase or an off-market repurchase- and on whether the Inland Revenue approves 
o f the repurchase being treated as a dividend distribution (Lasfer, 2000). 
CompanyLawClub.com 
6 
The difference between the market value of the repurchased shares and the book value of the 
corresponding paid-in-capital 
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On-market repurchases usually give rise to capital gains taxes while off-market 
repurchases are usually treated as dividends. The latter is because shareholders know 
that they are selling to the company, and can therefore claim the tax credit in the same 
way as they do for dividends. Nonetheless, it should be noted that off-market 
repurchases are rare in the UK, in comparison to on-market repurchases. Moreover, 
beneficiaries o f off-market repurchases are usually large shareholders, who tend to be 
holding institutions rather then individual shareholders. It is, therefore, diff icul t to 
determine individual shareholders' tax preferences, wi th regard to dividend payments 
or share repurchases, since this depends mainly on the individual investor's capital 
gains tax liability. 
Institutional investors, on the other hand, are quite a different story. Prior to 
September 1994, all repurchases had to be undertaken in the open market, which was 
an unattractive form of distribution to mutual funds relative to off-market repurchases 
and dividend payments. On some occasions, however, the Inland Revenue allowed 
some repurchases to be treated as dividends, in which case the repurchasing firm 
would pay the tax credit in the form o f Advanced Corporation Tax (ACT) that can be 
deducted from the corporation's tax liability and claimed back by shareholders^. 
On 21 September 1994 an innovative method was adopted by Barclays de Zoete 
Wedd for the repurchase program o f Northern Electric PLC. This method became 
known as the agency buyback, and consisted o f the repurchase o f the company's 
shares in the open market but through a broker-agent. This way, selling shareholders 
^ For instance, in 1993, The Inland Revenue agreed to treat every £1.16 per share repurchased by 
Reuters at £14 as capital repayment while treating the remaining £12 .84 per share as a 'distribution' 
(Lasfer, 2001). 
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knew that they were selling indirectly to the company and could claim back the tax 
credit. This method was soon adopted by many tax-exempt institutions, such as 
pension funds, and led to a remarkable increase in the repurchase activity, as 
evidenced by Rau & Vermaelen (2002). However, this tax loophole was detected by 
the Inland Revenue and subsequently abolished in October 1996, making dividends 
more attractive to pension funds again. This situation did not last for long, as from the 
third o f July 1997 pension funds were not allowed to claim the tax credit on dividends 
anymore, making them indifferent between dividends and share repurchases. 
The main thing to note from this is that in the UK, high taxpayers tend to prefer share 
repurchases to dividends, mainly because capital gains tax is deferred until the shares 
are sold while income tax on dividends is paid annually, and they prefer an off-market 
repurchase (tender-offer or private purchase) to an open-market buyback. And under 
the current tax code pension funds are indifferent between dividends and share 
repurchases, because in July 1997, the U K tax authorities eliminated all tax credits for 
dividends. 
Prior to December 2003, shares repurchased had to be cancelled in order to preserve 
the pre-emption rights o f shareholders. However, the Companies (Acquisition o f Own 
Shares) (Treasury shares) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/1116) changed that; as from the 
1 '^ o f December 2003, companies that purchase their own shares out o f distributable 
profits have the option o f holding them "in treasury" for sale at a later date or o f 
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transferring them for the purposes o f an employees' share scheme (Only "qualifying 
shares" may be held in treasury^). 
Nevertheless, companies which repurchase their shares and choose to hold them as 
treasury shares are subject to many requirements, these are highlighted below^. 
According to the first consultative document regarding the change in the law on the 
cancellation o f repurchased shares"', allowing companies to hold repurchased shares 
in treasury rather than cancelling them would give them an additional measure of 
flexibil i ty that would enable them to manage the level o f their capital in the same way 
as they manage other resources such as labour and land. This flexibili ty o f managing 
debt and equity capital could also help the company find and maintain its optimal 
average cost o f capital throughout the different phases o f the business cycle". 
"Qualifying shares" are defined in the regulations as shares which;- i) are included in the official list 
(ie listed on the London Stock Exchange); or ii) are traded on the market known as the Alternative 
Investment Market; or ii) are officially listed in another E E A State; or iv) are traded on a market 
established in an E E A State which is a regulated market for the purposes of Article 16 of Council 
Directive 93 /22 /EEC on investment services in the securities field (The companies Acquisition of Own 
shares, treasury shares, Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1116). 
' Summary of requirements to holding repurchased shares in treasury ( T H E C O M P A N I E S 
A C Q U I S I T I O N O F O W N S H A R E S ) ( T R E A S U R Y S H A R E S ) R E G U L A T I O N S 2003 (SI 
2003/1116)): 
• The aggregate nominal value of shares held in treasury must not at any time exceed 10% of 
the nominal value of the issued share capital of the company. I f that limit is exceeded, the 
company must dispose of or cancel the excess shares within 12 months. 
• Holding treasury shares does not give rise to the usual voting rights, and the rights to receive 
dividends or any other distribution of the company's assets. Exercising any rights in respect of 
treasury shares is void. 
• Treasury shares may be sold; or transferred for the purposes of, or pursuant to, an employees' 
share scheme; or cancelled. 
• If the proceeds of the sale of treasury stock are equal to or less than the purchase price paid by 
the company for the shares, then they should be treated as a realised profit of the company; if, 
however, they exceed the purchase price paid by the company for the shares, then the part of 
the proceeds that is equal to the purchase price paid should be treated as a realised profit and 
the excess sum should be transferred to the company's share premium account. 
• The pre-emption rights that apply to the allotment of new shares apply to the sale of treasury 
shares but may also be forgone with the agreement of shareholders. Repurchasing firms have 
to indicate any shares that are to be held in treasury and details of those treasury shares that 
are sold, transferred or cancelled. 
Department of Trade and Industry (1998). Share Buybacks: A Consultative Document 
Although share repurchases with their subsequent cancellation already allow companies to manage 
their debt-eauity ratio, it is argued this mechanism can he too cumbersome for anvthine other than 
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Moreover, allowing treasury stock would lead to a more flexible and effective 
management o f employee stock options and other employee share schemes. At 
present, the manner in which employee shares schemes involving existing shares - as 
opposed to newly issued shares - are managed is that funds are advanced by the 
company to a separate trust for the purchase o f the shares. Repurchasing shares and 
subsequently holding them in treasury would enable the f i rm to fund the exercise o f 
share options. 
On the other hand, allowing companies to hold treasury stock may give rise to some 
manipulative behaviour on the part o f repurchasing firms and their managers. These 
w i l l have a bigger incentive to create a false market or to manipulate the price o f their 
shares, particularly for short-term gain. Indeed, when share buybacks were first 
allowed in 1981, holding treasury stock was prohibited for this specific reason. 
Moreover, directors might be tempted to use share buybacks in order to strengthen the 
share price o f the company so as to increase the value o f their share options or any 
long term incentive plans (LTIPs) based on the performance o f the company's share 
price (Share buybacks: a consultative document. May 1998). 
large step reductions in equity capital. Indeed, in the presence of the risk of re-issuance of shares, this 
exercise may become a very costlv one 
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2.3 Motivations of sliare repurchases 
In this subsection, we review, the main theories discussed in the financial literature 
that could potentially explain the positive market reaction to the announcement o f a 
share repurchase program. 
2.3.1 The Signalling Hypothesis 
According to the available financial literature, mainly US-based studies, signalling is 
the main motivation for share repurchases. This is because o f the findings that on the 
announcement o f share repurchases, stock prices increase significantly while the 
cumulative abnormal returns on the pre-announcement period are generally negative, 
which suggests that repurchasing firms are undervalued (Lasfer, 2000). According to 
this hypothesis, the announcement o f a share repurchase is motivated by managers' 
belief that the shares o f their company offer the best available investment opportunity. 
Managers are believed therefore to use their private information to repurchase shares 
when they are undervalued. 
D 'Mel lo & Shroff (2000) test whether firms that repurchase their shares using fixed-
price tender offers are undervalued relafive to their economic value (EV). They use a 
sample o f 166 fixed-price self-tender offer announcements made during 1970 to 1989, 
and find that while 74% of repurchasing firms are undervalued with regard to their 
EV at the beginning o f the announcement year, only 5 1 % of control firms are under-
priced, and only 58% o f repurchasing firms are undervalued relative to their EV based 
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on available analysts forecast information. This suggests that share repurchases 
convey information to the market that is not already available to analysts. 
However, many have found that the signal o f a share repurchase is not always a 
positive one. According to Petfit (2001), a repurchase announcement can send a 
negadve signal in three situafions: 
• Other information can contradict, and sometimes swamp, the intended 
buyback signal. 
• In high growth industries a share repurchase may be seen as admittance that 
there are no other investment opportunities for the firm. 
• Managers' participation in the buyback may seriously weaken the credibility 
o f the signal. 
It is common knowledge that insiders have superior information about the future 
prospects o f their firms. Therefore, in the case o f a potential corporate announcement, 
insiders have the incentive to trade stocks before the announcement date, the type o f 
trade depending on whether the expected announcement is to have a positive or 
negative impact on the company's share price. The presence of such information 
asymmetry encourages markets to closely monitor insider activities. Insiders' 
increased equity holdings before the repurchase announcement are usually interpreted 
as a positive signal about the firm's future prospects, while decreased insider holdings 
before the announcement send a negative signal to the market and weaken the 
credibility o f the repurchase announcement (Raad & Wu, 1995). Comment & Jarrell 
(1991) build a sample that includes 84% of at-risk fixed-price offers and 46% of at-
risk Dutch-auction offers, and find evidence that the at-risk offers have excess returns 
o f about 12%) compared with 5% for the no-risk offers'^. These results are also 
Comment & Jarrell (1991) consider officers and directors as beina at risk if two conditions hold: 
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supported by Nohel & Tarhan (1998); who also find that officers being at-risk during 
the announcement seems to be positively related to the announcement returns, and 
Raad & Wu (1995) who find that when management ownership is small, the two-day 
excess return resulting from the repurchase announcement is 1.99%, while it is 3.85% 
when management's ownership is large, this difference being significant at the 1% 
level. This evidence is also supportive o f the findings o f Lee, Mikkelson & Partch 
(1992) and Lui & Gombola (1998). 
Nevertheless, according to Lasfer (2000), Ikenberry & Vermealen (1996) and Rau & 
Vermaelen (2002) the signalling hypothesis is controversial because open market 
share repurchases, which are the most popular means o f repurchasing shares, are not 
costly signals and they carry no obligation for the firm to actually repurchase the 
shares'^. This is somehow contradictory with the principles o f the signalling theory, 
which views share repurchase announcements as signals o f the undervaluation o f the 
f irm's share price. Hence, open market repurchase announcements are poor signalling 
• Their collective proportionate ownership interest in their company's stock must increase as a 
result of the offer (non-participation condition) 
• The minimum price that the company can pay in the offer is more than 2% above the closing 
market price 4 days before the offer is announced (premium-offer condition). 
In the US, firms can repurchase their shares in one of three general ways: 
• An open-market share repurchase: these are favoured because buying can be easily suspended 
if better investment opportunities arise. But the lack of commitment inherent in this type of 
repurchase makes it the least effective when it comes to signalling the undervaluation of the 
firm. Open market repurchases are also not very useflil in restructuring the balance sheet 
because of the limited amount of shares a company can buy on any one day, which can 
extremely lengthen the process. Therefore, many argue that open-market repurchases should 
be used when the primary objective of the repurchase is to distribute excess cash to 
shareholders just like dividends rather than signalling the firm's undervaluation. 
• Fixed-price tender offers: evidence from previous studies shows that this type of repurchase 
offers the strongest signal. But in the case of a misconception of the buyback, this type of 
repurchase causes the severest damage. 
• Auction-based tender offers: auction tender offers offer a medium solution between the above 
two types of repurchase. They are good signalling tools but with a reduced chance of 
transferring wealth between tendering and non-tendering shareholders because there is a 
smaller chance of a major price decline after the repurchase since investors have themselves 
participated in setting the repurchase size and price (Pettit, 2001). 
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techniques i f they do not show a strong management's belief in the undervaluafion o f 
the firm, which could be better signalled through tender offers. 
Comment & Jarrell (1991) find empirical evidence that open-market share 
repurchases are associated with the lowest returns o f the three kinds o f stock 
buybacks, on average about 3%, compared to 1 1 % for fixed self-tender offers and 
about 8% for Dutch auctions. However, they also find that the sub-sample offering to 
repurchase more than 20% o f the outstanding shares show an announcement excess 
return o f about 6%, which is close to the average o f Dutch auction offers. In other 
words, announcements o f large open-market repurchase programmes, which offer no 
premium over market price, have nearly the same signalling effect as premium Dutch-
aucfions. 
Consistent with the findings o f Comment & Jarrell (1991), Stephens & Weisbach 
(1998) test the signalling hypothesis by regressing three-day abnormal returns o f their 
sample o f repurchase announcements on the fraction o f the repurchase target as well 
as on the excess returns for days -40 to -6 prior to the announcement. They find that 
the larger the announced repurchase targets the larger the associated abnormal returns. 
Ikenberry & Lakonishok (2000) use a sample o f 1159 repurchase program 
authorisations announced by firms listed on the Canadian Stock Exchange to 
construct a portfolio o f repurchasing firms for which they calculate monthly returns in 
calendar time. They add firms to the portfolio at the beginning o f the month fol lowing 
their repurchase announcement, and they retain them for the following 3 years (or 
until the stock no longer trades) and calculate the portfolio returns for each year. They 
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find that for a three year holding period they observe abnormal returns o f 0.62% per 
month, while for a two-year holding period they observe abnormal returns o f 0.70%. 
Moreover, when they divide the sample according to the mean value o f the book-to-
market ratio, the authors find that value companies announcing a repurchase 
significantly outperform growth companies: the abnormal return for the value sample 
using the three-factor model is 0.76% per month, while for the growth sample it is 
0.28%) per month. They also find that the performance o f value firms prior to the 
repurchase announcement is very poor; -0.91% per month, while growth firms do not 
show any particular sign o f undervaluation. The authors interpret this as further 
evidence in support o f the signalling hypothesis. 
Most o f the studies mentioned above use US data. However, in the U K an early event 
study was undertaken by Rees (1996), who was the first to analyse the impact o f share 
repurchase announcements on stock prices using U K data. Using a sample o f open 
market repurchase announcements made in the eighties, Rees (1996) finds that, on 
average, British firms announce repurchases amounfing to 0.5% o f their equity, which 
result in a mean positive reacfion o f 0.25%. He also finds that prior to the repurchase 
announcement, his sample firms experience a significant decline in their stock prices, 
and that the market reacfion is posifively associated with the proportion o f shares 
repurchased. Rees (1996) interprets his findings as offering implicit support to the 
signalling hypothesis. 
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2.3.2 The Free Cash-Flow Hypothesis 
An alternative explanation for share repurchases is that they reduce the agency costs 
of free cash flow. Free cash flow (commonly defined as the company's true operating 
flow) is "the total after tax cash flow generated by the company and available to all 
providers o f the company's capital" (Evans, Evans, & Gentry, 2003). According to 
the FCF hypothesis, stock repurchases mitigate the agency costs associated with the 
potential overinvestment o f free-cash flow. Jensen & Meckling (1976), Easterbrook 
(1984) and Jensen (1986) suggest that distributing FCF to shareholders induces 
managers to be more disciplined in their expenditure. Therefore, share repurchases 
can be used as a signal o f managers' commitment to reducing the potential agency 
costs o f FCF. 
Contrary to the argument o f the signalling hypothesis, share repurchases do not 
communicate to the market information about the future prospects o f the firm, but 
they signal managers' intentions about the use o f fi-ee-cash flow (Opong, 2002). The 
FCF hypothesis suggests that firms should distribute cash to their shareholders i f they 
perceive an increase in the agency costs o f FCF, meaning when agency costs are 
severe and they experience a contracdon in their investment opportunity set (Grullon, 
Michaely & Swaminathan, 2002). Therefore, the FCF hypothesis predicts that 
repurchasing firms should be experiencing a decline in their investment opportunities, 
which is translated into a decline in profitability, systematic risk, and capital 
expenditure after the repurchase announcement. This hypothesis also predicts that 
agency costs should be more important among firms that have negative marginal 
returns on investment since they are more likely to be over-investing (Opong, 2002). 
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Lang & Litzenberger (1989) review dividend announcements to determine whether 
the free-cash flow theory has any explanatory power. They show that a Tobbin's Q-
ratio'"* o f less then unity indicates over-investment by a firm. They find that low-Q 
(overinvesting) firms announcing dividend increases realise significantly higher 
returns than high-Q (value-maximising) firms. 
Howe, He & Kao (1992) extend the analysis o f Lang & Litzenberger to include any 
cash distribution that is not expected to be repeated i.e. tender offer share repurchases 
and SDDs (Specially designated Dividends). They follow the same approach as Lang 
& Litzenberger. However, contrary to the findings o f Lang & Litzenberger (1989), 
Howe et al. (1992) do not find any statistically significant difference in announcement 
effects across values o f Q-ratio in any o f the samples. They conclude that the presence 
o f FCF is not the reason why firms undertake share repurchases. However, Perfect, 
Peterson & Peterson (1995), who also analyse the market reaction to share 
repurchases using the methodology of Lang & Litzenberger (1989), argue that the 
results o f Howe et al. (1992) are flawed because o f their measure o f Tobin's Q (the 
average Q-ratio over the three years preceding the repurchase). Perfect et al. show that 
low-Q firms experience a stronger market reacdon to share repurchases i f Tobin's Q 
is measured in the year immediately preceding the repurchase. They conclude that the 
FCF hypothesis best explains the motivations behind share repurchases (Nohel & 
Tarhan, 1998). 
Nohel & Tarhan (1998) complement these findings. Using a sample o f 242 tender-
offer announcements (both fixed-price and Dutch-auctions), made during 1978 to 
1991, they find that there is a significant improvement in operating performance after 
Tobbin's q is the ratio of a firm's market value to the replacement cost of its assets (Howe & He, 
1992) 
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the repurchase, which seems, however, to be driven mainly by the low-Q firms 
sample. Moreover, they find that share repurchases are associated with a lower growth 
rate in assets, and sales o f existing assets, but not with a significant change in capital 
expenditures. The asset sales' pattern is found amongst both groups o f high and low-
Q firm. These results seem to favour the FCF hypothesis, especially when we 
consider that even the high-Q firms, which face better growth opportunities, seem to 
engage in restructuring activities. 
Furthermore, based on a sample o f 398 share repurchase announcements reported in 
the Wall Street Journal Index from 01/01/78 to 31/12//95, Evans, Evans & Gentry 
(2003) find that repurchasing firms undergo a significant reducfion in FCF in the 
period subsequent to the repurchase program, which lends support to the free cash 
flow theory as a major motivator for share repurchases. 
Jagannathan et al. (2000) hypothesise that the inherent financial flexibility o f share 
repurchases renders them an attractive means to distribute potentially temporary cash-
flows, as opposed to dividends, which represent a long-term commitment and are thus 
used to distribute permanent cash flows. They estimate firms' payout decisions using 
a muUinomial logit model, and obtain results in support o f their hypothesis; the 
probability o f repurchasing increases with the increase o f non-operating income, 
while the probability o f increasing dividends increases with the increase o f operating 
income. They also find that firms with more volafil i ty in their cash-flows are more 
likely to repurchase. 
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Guay & Harford (2000) come to similar conclusions as they test the permanence o f 
cash-flow 'shocks' according to the payout mode chosen by their sample firms. They 
find that re-purchasers do not exhibit significantly more permanent cash-flow shocks 
than the control sample, while dividend increasers do. They interpret this as indicating 
that cash-flow of dividend-increasing firms is less likely to revert back to levels prior 
to the cash-flow shock, which is just a confirmation o f the findings of earlier 
corporate dividend behaviour models (see Lintner 1956, Fama & Babiak 1968 and 
others). 
2.3.3 The Management Entrenchment Hypothesis 
The management entrenchment hypothesis is based on the agency theory, and views 
targeted share repurchases as one o f the many practices used by managers to protect 
their own interests at the expense o f the interests o f shareholders. The argument is that 
by eliminating the threat o f a blockholder, hence increasing the control exercised by 
managers, targeted share repurchases could be an example o f an agency cost. 
Following this line o f reasoning we should expect negative abnormal returns on the 
repurchase date. However, some argue that given that greenmail protects the firm 
from only one blockholder, other investors may duplicate this strategy, and the 
anticipation o f a third-party takeover attempt could result in a price increase (Klein & 
Rosenfeld, 1988). Therefore, a negative cumulative average residual over the fu l l 
initial investment-to-repurchase period would add support to the management 
entrenchment hypothesis. 
Shieifer & Vishny's (1986) theoretical model suggests that defensive tactics such as 
'greenmail' can raise expected takeover premiums and enhance shareholder wealth. 
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They also argue that by undertaking a targeted repurchase programme, the target may 
induce other firms to consider the possibility o f taking it over, and subsequent bids 
may be enough to compensate shareholders for the elimination o f a potential acquirer 
as well as for the direct costs o f discouraging them. Similar arguments are advanced 
by other authors, for instance, Ang & Tucker (1988) report results suggesting that the 
positive wealth effects for non-participating shareholders o f targeted block share 
repurchases for the interval encompassing the buy-in and repurchase announcements 
are caused by the expectation o f subsequent acquisition activity. Moreover, Klein & 
Rosenfeld (1988) use a standard event methodology on a sample o f 77 New York and 
American Exchange target repurchases for the period o f 1979-1983. They find that 
over the fu l l purchase-to-purchase period, non-participating shareholders o f the target 
firm earn abnormal returns in excess o f \2%, however, the cumulative abnormal 
return for the two-day repurchases period is -3.27% and significant at the 1% level. 
Thus, the results o f the analysis do not ful ly support either hypothesis. Although they 
show that shareholders, on average, benefit from greenmailer's initial investment, the 
share prices' decline on the repurchase date points to a negative impact on 
shareholder wealth. 
A more comprehensive study o f the marginal impact o f the payout announcement on 
the wealth o f target finn shareholders is provided by Denis (1990). He examines 
abnormal returns during the two-day period including the day before, and the day o f 
the payout announcement in the Wall Street Journal. He uses standard event study 
methodology to compute excess returns for a fu l l sample o f 49 payouts. The results 
indicate that in a sample o f clean events, repurchases are associated with significantly 
negative abnormal returns (ARs) o f -1.45% while special dividend announcements 
result in average abnormal share price increases o f 8.94%. This difference in ARs is 
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significant at the 1% level. Moreover, when stock returns are measured over the entire 
control contest, firms which retained their independence fol lowing repurchase 
announcements exhibit substantially lower CARs than those in which a control 
change took place. When combined with the pre-announcement price effects, this 
evidence suggests that successfully resisting a takeover through a share repurchase is 
associated with large losses for the target firm's shareholders. 
More recently, Nohel & Tarhan (1998) investigate whether the threat o f a 
takeover has any impact on the outcomes o f the repurchase announcement. They find 
that when firms use repurchase announcements to fight against hostile takeovers 
investors revise downward the probability that they w i l l be taken over. These results 
are consistent with the findings o f Denis (1990). 
2.3.4 The Substitution Hypothesis 
According to this hypothesis, investors respond positively to cash distributions in the 
form o f share repurchases because o f historically favoured tax treatment and the 
diff icul ty o f observing future cash flows. It is well documented that companies face 
heavy penaldes for reducing dividends and are therefore cautious about adjusting 
dividends; as a result, companies with excess free cash are more likely to retire stock 
than increase dividends (Evans et al., 2003). 
Previous literature provides mixed views on whether managers view repurchases and 
dividends as interchangeable, for instance, John & Williams (1985), Bemheim (1991), 
and Allen, Bernardo & Welch (2000) support the view that dividends are used to 
signal the firm's quality, meaning that share repurchases and dividends are not 
interchangeable. Allen et al. argue that only undervalued firms wish to be monitored, 
and they achieve this monitoring by attracting institutional investors through the 
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payment of higher dividends, since institutional investors prefer dividends, this 
signalhng equihbrium cannot be achieved with share repurchases (Grullon & 
Michaely, 2002). Moreover, DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Skinner (2000) investigate 
whether the appearance of share repurchases is related to the disappearance of special 
dividends. They do not find evidence for any substitution effect. Additionally, 
Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) find evidence that dividends are usually 
paid by firms with relatively stable earnings, contrary to share repurchases. They 
conclude that dividends are used to payout permanent earnings while share 
repurchases are used to payout extraordinary transitory earnings. 
On the other hand, Miller & Modigliani (1961), Bhattacharaya (1979), Easterbrook 
(1984), Miller & Rock (1985), and Jensen (1986) argue that it is the payout itself 
which can be a signal of undervaluation, regardless of the form of this payout. At the 
heart of the corporate finance theory there is the Miller & Modigliani (1961) 
irrelevancy theory, which implies that, in perfect and complete capital markets, share 
repurchases and dividends are perfect substitutes. The conclusions of Easterbrook 
(1984) and Jensen (1986) also support the view that agency costs can be reduced i f 
cash is distributed to shareholders rather than being left to the managers' discretion, 
regardless of the form in which this cash will be distributed. 
Moreover, Grullon & Michaely (2002) examine the distribufion of firms by payout 
method over the period 1972 to 2000 and find that the number of repurchasing firms, 
as a percentage of the total number of firms distributing cash to their shareholders, 
increased from 31% in 1972 to 80% in 2000, while the number of firms only paying 
dividends decreased from 69% in 1972 to 20% in 2000. They argue that since the 
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number of firms distributing cash has been almost constant overtime, this suggests 
that dividends are being replaced by share repurchases. As firms repurchase more, 
their actual dividends are lower than their expected dividends. Moreover, Grullon & 
Michaely (2002) find that the three-day CAR around the announcement of dividend 
decreases is significantly less negative for repurchasing firms than for non-
repurchasing firms'^. These results suggest that the markets view share repurchases 
and dividend payments as substitutes. They, thus, penalise less repurchasing firms for 
dividend cuts then they do non-repurchasing firms. 
2.3.5 The Capital Structure Hypothesis 
This hypothesis suggests that, since Miller & Modigliani (M&M) (1963) show that in 
the presence of corporate taxes firms can increase their value by increasing the 
proportion of debt in their capital structure; firms repurchase their shares in order to 
benefit from the tax shield on debt (Opong, 2002). Buybacks can affect value by 
changing a company's capital structure to replace relatively expensive equity funding 
with cheaper debt funding and move the firm towards a more desirable capital 
structure. A share repurchase will automatically change the relative proportions of 
debt and equity held by a company, particularly i f the company borrows to fund the 
repurchase. This will subsequently impact on its weighted average cost of capital 
(Rau & Vermaelen, 2002; Oswald & Young, 2004a). 
Grullon & Michaely (2002) document a mean (median) reaction around the announcement made by 
non-repurchasing firms of-1.93% (-0.72%), and a mean (median) reaction around the announcement 
made by repurchasing firms of onlv -0.45% (Q.\0%). which is not significantlv Hiffprent form 7ero 
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2.3.6 Wealth Expropriation hypothesis 
According to this hypothesis, share repurchases allow informed shareholders to 
acquire shares from uninformed shareholders at less than their full-informative value. 
Advocates of this hypothesis extend the M & M model by including the differences in 
the level of information available to shareholders. In a world with no taxes and where 
market prices reflect 'fair values', M & M (1961) show that any distribution to 
shareholders will not affect their wealth, regardless of the form of this distribution. 
Therefore, shareholders should be indifferent between a dividend payment or a share 
repurchase. However, a share repurchase changes the ownership of the firm. This will 
affect the preferences for dividends or share repurchases even though the post-
distribution wealth is equivalent in both cases. Graham & King (2000) find that when 
the firm's shares are undervalued, informed shareholders would prefer to repurchase 
the shares of uninformed shareholders and thus capture the wealth of the latter. A 
repurchase of this kind encourages the informed shareholders to reveal their private 
information to the market. This means that when buying the shares of uninformed 
shareholders at a discount, uninformed shareholders are not expropriated of their 
wealth but rather they are paying a price to motivate informed shareholders to reveal 
their information. Therefore, uninformed shareholders may have to tender a portion of 
their holdings in order to capture some value from the private information of informed 
shareholders. 
2.3.7 Employee/Executive Stock Option Hypothesis 
The two largely discussed motives for share repurchases are the signalling theory and 
the free cash-flow hypothesis. However, neither hypothesis explains the recent 
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dramatic rise in the repurchase activity whose increasing popularity may yet be 
explained by the recent innovations in compensation schemes, particularly the 
growing use of stock options which may have lead many companies to change their 
payout policy. 
An employee stock option (ESO) is the right to purchase a set number of shares of 
company stock at the "strike" price between the vesting date and the expiration date 
of the option (Mehran & Tracy, 2001). The vesting being the interval of time between 
when the option is granted and when it can be first exercised. A vested option is said 
to be "in-the-money" i f its current market value exceeds its strike price, and is said to 
be "out-of-the-money" i f its current market price is below its strike price. I f in-the-
money options are exercised then the employee can realise a gain, which is the 
difference between the current market price and the strike price times the number of 
shares exercised. Although out-of-the-money options would not have a current value 
i f exercised, they still have a positive "option value", which reflects the possibility of 
future exercise prior to expiration (Mehran & Tracy, 2001). 
Originally, ESOs were introduced to limit the agency problems between employees, 
including executives, and shareholders. It has been argued that employee (executive) 
stock options help align the interests of managers with those of shareholders, and 
encourage employees to take appropriate risks in order to achieve better returns, 
resulting in a better performance and an increased value of the firm's share capital. 
In the UK, the Inland Revenue requires that the underlying shares of ESOs be part of 
the ordinary share capital of the company that has set up the scheme, or the company 
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that controls it, and that they must carry the same rights (for example to dividends and 
bonus issues) as other ordinary shares. However, holders of these options are not 
allowed to receive dividends and are not able to vote at company meetings until they 
have actually bought the shares. ESOs are also non-tradable and unlike the US, the 
exercise of ESOs in the UK is usually subject to the achievement of certain 
performance criteria'^. For a full definition of the types of stock options with tax rehef 
(approved by the Inland Revenue) refer to the information provided in the chapter 
appendix. 
According to Perm and Liang (1999), corporate payout policy is affected by 
managerial stock incentives in one of two ways. Firstly, managerial stock options can 
result in a higher level of total payouts by better aligning the interests of managers 
and shareholders. In other words, because they can help reduce the potential costs of 
FCF, the level of management share ownership and stock options may be positively 
related to the level of dividends and/or repurchases should be positively related to the 
level of managerial stock incentives. Secondly, managerial stock incentives can 
change the composition of corporate payouts. The last few years have witnessed a 
dramatic increase in the use of share repurchases as a distribution method, which can 
be due to the growing use of managerial stock options. As a matter of fact, the 
average number of options outstanding and exercisable by executives has tripled 
during the period ranging from 1992 to 1997. This pattern is consistent with the 
In the U K , each company can decide on the rules to include in its scheme such as when options can 
be used and whether other conditions like performance targets must be met before the options can be 
used. Depending on the rules of the scheme, the option holder may be able to use them even if he/she 
left the company, but often, options are forfeited if their holder leaves the firm before they become 
exercisable. In the unfortunate case of the death of the option holder, usually the scheme rules will 
allow whoever is legally responsible for his/her estate to use their share options within one year of the 
date of death. 
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increase in repurchases during the same period (Kahle, 2002). According to 
Weisbenner (2000), for the S&P 500, stock option grants increased from 1% of shares 
outstanding in 1994 to 1.6% of shares outstanding in 1998. Moreover, the size of 
stock option programs increased by more than 40% over the same period, with 
outstanding stock options represenfing 6.3% of shares outstanding at the end of 1998. 
This growth in option programs could be related to the growth in the repurchase 
activity. 
It is well known that stock options, just like any other call options, are reduced in 
value by future dividend payments. This offers management an incentive to distribute 
cash in the form of share repurchases rather than dividends. This argument was first 
put forward by Lambert, Lannen & Larcker (1989), who find that dividend payments 
have decreased relative to their expected levels following the adoption of executive 
stock option plans, and has since then been adopted and examined by many 
researchers. 
This relafionship can be better explained i f we decompose the constituents of the 
opfion value. These are: the risk-free interest rate, the price of the underlying security, 
the option's exercise price, time remaining before the expiry of the option, the rate of 
dividend payment on the underlying security and the volatility of the underlying 
security". 
Given that ESOs are call options, their value increases with the underlying share 
price, which decreases with the payment of dividends (share prices drop immediately 
after the payment of dividends), and employee (execufive) stock options are rarely 
" Global Investment Strategy; Global Sn-ategy Weekly "Dividend redux; the truth is out there", 12 
April 2002. http://dividends.behaviouralfinance.neVMont02a.pdf 
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dividend protected. As a result of this, managers have a clear incentive to reduce 
dividend payments in order to increase the value of their opfions. This fits well with 
the arguments presented under the stock option hypothesis which says that share 
repurchases are being used instead of dividends in order to maximise the value of 
executive stock options. Moreover, the value of call options increases with the 
volatility of the underlying equity. Therefore, ESOs provide managers with a strong 
incentive to increase the firm's volatility. This can be done in one of two ways; either 
by increasing the leverage of the firm, or by investing in riskier projects. 
It has been suggested in the financial literature that one of the reasons for undertaking 
a share repurchase program, is to move the firm closer to its optimum capital 
structure. Following the same line of reasoning, it can very easily be suggested that 
share repurchases are also undertaken to increase the firm's leverage in order to 
increase the volatility of the firms' returns, which would result in an increased value 
of ESOs. 
Another aspect of the stock option hypothesis is the EPS argument. Although stock 
option grants are not directly reflected in the firm's earnings, they potentially increase 
the number of common shares outstanding and common stock equivalents, a figure by 
which the earnings are divided to get the company's EPS. Thus, granting options 
dilutes EPS by increasing the denominator without necessarily having any impact on 
the numerator (earnings). This is crucial because EPS is one of the most widely used 
measures of firm performance and its dilution can potentially cause a devaluation of 
the price of the stock. 
Weisbenner (2000) argues that the dilutive effect of stock options does not occur at 
the time of their grant, nor when they are exercised, rather it occurs gradually and 
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continuously throughout the life of the option as the share price increases above the 
option's exercise price. As a result of this dilutive effect of option grants, firms may 
choose to repurchase an equivalent number of shares in order to counter the dilution, 
especially given that the cash used to finance the repurchase is not deducted from 
earnings. 
It is legitimate to wonder why such a superficial measure as EPS should have so large 
an impact on firm value even though the fundamental characteristics (i.e., the size and 
riskiness of earnings) of the firm do not change. This can be explained by the way in 
which execufive compensation is linked to EPS, as advocated by Jolls (1998) and 
Fenn & Liang (2001). A survey by the Hay Group Inc in 1993 indicates that a quarter 
of surveyed corporations base annual bonuses at least partly on EPS, and 30% fie 
long-term performance based plans on EPS (Weisbenner, 2000). Moreover, evidence 
presented by Healy (1985), Holthousen, Larker & Sloan (1995), and Guidry, Leone & 
Rock (1999) suggests that managers manipulate earnings to maximise the present 
value of bonus plan payments. As a matter of fact, Jolls (1998) finds that i f the 
average executive had chosen to increase dividends rather than repurchase the 
equivalent amount of shares, than his/her stock option portfolio would have lost 
$345,000 of its value as a consequence of the dilufion caused by the dividend 
distribufion'^. Because dividend payments reduce the stock price and the value of 
outstanding options, executives holding stock options have a clear incentive to avoid 
paying dividends and can be expected to choose to distribute cash to their 
shareholders through share repurchases instead. From 1985 to 1994, annual cash-
' Jolls (1998) also finds that a one unit increase (app. One standard deviation) in the option variable 
will increase the probability of a repurchase by 0.256, while it will decrease the probability of the 
dividend-increase-and-repurchase alternative by -0.087. Thus, the net effect on the probability of 
observing a repurchase is 0.169. 
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based compensation for CEOs at large US firms has increased by about 50% in real 
terms, while the average value of stock option grants has nearly tripled (Hall & 
Liebman, 1998). It is also worth nodng that now; the value of annual stock based 
compensation exceeds the value of cash-based salary for many US top executives 
(Weisbenner, 2000). Therefore, the payout policy of the firm does not only reflect 
shareholder preferences but also the interests of the agents making the payout 
decisions. 
Previous studies that examine stock options and the payout policy of the firm are 
numerous, and they all come to different conclusions as to the effects of stock options 
on the payout method. Lambert, Lanen & Larker (1989) investigate the relationship 
between the inifial adoption of execufive stock opfions and subsequent changes in the 
firm's dividend policy. The authors examine whether the initial adoption of execufive 
stock opfion schemes leads to any changes in the corporate dividend policy. Their 
main hypothesis is that the inifial adoption of executive stock opfions provides 
managers with an incentive to reduce corporate dividend payments relafive to what 
these payments would have been i f there was no execufive stock opdon plan in place. 
This hypothesis is motivated by the fact that stock options are usually not "dividend-
protected", which means that their value decreases with the payment of dividends. 
The authors come up with the main finding that the adopfion at the executive level of 
stock options, indeed, results in a reduction of actual dividends relafive to expected 
dividends. 
Overall, the authors find that dividend payments decrease relative to their expected 
levels following the inifial adopfion of senior-level executive stock opfions. There is 
also some evidence that the greatest decreases in dividends occur in firms where these 
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decreases will result in the greatest increases in stock option values. The authors view 
these results as suggesting that no matter what the dividend policy of the firm is, and 
regardless of the reasons why stock options are adopted; altering managerial 
compensation may induce managers to alter the corporate dividend policy. 
While Lambert, Lanen & Larker (1989) examine the corporate payout policy of the 
firm with a particular focus on dividends; Jolls (1998) was amongst the first to 
investigate the relationship between the use of executive stock options and share 
repurchases. She attempts to look at the repurchase decision from the perspective of 
the agents making that decision .i.e. managers. She tests the hypothesis that stock 
options held by top executives encourage the latter to choose repurchases over 
dividends. Using a sample that consists of 86 dividend-increase firms, 44 repurchase 
firms, 170 retention firms (firms that announced neither a dividend increase nor a 
repurchase), and 24 dividend-increase-and-repurchase firms, she finds that the level of 
opdons is over twice as high in the repurchase sample than in the dividend-increase 
sample. She also finds that executive stock options have a posifive and statistically 
significant effect on repurchases and on retention to the same extent, suggesting that 
the same economic effect underlies both decisions. 
On that respect Weisbenner (2000) comes to slightly different results. He uses data on 
both total outstanding options and the portion held by the top five executives for a 
cross-section of over 800 firms at the end of 1994 to examine the impact of opfion 
programs upon the payout policy. He finds that outstanding options are significantly 
and substantially related to share repurchases. Although the author initially finds a 
strong correlation between executive options and repurchases as documented by Jolls 
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(1998), he subsequently finds that after accounting for the total size of the option 
program this correlation disappears. 
On average, Weisbenner's results indicate that an increase in outstanding options 
normalised by shares outstanding of 5% is associated with an increase in the 
repurchase payout rate the next year of 0.4%. Moreover, the funding of option 
programs with the repurchased shares seems to be strongest for firms with high stock 
returns. In other words, options become more in-the-money as the share price 
increases, accelerating the dilution of EPS. The results indicate, however, that total 
payouts are boosted, as a reduction in dividends is not enough to offset the option-
induced increase in share repurchases. Nevertheless, in spite of the increased payouts 
and decreased retention associated with option grants, there seems to be a positive 
relationship between the executives' holdings of stock options and earnings' retention 
rate; a firm where managers hold options equivalent to 1% of outstanding shares wil l 
retain 2.7% more of earnings. 
Fenn & Liang (2001) use data on more than 1100 non-financial firms during 1993-97 
to examine how managerial stock incentives influence corporate payout policy. They 
find that the correlation between managerial stock incentives and payouts is negative, 
especially in the case of dividends and stock options. They find that although 
management stock incentives do not appear to encourage higher payouts, 
management stock options seem to alter the payout composition of the sample firms 
by discouraging dividend payments. In fact, the authors find that a one standard 
deviation increase in stock options reduces dividend payouts by 38 basis points and 
increases repurchases by 13 basis points. 
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When the authors split their sample into four based on values of management 
ownership and the market-to-book ratio, they find that management stock ownership 
leads to higher payouts in firms faced with the greatest agency problems i.e. firms 
with low market-to-book ratios and low management ownership. On the other hand, 
there is no such evidence for firms with high book-to market ratios and high levels of 
management stock ownership. Therefore, overall the results of this study seem to 
suggest that stock options strongly affect the composition of payout policy, by 
substituting share repurchases for dividends. While management stock incentives 
have a significant effect only on a group of firms, stock options affect all types of 
firms. This can be explained by the way in which dividend payments reduce the value 
of stock options, especially when we consider that most stock opfions are not dividend 
protected. Fenn & Liang (2001) argue that while the substitution of repurchases for 
dividends induced by stock options leads to great ex-post management wealth effects, 
this does not necessarily imply great losses to shareholders. They argue that 
substituting repurchases for dividends can affect shareholders adversely in one of two 
ways: either i f the subsfitufion resulted in a net reduction of total payouts, which 
would increase the agency costs of FCF, or, i f such a subsfitution is not anficipated by 
shareholders, which would result in wealth being transferred from shareholders to 
managers. 
Another extensive study on the link between stock options and corporate payout 
policy is by Aboody & Kasznik (2001). They investigate whether the structure of 
corporate payouts is affected by CEO's stock option holdings. The authors focus on 
CEO compensation because of the considerable influence that the latter have over 
their firms' payout policies. Given that stock pofions are generally not dividend-
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protected, the authors hypothesise and find that CEOs who are compensated primarily 
with stock options favour share repurchases over cash dividends. They further find 
that this posifive associafion between stock options and share repurchases mainly 
holds for unexercisable stock options with a longer expected life, but not exercisable 
options. This is strong evidence that this relafionship between stock opfions and share 
repurchases does not stem from the firms' need to obtain shares in order to exercise 
their options, but rather reflects managers' desire to avoid the dilution of their stock 
option values that would be caused by the payment of dividends. They also find that 
this relationship holds only for the firm's CEO but not for other top execufives. 
Finally, the authors find that in firms where CEOs are compensated by restricted 
stock, which are dividend protected, meaning that CEOs receive dividends and are 
under no obligation to refund them even i f they fail to meet the restricted stock 
performance criteria, the extent of repurchases relative to dividends is lower than in 
firms where CEOs are compensated with stock options, which are not dividend 
protected. 
Although the primary objective of Aboody & Kasznik (2001) is similar to that of Jolls 
(1998), their research design is different in several ways. For instance, Jolls (1998) 
uses a discrete approach, but Aboody & Kasznik (2001) examine the actual dollar 
amount of payouts, and are thus able to examine directly whether there is any 
substitution of share repurchases for dividends. While Jolls (1998) implicifiy assumes 
that the relationship between executive stock options and the choice between share 
repurchases and dividends is cross-secfionally constant, Aboody & Kasznik (2001) 
find that this relationship between stock options and share repurchases is driven only 
by exercisable opfions with longer expected life and not by vested opfions, and holds 
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only for the firm's CEO rather than all the top executives. Finally, while Jolls (1998) 
uses a sample of just one year, Aboody & Kasznik (2001) use a sample period of six 
years. 
This topic has also been examined by Fenn & Liang (1997), Bartov, Krinsky & Lee 
(1998), and Barth and Kasznik (1999). These studies, however, focus on total 
employee stock options and not just on those held by top executives. Therefore, even 
though these studies also find positive correlation between stock option and share 
repurchases, it is difficult to explain this finding fully by the option-induced 
managerial incentive especially given that some companies may decide to repurchase 
their stock in order to be able to fund the exercise of stock options without having to 
re-issue shares and thus dilute the EPS of their firm. 
Kahle (2002) offers a more recent study where she uses three samples to extend 
previous literature and also takes into account the excercisability of the option, in 
order to define a more accurate relationship between stock options and share 
repurchases. Her first sample consists of 712 open market repurchase announcements 
for the period 01/01/91 to 31/12/96. The second sample consists of 205 firms that 
have increased their dividends during the same time period. The third sample is the 
information on executive compensation and ownership for the S&P 500 beginning 
1992. 
She finds that for the 40 days preceding the announcement, dividend-increasing firms 
experience no abnormal returns, while repurchasing firms experience negative 
abnormal returns averaging -3.6%. Moreover, compared to dividend-increasing 
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firms, repurchasing firms have double the number of employee stock options 
outstanding and exercisable in the year of and the year after the announcement. 
After dividing the sample into exercisable and unexercisable options; the author finds 
that repurchases are significantly positively related to total exercisable options, but 
not to total unexercisable options. This means that firms only repurchase stock to fund 
options that are likely to be exercised in the near future, contrary to the findings of 
Aboody and Kasznik (2001). Furthermore, the author finds the repurchase 
announcement return to be significantly negafively related to total opfions 
outstanding. Therefore, it would seem that the market could distinguish when the firm 
repurchases its share to fund its employee options and not because it is undervalued. 
Leaving the argument of the opfion value aside, and looking at the issue with a focus 
on the EPS argument, Bens, Nagar & Wong (BNW) (2002) invesfigate how ESOs 
plans impact on corporate payout policy and investment decisions. They hypothesise 
that granting ESOs will shift the resources away from potentially value-enhancing 
investments towards repurchasing the firm's stock in order to mifigate the EPS 
dilufion caused by the exercises of ESOs. 
This paper is motivated by the major assumption that managers are extremely 
concerned about EPS dilution in equity related compensafion and, therefore, managers 
would repurchase the shares of their company in order to mifigate the EPS dilution 
effect caused by the exercise of ESOs. The authors argue that when external financing 
comes at a cost and the firm uses its internal funds to repurchase its shares, this would 
reduce resources that could have been used for more value-enhancing projects. 
The authors select their sample fi-om the S&P 500 industrial companies, excluding 
utilifies, financials, and transportafion firms. They assume the sample firms to be 
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facing severe cash constraints and high financing costs. They use data for the period 
of 1996-1999. Their findings show that firstly, the repurchase of treasury stock is 
positively associated with the value of ESOs in the firm. Secondly, they find a 
negative relationship between the value of ESO exercises and research development 
(R&D) and capital expenditure, both of these being used as measures of investing 
activity. This reduction in investment does not seem to be caused by a reduction in 
investment opportunities because it appears to be only temporary. However, there is 
no evidence that suggests that these investment cuts are associated with subsequent 
poor performance. 
The assumpfions on which the study of BNW (2002) is based are questionable. Guay 
(2002) offers a critical analysis of BNW, particularly the fact that they emphasise EPS 
rather than earnings. He argues that investors are aware of all the implications of 
option grants; therefore, security prices incorporate the value that these informed 
investors give to the security. 
According to Guay (2002), BNW provide no evidence that share repurchases increase 
the short-term EPS. They merely document a positive relafionship between ESO 
exercises and share repurchases and they use it as evidence that share repurchases are 
used to counteract the dilution of EPS caused by the exercise of ESOs, which implies 
that share repurchases increase EPS. Furthermore, Guay (2002) questions whether the 
proceeds from option exercises would exceed the cash used to repurchase shares, 
especially i f potenfial compensafion-expense-related tax savings upon option exercise 
are taken into account. It is, finally, also questionable whether the BNW sample really 
satisfies the assumption of financial constraints, which is so crifical to their analysis. 
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For a brief discussion of employee stock options and their regulatory framework in 
the UK refer to the information provided in the chapter appendix. 
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2.4 Corporate governance: a comparison of the US and the UK 
The motivations for share repurchases discussed in the previous section may seem 
very different; signaHing the undervaluation of the firm is not really related to 
distributing free cash-flow, and neither are obviously related to restructuring the 
firm's capital or avoiding the dilution of EPS. However, all these motivations have 
two things in common: they all draw their arguments from agency theory, and they all 
have their origin and support in the US with its very unique corporate history, 
institutional and legal framework and corporate governance system. 
These motivations may, thus, not reflect the reality of share repurchases in the UK, 
which, contrary to popular belief, has a different corporate governance system to the 
US. Although both countries emphasise shareholder value and wealth maximisation, 
and share some similarities such as disclosure requirements and board structure, they 
are very different in terms of responsibility and accountability, as put forward in the 
consultation document of the ICAEW'^ (2005, p.5): "...while there are strong 
similarities between the US and the UK, the fundamental balance of responsibility, 
accountability and power accorded to market participants is different. Hence the 
assertion that Anglo-American corporate governance is, in fact, a myth." 
All of the motivations for share repurchases found in the literature stem from agency 
theory, and how to mitigate agency costs are the central concerns of any corporate 
governance system. The system of corporate governance in the UK is very different 
19 I C A E W (2005). Dialogue in Corporate Governance: Beyond the myth of Anglo-American corporate 
governance - Consultation. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. 
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to that of the US, and this leads us to ask the following question: what do the 
differences in corporate governance in the US and the UK entail for firms' 
motivations to repurchase their shares in the UK? 
In this section, we will try to answer this question by first identifying the main 
differences in corporate governance across the two countries, and then determining 
what aspects of these differences can affect firms' motivations to repurchase their 
shares. 
In the UK, the general approach to corporate governance is one of 'comply or 
explain', where companies are expected to comply with the guidelines of the 
'Combined Code', or to give reasons for their non-compliance. Although the Code 
does not have the weight of a binding law, like the Company Law, but it is appended 
to the Listing Rules of the UK Listing Authority, and all firms listed on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) are expected to abide by its provisions, or else to explain to 
their shareholders their non-compliance, so that the latter are given the opportunity to 
decide for themselves whether the management was jusfified in its decisions. 
This mode of governance offers firms the flexibility they need to do what is best for 
their shareholders given their individual circumstances, but at the same time it ensures 
that ultimately the shareholders are in a posidon to scrutinise managers' decisions and 
discipline them i f necessary. The UK's governance system is, thus, very much 
shareholder-driven, as it puts the regulatory power in the hands of investors rather 
than the government. For this reason, it is generally referred to as a self-regulatory 
system. 
59 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
In that respect, corporate governance in the US could not be more different, as it is 
regulated and enforced mainly through the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), 
the stock exchanges, and State law. While in the UK shareholders play a big role in 
regulating the behaviour of firms, as they are empowered to do so both by the 
Company Law and the Combined Code, in the US shareholders have limited scope for 
action, and it is for this reason that they ultimately often have to take matters of 
dispute through the courts. 
Indeed, nowadays it is not surprising to hear about the shareholders of some firm 
bringing a law suit against its directors for misconduct, it is estimated that every year 
about 200 class action law suits are filed in Federal courts^°. This does not usually 
happen in the UK, for the simple reason that shareholders in the UK have other 
methods to bring about changes in their firms' strategies and/or board membership, so 
that dissatisfaction is usually dealt with at an early stage and rarely reaches the stage 
of a law-suit. 
The fact that corporate governance in the UK is shareholder-led while in the US it is 
regulator-led means that several differences exist in its application across the two 
countries; the following are the major differences which will be relevant to our 
discussion of the motivations of share repurchases: 
1. Takeover defence mechanisms: this area of corporate finance constitutes one 
of the main differences between the UK and the US in the way it is regulated. 
In the UK, consistent with the shareholder-led corporate governance approach 
I C A E W (2006). Dialogue in Corporate Governance: Beyond the myth of Anglo-American corporate 
governance - Business dialogue. The Institute of Chartered Accountant.'; in FnglanH anH Waie? 
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we described above, the decision to accept or refuse a takeover bid is put in 
the hands of shareholders, while in the US, where it is believed that it is the 
duty of the management board to do what is best for shareholders, the decision 
is, thus, put in the hands of managers. To put it differently, in the UK the 
success of a takeover depends on whether shareholders want to sell their 
shares which, according to the Companies Act 1985, have to make up at least 
90 percent of the target's share capital^'. Therefore, when a company is faced 
with a takeover bid, it has to seek the approval of its shareholders, and has 
limited scope to use any defence mechanisms. In the US, on the other hand, 
shareholder's approval is not necessary for a takeover to succeed or fail, so 
that this decision depends entirely on managers, who can indulge in as many 
defence tactics as they can spare, such as green mail or poison pills, to 
ultimately defeat the bidder or make them raise their offering price. In fact, it 
is very common for firms in the US to have policies on anti-takeover 
mechanisms. 
2. Board leadership: in the UK, the board of directors is usually composed of 
executive directors, non-executive directors (who usually make up two thirds 
of the board^"), the chairman and the CEO. In the US the board is made up 
almost entirely of non-executive directors, while the position of chairman is 
usually assumed by the CEO. By UK standards, this constitutes a potential 
conflict of interests, since it gives the leadership advantage to the CEO over 
and above his/her executive and non-executive colleagues. 
I C A E W (2006). Dialogue in Corporate Governance: Beyond the myth of Anglo-American corporate 
governance - Policy dialogue, The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. 
I C A E W (2006), Dialogue in Corporate Governance: Beyond the myth of Anglo-American corporate 
governance - Business dialogue. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. 
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3. Appointment of directors: In the UK, not only do shareholders have the right 
to appoint or remove directors, but they also have the right to nominate them. 
As a matter of fact, under the Companies Act 1985 all that is needed to 
appoint or remove a director is a voting majority on an ordinary resolution or 
an extraordinary meeting called for by shareholders themselves, and for which 
they need to hold at least 10% of share capital^''. Shareholders can also call for 
a resolution at any fime i f they hold 5% of the share capital, which means that 
there is a significant amount of power in the hands of shareholders which they 
can use to exert pressure on the directors or to make material changes such as 
removing one or more directors. In the US it is a different story, because most 
firms use a plurality voting system, which means that shareholders do not have 
the option to vote against a director, they can either approve or abstain, and 
given that only one vote of approval is needed to appoint a director, it renders 
the whole voting process quite useless. 
4. Remuneration of directors: Ln the UK, executives' pay is generally made up of 
four components; a fixed salary, annual bonuses, share options and Long Term 
Incentive Plans (LTEPs). The fixed salary represents the risk-fi-ee component 
of compensation and is still much higher for British executives than their US 
counterparts '^*. Annual bonuses are usually paid subject to the satisfaction of 
some accounting performance during the year. LTIPs are grants of shares that 
are transferred to the executive (when they vest) after some performance 
objectives have been met. They are also common in the US and take the form 
of either 'restricted stock' that vests after a period of time without being linked 
" I C A E W (2006). Dialogue in Corporate Governance: Beyond the myth of Anglo-American corporate 
governance - Investment dialogue, The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. 
" Using data for 1997, Conyon and Murphy (2000) find that U K C E O s receive 59% of their pay as a 
fixed salarv. while U S C E O s receive onlv 29% of their nav as a fixed salarv 
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to any performance criteria, or multi-year bonus plans that are subject to a 
combination of three- or five-year accounfing performance. It is also relatively 
common for British firms to offer their executives restricted shares and 
supplementary retirement plans. Director remunerafion has often been on the 
news, a result of increased corporate scandals that have focused the public's 
attention on the colossal amounts of money that some executive directors are 
paying themselves. Although most of the recent scandals involve firms based 
in the US, like Enron, the UK has also known a time when executive pay was 
on the spotlight. ESOs became very popular in the UK during the mid-80s and 
early-90s. However, their use declined noticeably following a series of reports 
and recommendations in the mid ninefies, that were the result of public 
discontent with the so called 'fat cats pay' which referred to the compensation 
packages of executives of newly privatised utility companies. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2-1 where we can clearly see that there was a sharp 
decline in the initial value of approved opfion grants in 1997^ .^ Such reports as 
the Greenbury report combined with shareholder activism resulted in a general 
review of executive compensation in the UK which led to the formation of the 
Combined Code. Prior to the Greenbury report, firms were able to issue 
options at a discount of up to 15% of the share price. Firms were also not 
required to disclose detailed informafion about their executives' opfions. This 
situation has changed now as the Combined Code sets a series of 
recommendations that have expanded the disclosure requirements of 
executives pay, and that call for options to be linked to some performance 
Refer to the information provided in the chapter appendix for the types of options approved by the 
Inland Revenue i.e. for which there is tax relief It is important to note that many firms grant 
unapproved options to their employees, which means that the value of these options exceeds the 
maximum amount for which tax can be claimed (i.e. £30.000V 
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criteria, typically EPS growth or TSR (total shareholder return). The 
tightening of law has automatically resulted in a sensible reduction in the stock 
option frenzy of the early nineties. However, this is not to say that options 
have completely lost ground in the UK. In fact, far from it, compared to other 
European countries, executives in the UK still receive a relatively high 
proportion of their salary in the form of options. Nonetheless, using the 
expression of Conyon and Murphy (2000), British executives are mere 
paupers by American standards. The difference in executive pay between the 
two countries is reflected both in the base salary and the share based 
compensation, especially stock options. These differences in executive 
compensation reflect both cultural and regulatory differences. Historically, the 
British public has been very intolerant towards excessive pay, while in the US 
it is culturally acceptable to reward achievers and attract them using very high 
pay. On the regulatory level, it is very common in the US to reward non-
executive directors with options, while in the UK this rarely happens. In the 
UK, firms listed on the LSE must comply with the Directors' Remuneration 
Regulations 2002 (DRR)^'', which gives shareholders the right to vote on the 
remuneration policy of their firm, but there is no such requirement in the US. 
Moreover, while firms in the UK are required to disclose in detail all their 
remuneration schemes and how they are tied to performance, the disclosure 
requirements are weaker in the US, especially in terms of stock options, which 
leaves room for execufives to manipulate their values. 
5. Pre-emption rights: in the UK, shareholders are protected from the erosion of 
their wealth when firms decide to issue new shares. The Companies Act 1985 
I C A E W (2006). Dialogue in Corporate Governance: Beyond the myth of Anglo-American corporate 
governance - Business dialogue. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Enaland and Wales 
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requires that any new shares should be first offered to existing shareholders in 
proportion to their shareholdings, before they are offered to other investors^^. 
In the US, however, it is believed that pre-emption rights lengthen the process 
of issuing shares and raising capital, and thus reduce the firm's operating 
efficiency. Consequently, it is not common for shareholders in the US to have 
such rights which, again, puts more power in the hands of managers. 
Figure 2-1 
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Thus, it appears that beneath the similarities in their capital markets and their 
seemingly identical unitary boards of directors, the US and UK harbour significant 
differences in their corporate governance systems. Initially, these differences may 
seem unrelated with the topic we're dealing with i.e. share repurchases, but a link 
I C A E W (2006). Dialogue in Corporate Governance: Beyond the myth of Anglo-American corporate 
governance - Investment dialogue, The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. 
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between these differences and firms' motivations to repurchase their shares can be 
easily established. 
As we have seen, shareholders in the UK have considerable rights and are empowered 
to enforce those rights by the Company Law and the Combined Code. It thus appears 
more difficult for managers in the UK to exploit their positions, contrary to their 
counterparts in the US. Moreover, institufional ownership in the UK is quite high; 
80% of equities compared to 63% in the US. This means that institufional 
shareholders in the UK are much more involved in corporate governance than in the 
US. 
Since managers in the UK are not the ones who decide whether to accept or refuse a 
takeover bid, and since they have limited scope for using anti-takeover devices, the 
hypothesis that share repurchases can be used as a takeover defence mechanism does 
not really apply to the UK. 
In terms of the signalling hypothesis, as we have seen in the literature review, it is 
argued that the most effective way to signal undervaluation is through a tender-offer, 
but tender offers in the UK are quite rare. Although Comment and Jarrell (1991) find 
that announcements of very large repurchases have nearly the same signalling effect 
as tender offers, in the UK even large open market repurchases are unlikely to take 
place, since the maximum number of shares any firm can acquire with a single 
authority is 15% of its share capital. This means that for larger repurchases managers 
have to go back to shareholders who would have to vote for another authority in an 
extraordinary meeting. 
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Moreover, exploiting price volatilities is made very difficult in the UK, since firms 
are prohibited fi"om repurchasing their shares during periods of increased information 
asymmetry, which include the period of two months prior to the preliminary 
announcement of annual or interim results (Oswald & Young, 2004a). It thus appears 
that the signalling hypothesis that has enjoyed strong support from empirical studies 
in the US, especially during the early nineties, may not have a significant explanatory 
power for share repurchases in the UK. 
We have mentioned previously that in the UK shareholders have pre-emption rights. 
Before December 2003, these rights applied even to repurchased shares, which meant 
that firms that repurchased their shares had to cancel them immediately after the 
repurchase. However, as was mentioned at the start of this chapter, after December 
2003, firms became able to repurchase their shares and hold them in treasury stock, 
like in the US^ .^ Practically, firms that repurchase their shares to counter the dilution 
of EPS caused by the exercise of stock opUons are more likely to cancel these shares, 
since keeping them in treasury stock means that at some point in the future they will 
be re-issued. However, using these shares to fund stock options instead of issuing new 
shares can, indeed, limit the dilufion of EPS. 
The problem is that it is not easy to distinguish between firms that repurchase purely 
to fund stock options, and those that do so to enhance the value of their EPS. In fact, 
none of the studies that find support for the EPS dilution argument look at how share 
repurchases are affecting share retirements, except for Liang and Sharp (1999), who 
Shareholders in the U K , however, have pre-emption rights on the sale of shares in treasury stock; 
refer back to footnote eieht. 
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find that from 1994 to 1998, share repurchases have reduced outstanding shares by 
2% annually, but that only half of these shares were retired. Nonetheless, this study 
suffers fi-om some weaknesses especially in terms of its data, and it measures share 
retirements as the difference between share repurchases and shares issued for stock 
option schemes, which is a very vague measure that assumes that all stock option 
exercises are funded out of shares repurchased, and does not take into account shares 
that are kept in treasury stock. 
In the UK, the situafion is less complicated, or at least was prior to December 2003, 
because all repurchased shares had to be cancelled, and option exercises were 
generally funded with shares repurchased through independent employee trusts. An 
Employee Benefit Trust (EBT) can be administered by an elected employee, a 
member appointed by the company and an outside professional, or the company can 
choose to have a corporate trustee instead. The role of the trust is to buy shares in the 
market through a bank loan, or a loan or gift from the company (which may qualify 
the company for corporation tax relief), and subsequently transfer them to employees 
or executives when these exercise their options^^. 
Therefore, firms in the UK were not likely to repurchase their shares in order to fund 
option exercises, but it is very likely that they did so to ensure that their EPS was not 
greatly affected from re-issuing the shares kept in employee trusts at the exercise of 
stock options. 
The second facet of the stock option hypothesis, which posits that share repurchases 
are used instead of dividends in order to avoid the devaluation of executive opfions, 
also faces a challenge in the UK. We mentioned earlier that executive in the US 
" For more information refer to the Esnn Centre at- httrv7/www mhc'-
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generally receive a large portion of their salaries in stock options, are not required to 
disclose detailed informafion about these options, such as how they are tied to 
performance, and are, thus, immune fi-om the scrutiny of shareholders. In the UK, 
although stock options sfill form a component of most execufives' compensation 
packages, their use declined considerably following the publication of the Greenbury 
report in 1995, which recommended extensive disclosure in annual reports on 
remuneration, including stock options, and the establishment of a remuneration 
committee involving non-executive directors^°. The Inland Revenue also reduced the 
value of options that could be granted with tax relief from £100,000 to only £30,000. 
However, many finns sfill grant opfions with a value higher than £30,000 to their 
directors (they are usually refen-ed to as unapproved option schemes), which may 
indicate that despite restrictions, executive options have far from disappeared. 
Given this tighter regulatory environment, testing the substitution argument of the 
stock option hypothesis in the UK offers many advantages. Evidence from the US 
suggests that managers tend to repurchase in order to avoid the devaluation of their 
options caused by dividend payments. It would be, thus, interesting to know whether 
the shareholder-led corporate governance of British firms fares better in disciplining 
managers. I f it does, at least in relation to their repurchase activity, then we should 
expect firms in the UK not to repurchase in order to avoid the devaluafion of 
execufive stock options, but for other reasons. 
Given that the signalling hypothesis is not likely to find strong support in the UK, as 
we argued earlier, this leaves the free cash-flow hypothesis and the capital structure 
I C A E W (2006). Dialogue in Corporate Governance: Beyond the myth of Anglo-American corporate 
governance - Policv dialogue. The Institute of ChartereH Accountant*; in Fn2l?-n'i ^V'*^ e^  
69 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
hypothesis. Out of all the motivations mentioned in the literature review, these seem 
to fit most with the interests of shareholders, and in a country where corporate 
governance is efficient, it is very likely for share repurchases to be linked to either one 
of these motivations. 
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2.5 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter, we have looked at the regulatory framework of share repurchases in 
the UK, the different hypotheses explaining firms motivations to repurchase their 
share that have found empirical support in the US, and the differences in corporate 
governance between the UK and the US, and how they can affect firms' motivations 
to repurchase their shares. 
We have established that, despite the fact that there have been several studies already 
published on the mofivations of share repurchases, most of these studies use US data, 
and given differences in corporate governance between the US and the UK, we expect 
firms' motivations to repurchase their shares in the UK to be different from those 
documented in the US. Some of these differences are related to the regulations of 
share repurchases themselves, for instance, while the signaling theory has received 
significant backing in the US, it is unlikely to explain a great proportion of share 
repurchases in the UK. This is because firms in the UK are less able to take advantage 
of price movement, given that shares cannot be repurchased during periods of high 
information asymmetry. Moreover, tender-offers, which are said to be the most 
effecfive signals of undervaluation, are rare in the UK, while large open-market 
repurchases cannot take place, given that the maximum number of shares any firm can 
repurchase with a single authority is 15% of its share capital. All these restrictions 
make signaling unlikely to be the leading motivafion for share repurchases in the UK. 
Furthermore, we have also established that other motivadons such as that of using 
share repurchases as a takeover defense mechanism (the wealth exoroDriation 
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hypothesis) to be equally unlikely. Given the nature of the shareholder-led corporate 
governance system in the UK, managers have less opportunity to behave against the 
interests of shareholders, or at least against their wil l , contrary to the US, where 
indeed, there has been evidence that some managers make targeted repurchases to 
defeat takeover bids. 
Another motivation that has recently received strong backing from financial 
researchers is the stock option hypothesis. We found that managers' incentives to 
repurchase in order to avoid the devaluation of their stock options are less substantive 
in the UK. This is because executives in the UK have smaller portions of their salaries 
in ESOs, and also because shareholders have a greater say in the setting up of these 
options, which means that they are more likely to discipline managers i f they indulge 
in unhealthy price manipulation. 
Nonetheless, despite differences in corporate governance across the two countries, it 
is sfiU possible for executives in the UK to repurchase in order to avoid the 
devaluation of their ESOs. Despite stronger disclosure requirements in the UK and the 
requisite that options be subject to the attainment of some performance criteria, the 
latter are usually very undemanding. For instance, typical performance criteria require 
an EPS growth of a mere 2 to 3% in any 3 years of the option's term^'. This means 
that though corporate governance in the UK is such that managers in the UK have not 
as great an incentive to repurchase shares in order to avoid the devaluation of their 
ESOs as their counterparts in the US do, but there is sfill a possibility that this 
" Peter Pope & Steven Young: Executive Remuneration: an investor's guide. International Centre For 
Research In Accounting, Lancaster University. 
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incentive, though not very great by US standards, is great enough by British 
standards. 
We have also shown that before December 2003, firms in the UK could not keep the 
shares they repurchased in treasury, which means that they could not fund option 
exercises with share buybacks. This implies that i f there is a relationship between 
option exercises and share repurchases, then it is more directly related to enhancing 
EPS. 
To conclude, it appears necessary that an empirical investigation is undertaken on the 
motivations of British firms to repurchase their shares. Not only will the findings be 
useful in terms of bettering our understanding of the new trends of corporate payout 
behaviour in the UK, but they will also serve as an indication of how well does the 
shareholder-led type of corporate governance regulate managers' behaviour. For this 
reason, investigating the Stock option hypothesis is particularly useful, since 
executive remuneration forms an area of difference between the US and the UK. 
Moreover, testing all the hypotheses that have empirical support in the US is also 
necessary i f we are to draw any conclusions on the differences in corporate payouts 
between the two countries and their relationship with corporate governance. 
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2.6 Appendix 
Employee share schemes in the U K 
The Inland Revenue can approve three types of employee stock option schemes: 
1. Savings-Related Share Option Schemes 
The present tax relief for these share option schemes was introduced in 1980. Under 
an approved savings-related scheme set up by a company, the strike price of the 
option must not be less than 80 per cent of the value of the shares at the time of the 
grant. Participating employees are required to save between £5 and £250 (out of their 
post-tax pay) per month under a Save As You Earn (SAYE) savings contract with 
either a bank or building society. These contracts can last for a period of three or five 
years. Those with five-year SAYE contracts are free to take the proceeds after the 
fifth year or leave them for another two years to earn an additional bonus which will 
be tax free. The employee can, therefore, use the resulting lump sum to buy the 
underlying shares whether they decide to exercise their options after 3, 5 or 7 years, 
depending on the terms of the option. The exercise of these options will not entail a 
tax payment on the difference between the strike price and the market value of the 
share. However, i f the option is not exercised the employee receives the proceeds of 
the SAYE contract in the normal way. 
2. Company Share Option Plans 
These plans came to replace Discretionary Share Option Schemes in 1996. This 
scheme limits the value of the underlying shares of the options held by an employee 
to £30,000. Options granted under these schemes must not have a strike price that is 
lower than the prevailing market value of the underlying shares at the time of the 
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grant, but they do not have to be hnked to any kind of savings arrangement, and it is 
up to the company to decide which of its employees or full time directors could 
participate. 
Holders of these options have an income tax and National Insurance relief at the grant 
and exercise of their options. However, to obtain this relief, employees should not 
exercise their options less than 3 years, or more than 10 years, after the grant date. 
Options satisfying the criteria above are usually granted under an approved option 
scheme; they entitle their holder to a certain tax relief but they must not exceed 
£30,000 for each participant. If this amount is exceeded for any participant then the 
balance is automatically classified under an unapproved option scheme which 
essentially means that the holder is not entitled to any tax relief. This distinction exists 
since the Inland Revenue reduced the value of options that could be granted with tax 
relief from £100,000 to only £30,000. 
3. Enterprise Management Incentives 
This scheme is designed to help small, higher risk companies recruit and retain high 
calibre employees. It is particularly targeted at small, independent high risk trading 
companies or groups with gross assets not exceeding £30 million. Under this scheme, 
an employee can be granted options over shares worth up to £100,000 at the date of 
grant, and the company granting the options can have up to £3m of shares under EMI 
options at any one time. In addition, nil cost and discounted options can be used, even 
though they may carry different tax and National Insurance implications. As with the 
other option schemes, EMIs offer tax relief on both the grant and the exercise of the 
options, i f they are not offered at a discount, and i f the exercise takes place within ten 
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years. The exercise price is the market value of the shares at the grant date of the 
option. 
Table 2-1: Save As You Earn Share Option Schemes 
Save As You Earn Option Schemes approved under Schedule 3 Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 
Year Number 
approved 
in year (1) 
Number of 
employees to 
vjhom options 
granted during year 
(•000) (2) 
Initial value of 
shares over which 
options granted 
during year 
(£ million) 
Average value of 
shares over which 
options granted 
per employee 
(£) 
Number of 
employees who 
exercised options 
during year 
(•000) (2,3) 
Estimated 
Cost of 
of income 
tax relief 
(£ million) 
1980- 81 
1981- 82 
1982- 83 
1983- 84 
1984- 85 
22 
115 
78 
73 
114 
11 
89 
95 
105 
225 
18 
151 
175 
185 
560 
1,600 
1,700 
1,800 
1,800 
2,500 
1985- 86 
1986- 87 
1987- 88 
1988- 89 
1989- 90 
114 
103 
90 
101 
84 
200 
290 
440 
370 
460 
460 
520 
970 
740 
1,020 
2,300 
1,800 
2,200 
2,000 
2,200 
70 
275 
15 
50 
30 
40 
60 
1990- 91 
1991- 92 
1992- 93 
1993- 94 
1994- 95 
81 
83 
95 
104 
144 
550 
480 
590 
480 
550 
1,430 
1,400 
1,880 
1,290 
1,590 
2,600 
2,900 
3,200 
2,700 
2,900 
160 
165 
185 
235 
225 
110 
60 
100 
135 
135 
1995- 96 
1996- 97 
1997- 98 
1998- 99 
1999- 00 
116 
176 
141 
189 
120 
610 
800 
1,170 
990 
1,000 
1,730 
2,170 
2,970 
2,930 
2,830 
2,800 
2,700 
2,500 
3,000 
2,800 
320 
310 
395 
320 
465 
290 
310 
500 
390 
445 
2000- 01 
2001- 02 
2002- 03 
2003- 04 
115 
101 
60 
38 
1,030 
1,300 
865 
600 
3,460 
2,785 
2,945 
1,889 
3,400 
2,100 
3,400 
3.100 
325 
530 
330 
300 
365 
295 
145 
100 
Total 2,457 - 36,098 
Source: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/emp_share schemes/menu.htm 
(1) The number of new schemes approved in 2004-2005 was 80. 
(2) The total number of employees cannot be calculated since some employees may have been granted options or 
exercised options in successive years. 
(3) The number of employees v * o m exercised options during the year is not available for years prior to 1988-89. 
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Table 2-2: Company Share Option Plans and Discretionary Share Option Schemes 
Company Share Option Plans approved under Schedule 4 Inconne Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 and 
Discretionary Share Option Schemes approved under the Finance Act 1984 
Year Number 
approved 
in year (2) 
Number of 
employees to 
w/hom options 
granted during year 
(•000) (3) 
Initial value of 
shares over which 
options granted 
during year 
(£ million) 
Average value of 
shares over which 
options granted 
per employee 
(£) 
Number of 
employees who 
exercised options 
during year 
COOO) (3,4) 
Estimated 
Cost of 
of income 
tax relief 
(£ million) 
1984-85 208 50 800 16,000 -
1985-86 1,259 50 870 17,000 -
1986-87 772 55 1,150 21,000 -
1987-88 746 90 1,800 20,000 55 
1988-89 855 90 1,660 18,000 30 
1989-90 549 105 1,900 18,000 110 
1990-91 395 65 1,450 22,000 125 
1991-92 305 80 1,350 17,000 20 140 
1992-93 243 80 1,600 20,000 25 155 
1993-94 348 70 1,760 25,000 35 220 
1994-95 488 90 2,200 24,000 25 190 
1995-96 347 125 1,970 16,000 35 280 
1996-97 422 140 800 5,700 30 280 
1997-98 463 330 1,070 3,300 30 315 
1998-99 499 280 1,500 5,400 45 315 
1999-00 514 240 1,310 5,000 80 250 
2000-01 714 415 2,200 5,000 25 80 
2001-02 454 280 1,860 7,000 80 155 
2002-03 262 185 1,410 8,000 80 95 
2003-04 130 220 980 4,500 120 95 
Total 9,973 - 29,640 
Source: http://www.hmrc.uov.uk/stats/emp share schemes/menu.htm 
(1) Discretionary Share Option schemes were replaced by Company Share Options Plans in 1996. 
(2) The number of new schemes approved in 2004-05 was 169. 
(3) The total number of employees cannot be calculated since some employees may have been granted options or 
exercised options in successive years. 
(4) The number of employees whom exercised options during the year is not available for years prior to 1991-92. 
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3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have looked at the main motivations behind share 
repurchases. We have seen that most of these motivations enjoy empirical support 
mainly from US studies. Thus, in order to test their validity in the UK context; in this 
chapter we go over our data collection process and describe our sample firms with the 
view of providing a basis for the empirical tests that will be carried out in the 
following chapters. 
We start with a presentation of our sampling methodology, followed by a general 
description of the sample, where the repurchase behaviour of sample firms is used as 
a differentiating factor. Then we review the characteristics of our sample firms during 
each year of the sample period, in order to determine whether these characteristics are 
consistent across the period. Next, we describe our sample in terms of its industrial 
composition, and we then analyse the group of firms that repurchase their shares in 
more detail. Finally, we go over the motives given by sample firms for repurchasing 
their share, and we summarise the findings of the chapter and offer a few concluding 
remarks. 
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3.2 Data collection and description 
Our sample of firms consists of all publicly traded companies that belonged to the 
FTSE 350, excluding the financial sector (apart from a few real estate firms), in April 
2004 for which we were able to obtain the required accounting and financial 
information used in our analyses. 
The FTSE 350 is simply a market value weighted combination of the FTSE 100 and 
the FTSE 250, thus, our sample contains all of the largest non-financial UK listed 
companies. This means that our results ought to provide a fair reflection of the 
behaviour of the UK's largest and most economically important firms. This is also a 
studied choice in the sense that we would expect the share repurchase activity to be 
higher amongst larger firms that earn more, rather than small firms that do not have 
much cash to spare. In fact, in a recent paper, Oswald and Young (2004b) find that the 
share repurchase activity in the UK clusters in cash generative industries, and that the 
probability and value of a repurchase are highly associated with operating cash flows, 
which supports our choice of concentrafing our study on the largest UK firms .i.e. the 
FTSE 350 firms. 
All data was collected according to each firm's financial year, most sample firms have 
January to December financial years, but many also have different financial years, for 
example beginning in April. Combining data from different financial years into our 
sample was done in the following manner: first we collect the data for each company 
according to its own financial year, and then we place this data into calendar years 
that would correspond most to the firm's own financial year. For instance. British 
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Airways has a financial year ending in the 31^' of March of each year; therefore, the 
majority of the months of the financial year of this firm can fall within the normal 
calendar year. Thus, we collect data for the April 2001 financial year (for example) of 
BA and include it in our sample year of 2001. Similarly, Carnival has a financial year 
ending in the 30'*^  of November of each year, thus, for the year starting December 
2001 we allocate financial year data to our sample year of 2002, since most of 
Carnival's 2001/2002 financial year falls within the calendar year 2002. 
The data collection process was divided into two phases. Firstly, using company 
annual reports, data was hand collected on stock options and share repurchases from 
2004 and going back three years (until 2001). Data from the published financial 
statements was also collected on other variables such as long-term incentive plans, 
director shareholdings, major shareholdings and shares held in trusts (refer to the 
appendix for a full definition of variables). 
After data on these variables had been collected, DataStream was used to collect other 
financial information such as size, EPS, debt, operating income, market capitalisation, 
returns, etc. 
After excluding cases with incomplete information, the resulting dataset consists of an 
unbalanced panel of 267 firms with a total of 1016 observations spanning over a 
period of four years from 2001 to 2004.^ ^ Over the four years, the sample contains 
179 repurchase observations; 176 of which are open market repurchases and the 
All sample firms belonged to the F T S E 350 in 2004, some however, were not part of the index 
during the whole sample period, as some companies were not yet listed on the stock exchange at the 
beginning of the sample period. Mergers and de-mergers were taken into account as far as they were 
known and the cnmnanies cnncemeH listed nn the srnrW pxchanoe 
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remaining three are tender offers. The total number of firms involved in repurchases 
over the 4 year period is 88. The relatively small number of firms involved indicates 
that a high proportion of the repurchase observations consist of firms that routinely 
repurchase their shares. 
It is, however, very common for most firms to ask and obtain authority to purchase 
their ordinary shares up to the maximum allowed by law, i.e., 15% of the total 
outstanding share capital. Even so, though most firms pass a repurchase resolution 
regularly in their yearly (or special) general meetings, this does not necessarily mean 
that an actual repurchase will take place. Our sample shows that of the 1016 firm-year 
observations, some 741 have authorisations to repurchase and only 275 do not". 
Although the maximum allowed by law is 15%, most firms pass resolutions to 
repurchase not more than \0% or sometimes 5% of the total shares outstanding. 
Table 3-1 in the appendix to this chapter presents descriptive stafisfics for the total 
sample, the sub-sample of firms that undertook an open market repurchase at least 
once during the four year sample period, and the sub-sample of firms that never 
repurchased during the sample period. Overall, sample firms have an average 
(median) market value (MV) of £3.7 billion (£856 million) and average (median) total 
assets (TA) of £4 billion (£1 billion). However, firms that repurchased their shares in 
the market at least once during the sample period (re-purchasers) seem to be much 
larger than those that never repurchased (non re-purchasers) both in terms of market 
value and total assets. For instance, re-purchasers have an average (median) MV of 
£7.4 billion (£1.3 billion), compared to £2 billion (median billion £0.7) for non-re-
purchasers. 
" We defined firms that do not have an authority to repurchase as those that do not mention any 
information relating to repurchases or authorisations in any of their annual reports during the sample 
period. 
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The average (median) long-term debt (LTD) of the sample firms is £828 million 
(£230 million), though again we notice large differences between re-purchasers and 
non re-purchasers, as the former have an average (median) LTD of £1.2 billion (£313 
million), while the latter have an average (median) LTD of only £0.6 billion (£210 
million). Earnings are also noticeably higher in the re-purchasers' sample; both the 
mean and the median EPS values of the re-purchasers are double those of the non re-
purchasers, £0.27 and £0.13 respectively. 
Table 3-1 also indicates that the average (median) majority shareholding in our 
sample is about 28% (25%)^ ^*, and out of the 176 open market repurchases undertaken 
in the four year sample period, the average (median) repurchase amounts to 3% (2%) 
of outstanding share capital at the start of the year. Most firms in our sample have 
some stock option programme in place; out of 267 firms, only two do not offer any 
options throughout the four years sample period. On average, sample firms grant 
employee options that represent about 3.5% of their outstanding share capital (median 
3.2%), and executive options that represent 0.6% of their outstanding share capital 
(median 0.35%). Director shareholdings, long-term incentive plans and shares held in 
trusts represent, on average, 3%, 0.13% and 0.7% of shares outstanding respectively. 
Additionally, we can notice that option variables also show some dissimilarity 
between re-purchasers and non re-purchasers. Consistent with previous studies that 
have shown that smaller firms tend to make greater use of share options than larger 
firms. Table 3-1 shows that non re-purchasers tend to offer slightly more options than 
Ma jor holdmgs represent anv interest in the firm exceeding 3% of outstanding share caoital. 
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re-purchasers, both in terms of total and executive options. However, at this stage it is 
not possible to determine whether these and the other differences mentioned above are 
significant. 
Therefore, in order to verify the significance of these differences, a mean comparison 
test is applied to the two sub-samples. An important consideration before applying 
such a test is with regard to data assumptions. The ANOVA test assumes that the 
variances of the groups are equivalent. Although the F test is robust to this 
assumption when the groups are of similar sizes, when the groups are dissimilar in 
size and their variances also differ the standard F statistic can yield incorrect results. 
Indeed, this is the case with our two sub-samples; the re-purchasers group contains a 
total of 330 obsei-vations while the non re-purchasers group contains a total of 686 
observations. A simple test of the homogeneity of variances (whose results are 
presented in Table 3-2 in the appendix) also confirms that the two sub-samples have 
significantly different variances with regard to most variables. 
An alternative to the standard F statistic is the Welch statistic, which is more powerful 
when sample sizes and variances are unequal. The results of this test are presented in 
Table 3-3 together with some descriptive statistics of the variables. They indicate that 
there are significant differences between the two sub-samples. For instance, it 
appears that re-purchasers are, on average, significantly larger and earn significantly 
more than non re-purchasers. Contrary to what we found earlier, when debt is 
normalised by market value it is significantly higher in the non re-purchasers sample 
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than in the re-purchasers sample, which makes more sense as highly leveraged firms 
are less likely to buy back their shares and increase their default risk. 
On average, re-purchasers also seem to pay significantly more dividends per share 
than non re-purchasers, and contrary to the predictions of the stock options 
hypotheses, they grant significantly less options. Possibly due to their larger average 
size, re-purchasers have significantly smaller percentages of their shares owned by 
either their managers or large shareholder blocks^^. This might be interpreted to mean 
that firms that repurchase their shares are likely to be more exposed to agency 
problems than those that do not. 
The finding that firms that buy back their shares pay more dividends than those that 
do not and grant fewer options is quite surprising, since they seem to contradict the 
stock option hypothesis. However, one can easily establish a link between retained 
earnings and the grant of options. Since the stock option argument hypothesises that 
firms repurchase their shares in order to avoid the devaluation of options that would 
result from dividend payments, this devaluation can also be avoided by simply not 
paying dividends at all, which would fit the results of our data perfectly. Smaller firms 
with higher levels of debt, do not repurchase and pay less in dividends, but grant more 
options than larger firms that pay dividends and repurchase their shares. Nonetheless, 
these are just speculations that still need to be verified by more rigorous empirical 
tests. What is important to retain from this is that the stock options argument can be 
used to establish a link between earnings' retention and option grants in the same way 
it has been used to establish a link between repurchases and option grants. 
Large shareholders (or major shareholders) being those that own more than 3% of the share capital of 
the firm. 
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Correlations between the different variables are reported in Table 3-6 in the appendix. 
Again we find that both total options and executive options appear to be significantly 
negatively correlated with size. This means that larger firms grant relafively fewer 
opfions in reladon to their share capital than smaller firms. This does not, however, 
imply that the value of options granted by smaller firms is larger than that of larger 
firms, since options here are measured as a fraction of total shares outstanding and 
information about their value is very difficult to obtain. 
Options are also significantly negatively correlated with earnings and dividends per 
share. This further suggests that firms that grant more options, which tend to be 
smaller firms (possibly high growth firms), are likely to pay less in the form of 
dividends than other firms. This follows the argument in the stock option hypothesis 
which suggests that dividends reduce the value of options and therefore in the 
presence of high levels of options (in particular execufive opfions) managers have an 
incentive to distribute cash in the form of repurchases or retain it rather than distribute 
it in the form of dividends. However, despite this negafive correlation found between 
opfions and dividend payments, it is still too early to suggest that the presence of 
opfions encourages firms to retain their earnings or to pay less in dividends, since one 
can also easily suggest that smaller firms which lack free-cash flow are likely to 
attract employees and to keep them by offering options, which means that the 
relationship between dividends and options is not really one of a cause and effect, as 
would be suggested within the context of the stock opfion hypothesis. 
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Finally, total options are also highly positively correlated with major shareholdings, 
which would suggest that companies with a large institutional shareholding base tend 
to award more options, whether institutional holders encourage firms to implement 
option programs is, however, not clear at this stage. 
Table 3-7 in the appendix reports the correlations of the same variables but within the 
two sub-samples of re-purchasers versus non re-purchasers. Correlations for the group 
of re-purchasers are presented in the bottom left of the matrix, while those for the 
group of non re-purchasers are presented in the top right comer of the matrix. 
It is interesting to note that although options and dividends in both sub-samples are 
significantly negatively correlated, the magnitude of this correlation is larger in the 
case of re-purchasers; -0.307 compared to -0.195 in the case of non re-purchasers. It is 
also interesting to note that the fraction of shares repurchased within the re-
purchasers' sample is not significantly correlated to any of the other variables, while 
the value of shares repurchased (normalised by market value) is only significantly 
correlated with operating income. This might be due to the fact that even within the 
re-purchasers' sample, the repurchase variable contains many zero values for the 
firm/years when a buyback did not take place. 
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3.3 Yearly descriptive statistics 
In order to fUrther investigate the differences that may exist between firms that 
repurchase their shares and those that do not, we now look at the movement of some 
of the variables described above throughout the past four years. Firstly, the median 
market value of firms that repurchase their shares is clearly above that of firms that do 
not, and has been so throughout the sample period. One can notice that in 2003, firms 
in both sub-samples experienced a decline in their market value, although re-
purchasers experienced a relatively sharper decline than non re-purchasers. 
Figure 3-1: Movement of the median market value and median debt over the sample period 
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Again, we can see that long-term debt relative to total assets has been constantly 
higher in the non re-purchasers group, as one would expect, throughout the sample 
period. We can also see that the year 2003 when re-purchasers witnessed the sharpest 
decline in their market value is also the year which saw the sharpest (in relative terms) 
increase in their long-term debt. 
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Figure 3-2, which illustrates the movement of the median retum, shows that, although 
both groups experienced a decline in their median rettim in 2002, this was followed 
by an increase in 2003 in the group of non re-purchasers, while re-purchasers did not 
see their retum increase until 2004. One can argue that re-purchasers were 
undervalued and this is one of the reasons why they undertook to repurchase their 
shares. However, very little supports this suggestion, since we found earlier that re-
purchasers were on average much larger than firms that did not repurchase. It follows 
from this that the market is unlikely to undervalue the largest and most active of its 
firms. 
Figure 3-2: Movement of the median return over the sample period 
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Finally, Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4 confirm that, apart from the year 2003 which saw a 
sharp decline in earnings in the re-purchasers sample, the latter consistently paid 
higher dividends per share than the non re-purchasers throughout the sample period. 
The movement of the median fraction of shares underlying total options issued by 
firms in the two sub-samples also shows that options tend to move in the opposite 
direction to eamings and dividends per share. This is particularly the case in the year 
2003 when both EPS and DPS fell sharply in the re-purchasers group, while at the 
same time the fraction of shares underlying total options increased. This could either 
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be because employees are less likely to exercise their options when share prices 
decline, or because firms grant more options to their employees when prices decline. 
Figure 3-3: Movement of the median earnings and dividends per share over the sample period 
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Figure 3-4: Median Total employee stock options 
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Overall, this historical overview confirms the imivariate statistics reported above, 
since it shows that these statistics are mostly an indication of real differences that 
exist between firms that repurchase their shares in the market and those that do not 
throughout the sample period. We found that re-purchasers tend to be larger with 
smaller long-term debt, and tend to be less controlled by major shareholders, issue 
fewer options relative to their share capital, and pay higher dividends. 
90 
Chapter 3: Data sources, collection and preliminary results 
3.4 Industrial composition of the sample 
The industrial classification of sample firms was undertaken according to the FTSE 
Global Classification System, which comprises ten economic groups, equivalent to 
the DataStream 'level three' industrial classification. As has been said earlier, the 
sample comprises all FTSE 350 firms that were listed in 2004, excluding the financial 
sector. Therefore, although the sample is very representative of the FTSE 350 in 2004, 
there may have been slight differences in the earlier years of the sample period, due 
mainly to some companies not being listed yet. Figure 3-9 and Figure 3-10 in the 
appendix present the industrial composition of the FTSE 350 and our sample 
respectively. We can see that the main difference between the two figures is the large 
percentage of financial firms in the FTSE 350''*^ . 
The industrial composition of re-purchasers and non re-purchasers is presented in 
Table 3-4. The cyclical services sector is by far the dominant sector in all samples 
with about 39% of sample firms, followed by basic industries with 13% of total 
sample firms. In the re-purchasers sample basic industries are preceded by non-
cyclical consumer goods, while the latter is in turn preceded by general industrials in 
the non re-purchasers group. This seems to suggest some slight differences in the 
industrial composition of the two sub-samples. For instance, while general industrials 
represent 12% of the non re-purchasers sample, they represent only 3.6% of firms in 
the re-purchasers sample. Similarly, information technology is twice as present in the 
non-re-purchasers group while cyclical consumer goods are nearly four times as 
present in the re-purchasers group. 
The 'Financials' sector in our sample is constructed only of real estate firms, which the F T S E Global 
classification svstem classifies as financial firms. 
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In order to determine whether these differences in industrial composition between the 
sub-samples are significant, we use a Chi square to test whether each sub-sample is 
significantly different from one another with regard to its industrial composition. The 
results indicate that the group of re-purchasers is, indeed significantly different from 
that of non re-purchasers, with a significance level beyond 0.001. It thus appears that 
firms in the technology, general and basic industries are less likely to repurchase than 
those in other industries such as cyclical and non-cyclical consumer goods and 
utilities (see Table 3-5). This conforms with the predictions of the free-cash flow 
hypothesis for share repurchases, which claims that firms buy back their shares in 
order to distribute excess cash to their shareholders; clearly, technology firms are less 
likely to have excess cash then utility firms for instance. 
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3.5 Analysis of the re-purchasers sample 
The univariate statistics have uncovered a marked difference between the sample of 
re-purchasers and that of non re-purchasers. However, within the re-purchasers group, 
there might also exist some differences between firms that buy back their shares only 
once during the sample period, and those that do it more frequently. There may also 
exist some differences between re-purchasers according to what motivates them to 
buy back their shares. In this section, we attempt to reveal whether indeed, there is 
significant heterogeneity within the sample of re-purchasers, and i f so, what are its 
sources. 
As mentioned earlier, the overall number of repurchases is 179, three of which are 
tender offers and the remainder are open market repurchases. Out of the 176 open 
market repurchases, 36 were undertaken in 2001, 42 in 2002, 43 in 2003 and 55 in 
2004 (as shown in Figure 3-5 below). The average fraction of shares repurchased 
varied between 2.6 and 3.6% of outstanding share capital, while the median ranged 
between 2.3 and 2.7% (see Figure 3-6 below). 
Figure 3-5: Yearly distribution of open market share repurchases 
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Figure 3-6: Movement of the Mean and the Median of the fraction of shares repurchased over the 
sample period 
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Out of the 176 open market repurchases included in our sample, 38 are one-off 
repurchases undertaken by 38 different firms, while the remaining 138 are repeat 
repurchases undertaken by 48 companies. Collecting data for each of these firms 
during the four year sample period yields an unbalanced panel of 330 observations. It 
is possible that some differences exist between firms that bought back their shares 
only once during the sample period, and those that regularly repurchased shares. In 
order to uncover these possible differences, an ANOVA test is applied to the two sub-
samples. Although there is not a great difference in size between the two sub-samples, 
we use the Welch statistic instead of the standard F statistic to control for any 
differences in the variance of the two groups^^. The results are reported in 
Table 3-9, they show that the only notable differences between the two groups relate 
to their size, their dividends, and the fi-action of their shares held by majority 
shareholders. It appears that frequent re-purchasers are slightly larger than one-off re-
purchasers. In fact, i f we look back at the mean difference test applied to the overall 
group of re-purchasers and that of non re-purchasers, we quickly perceive that the size 
See Table 3-8 in the appendix for the results of Levene's test of the homogeneity of variance. 
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of non re-purchasers is nearly the same as that of one-off re-purchasers. Thus, the 
separation of one-off and repeat re-purchasers seems to suggest that the latter are the 
ones likely to repurchase their shares to distribute free cash flow, while one-offs may 
be repurchasing their shares for some other reasons such as signalling or the funding 
of option exercises. 
One-off re-purchasers also seem to pay significantly less dividends than frequent re-
purchasers. However, both groups pay more dividends than non re-purchasers. 
Finally, one-off re-purchasers appear to have significantly more of their shares 
controlled by major shareholders than frequent re-purchasers. As we compare the 
means of both groups to that of non re-purchasers, we find that one-off re-purchasers 
are closer to non re-purchasers in terms of their shareholding base than they are to 
frequent re-purchasers. 
Nonetheless, these are the only variables that show some significant differences 
between the two groups of re-purchasers, none of the option variables seem to be 
different across the two groups. 
Although not reported here, we also carried out a test on the means of the fraction and 
the value of shares repurchased across all the 176 open-market repurchases, to test for 
differences between the group of one-off re-purchasers and the group of frequent re-
purchasers. The results did not show any significant differences between the two 
groups. 
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3.6 Analysis of the reasons to repurchase 
It is interesting to note that even though most repurchasing firms give very precise 
information as to the number of shares they repurchased and the effect of this on their 
EPS, they are very vague when it comes to stating the reasons behind such 
repurchases. In order to obtain the authority to repurchase they mostly use the same 
arguments and in some cases very similar wordings; mostly stressing how such 
authority would be used only i f directors believe that it would result in an increase in 
eamings per share and would be in the best interests of shareholders generally. 
Consequently, it is very difficult to categorise the reasons behind share buybacks from 
information reported in company annual reports. In addition, several companies give 
more than one reason for repurchasing their shares, which makes the task of 
categorising them even harder. 
Nonetheless, in this section we broadly define the following motivations: 
• Free cash flow: included under this motivation are all firms that mention 
repurchasing their shares to retum surplus cash to their shareholders or to 
improve the efficiency of their balance sheet (share capital). 
• Earnings per share: included under this motivation are all firms that mention 
repurchasing their shares to enhance eamings per share. 
• Capital structure: included under this motivation are all finns that mention 
repurchasing their shares for capital maintenance purposes or to minimise the 
cost of capital. 
• Options: included under this motivation are all firms that mention 
repurchasing their shares in order to fund the exercise of employee/executive 
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stock options or to counter the devaluation of EPS resulting from the exercise 
of such options. 
• Other, included in this category are all firms that mention other reasons for 
repurchasing their shares that do not fall into any of the above categories, such 
as buying shares because they are undervalued, or because it is part of the 
distribution policy of the firm. 
• None: included in this category are all firms that fail to give any specific 
reason for repurchasing their shares. 
Although we tried to keep as close to this classification as possible, there were a few 
cases were a personal judgment had to be made. There were also a few other cases 
where a single firm gave more than one reason for repurchasing its shares. For cases 
where one reason was more compelling than the others, we just used it as one 
motivation, however, in other cases where the repurchase had clearly more than one 
motive, we had to classify it imder more than one category. This classification has 
resulted in the figure below. 
Figure 3-7: Motivations of share buybacks (out of 176 repurchases) 
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It appears from this classification that the most popular motive for share buybacks is 
the distribution of free cash flow to shareholders, followed by earnings' enhancement, 
though the latter is a rather vague motive. In only 7% of the repurchase observations 
is the funding of options mentioned as a motive for share buybacks, while a large 
number of firms do not mention specific reasons for repurchasing their shares. When 
the sample is divided into one-off re-purchasers and repeat re-purchasers, we can 
observe that frequent buyers state the distribution of free cash flow as their motive 
much more than do one-off buyers. This may indicate a real difference between the 
nature of repurchases in the two groups, or it could simply be a result of the failure of 
many one-off re-purchasers to mention specific reasons for their motivations, which 
could well be related to the distribution of FCF. Nonetheless, taking into account the 
findings of the mean comparison test between the two groups of re-purchasers, it 
seems more compelling to believe that frequent re-purchasers are in fact more likely 
to buy back their shares because they have excess cash than one-off re-purchasers. 
Figure 3-8: Motivations of share buybacks in the one-off and repeat re-purchasers 
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In order to test i f re-purchasers differ significantly according to their stated motive for 
repurchasing their shares, we carried out another mean comparison test. Although 
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dividing the repurchase observations (176) according to firms' stated motivafions 
results in some very small samples, it is still worth while checking whether any 
substantial differences emerge, especially between the FCF repurchases and the EPS 
enhancement repurchases . 
The results are not reported here, as they do not show many significant differences 
across the motivation-sub-samples, but a few very interesting differences emerge, 
particularly between the FCF repurchases and the EPS repurchases (perhaps because 
these are the largest of the sub-samples). 
Firstly, it appears that firms that repurchase their shares in order to enhance their EPS 
have significantly fewer shares in their employee benefit trusts than firms that 
repurchase to distribute FCF. This appears very logical, since firms that do not have 
many shares already available to be transferred to their employees upon exercise of 
their options are more likely to suffer a devaluation of their EPS upon issuing new 
shares to satisfy those options. This seems to suggest that these firms, at least those in 
our sample, are being tmthful about their reasons for repurchasing their stock. 
Although in our classification we also have a group of firms that mentioned 
repurchasing their shares in order to fiand option exercises, it is highly likely that these 
repurchases occurred after December 2003, when firms in the UK became allowed to 
keep the shares they repurchased in treasury stock. Therefore, it is highly likely that 
many firms that mentioned repurchasing their share in order to enhance their EPS did 
so after their employees had already exercised their options, which were mostly likely 
funded with a new stock issuance. 
The number of observations where the motivation to repurchase was to return F C F is 62. The number 
of observations where the motivation to repurchase was to enhance E P S is 36. The number of 
repurchases related to capital restructuring, or some other motivations is 19 and 18 resoectivelv. 
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Finally, none of the option variables are significant across the sub-samples, while, 
again, debt appears to be significantly lower in the group that repurchases to distribute 
FCF than in the group that repurchases to enhance EPS. 
100 
Chapter 3: Data sources, collection and preliminary results 
3.7 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter, we have presented our sampling methodology and we have analysed, 
in a univariate framework, our sample firms. We found that there are some significant 
differences between firms that repurchase their shares and those do not. It appears that 
those that do are generally significantly larger and earn significantly more than those 
that do not. This seems to give credit to the free-cash flow hypothesis of share 
buybacks. Moreover, we found that re-purchasers are significantly less indebted than 
non re-purchasers, which seems plausible i f these firms repurchase in order to re-
adjust their capital structure. 
We have also found that re-purchasers pay significantly more in dividends than non 
re-purchasers and grant significantly less options, which seems to suggest that the 
hypothesis that firms repurchase their shares instead of paying or increasing dividends 
in order to avoid devaluating executive stock option may not enjoy empirical support 
in the UK. 
An analysis of the characteristics of firms that repurchase and those that do not across 
each year of the sample period reveals that the differences identified above are not the 
result of a particular year driving the results, but rather, these differences are mostly 
consistent throughout the whole sample period. 
We have also found that there are some significant differences between re-purchasers 
and non re-purchasers in terms of their industrial classification. It appears, for 
instance, that firms in the technology or general and basic industries sectors are less 
% 
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likely to repurchase than those in the cyclical and non-cyclical consumer goods and 
utilities sectors. 
Furthermore, we found that some differences also exist within the sample of re-
purchasers, which seem to suggest that firms that routinely repurchase their shares are 
the ones likely to repurchase to distribute free cash flow, while those that make one-
off buybacks are likely to repurchase shares for other reasons such as signalling or the 
funding of option exercises. 
Finally, looking at the motives that sample firms give for repurchasing their shares (in 
their annual reports), we were able to establish that there is an element of truth in 
these reported motives, especially in relation to repurchases related to enhancing EPS. 
These results are, however, preliminary, and are not at all conclusive, since we need 
to examine them in a multivariate context in order to control for any relationships that 
exist between different firm characteristics. This will be the objecfive of the next 
chapter, where we will build on the findings of this chapter and the findings of 
previous studies in order to determine the most likely motivations of firms in the UK 
for repurchasing their shares in the market. 
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3.8 Appendix 
Table 3-1: Descriptive statistics of sample firms 
Total sample (N=1016) Sample of re-purchasers (N=330) Sample of non-re-purchasers (N=686) 
Rrm characteristics Mean Median 90th Perc Std.Dev. Mean Median 90th Perc Std.Dev. Mean Median 90th Perc Std.Dev. 
\^arket value (millions £) 3743 856 6751 11906 7399 1279 12309 19900 1984 747 4840 3213 
-ong-term debt (thousands £) 828587 230100 1919000 1761770 1202610 313100 3036500 2578400 648663 209629 1698000 1142920 
Operating income (thousands £) 265414 79450 554500 914325 466730 100200 1418050 1494580 168571 68450 429700 370068 
Total assets (thousands £) 4121360 1153700 8662500 12636100 7312240 1406740 16132000 21021300 2586390 1072500 6872500 4134050 
•Return 0.0422 0.1152 0.4740 0.4829 0,0717 0.1172 0.4364 0.3337 0.0280 0.1137 0.4951 0.5398 
'Earnings per share 0.1737 0.1535 0.5280 0.4150 0.2693 0.2335 0.5875 0.4506 0.1277 0.1100 0.4875 0.3888 
Dividend per share 0.1243 0.0960 0.2915 0.1187 0.1567 0.1230 0.3510 0,1204 0.1087 0.0820 0.2495 0.1148 
\^ajor holdings % 27.80% 25.36% 54 .51% 18.30% 2 4 . 1 1 % 22.47% 48.59% 16,57% 29.58% 26,99% 54.97% 18.83% 
Repurchase variables (N-176f 
••raction of shares repurchased % 3.008% 2.034% 6.699% 2.864% 
Value of repurchases (thousands £) 208555 30000 609053 547086 
employee compensation 
' otal options % 3.446% 3.157% 6.332% 2.360% 3.037% 2.890% 5.660% 2.067% 3.643% 3,277% 6.610% 2.467% 
l::xecutive options % 0.624% 0.352% 1.490% 0.839% 0.445% 0.271% 1.175% 0.528% 0.710% 0.390% 1.786% 0 .941% 
l-ixercisable executive options % 0.242% 0.100% 0.575% 0.457% 0.162% 0.072% 0.429% 0.230% 0.281% 0.122% 0 .671% 0.529% 
Long-term plans % 0.134% 0.000% 0.392% 0.295% 0.124% 0.001% 0.372% 0.265% 0.138% 0,000% 0 .401% 0.308% 
Director shareholdings % 3.233% 0.152% 9.549% 9,063% 2.473% 0.127% 5.669% 6.563% 3.598% 0.162% 11.261% 10.030% 
Shares in trust % 0.709% 0.248% 1.983% 1.187% 0.805% 0.358% 2.248% 1.138% 0.663% 0.220% 1.787% 1.208% 
All variables reported as percentages are fractions of total shares outstanding at the start of the year. 
These statistics exclude tender offers 
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Definition of variables: 
Firm characteristics: 
AW these variables (apart from nnajor shareholdings) have been collected form DataStream at the start of each financial year. 
Market value (data item MV): the share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue. 
Long-term debt (data item WC03251): all interest bearing financial obligations, excluding amounts due within one year. It is shown net of premium or 
discount. 
Operating income (data item WC01250): represents the difference between sales and total operating expenses, net of income taxes. 
Total assets (data item WC02999): the sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other 
investments, net property plant and equipment and other assets. 
Return: is calculated as the Log (Rl in year1)-log (Rl in year 0), where Rl is the return index. 
Earnings per share (data item WC18193): 
Dividend per share (data item WC05101): total dividends per share declared during the fiscal year. It includes extra dividends declared during the 
year. 
• Major holdings: the aggregation of fractions of shares exceeding 3% of outstanding shares owned by individuals or corporations. This variable is 
collected mainly from annual reports at the start of each financial year. 
Repurchase variables: 
These variables have been collected from annual reports, and represent repurchases made during each financial year. 
• Fraction of shares repurchased %: the number of shares repurchased during the year divided by the number of shares outstanding at start of the 
financial year, all multiplied by a hundred. 
• Value of repurchases (thousands £): the pound value of the shares repurchased as reported in the financial statements. 
Employee compensation: 
These variables have been collected from annual reports, and represent values at the start of each financial year. 
Total options %: (Number of shares underlying total options / number of shares outstanding)*100 
Executive options %: (Number of shares underlying executive options / number of shares outstanding)*100 
Exercisable executive options %: (Number of shares underlying exercisable executive options/ number of shares outstanding)*100 
Long-term plans %: (Number of shares underlying other long-term plans / number of shares outstanding)*100 
Director shareholdings %: (Number of shares held by executive directors / number of shares outstanding)*100 
Shares in trust %: (Number of shares in trust / number of shares outstanding)*100 
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Table 3-2: Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
This table reports the result of the Levene test for homogeneity of variances between the re-purchasers and 
the non re-purchasers groups. 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
SIZE 24.108 1 1014 0 
DEBT 9.639 1 1014 0.002 
OPINCOME 7.687 1 1014 0.006 
RETURN 17.178 1 1014 0 
MB 2.25 1 1014 0.134 
EPS 0.101 1 1014 0.751 
DPS 6.883 1 1014 0.009 
MSH 5.776 1 1014 0.016 
ESO 1.329 1 1014 0.249 
EXSO 30.661 1 1014 0 
EXSOEX 26.793 1 1014 0 
LTIP 0.882 1 1014 0.348 
MO 10.81 1 1014 0.001 
STRUST 2.924 1 1014 0.088 
Table 3-3: Robust test of equality of means between re-purchasers and non re-purchasers 
Means Mean Diff Welcti statistic^ df1 df2 Sig. 
Re-purchasers Non-re-purchasers 
SIZE 21.2124 20.6114 0.6010 38.8450 1 531.41 0.0000 
DEBT 0.3252 0.4848 -0.1596 14.4320 1 983.72 0.0000 
OPINCOME 0.1060 0.0777 0.0283 7.3260 1 865.50 0.0070 
RETURN 0.0717 0.0280 0.0437 2.5000 1 953.19 0.1140 
EPS 0.2693 0.1277 0.1416 23.9960 1 571.74 0.0000 
DPS 0.1567 0.1087 0.0480 36.5090 1 622.66 0.0000 
MSH 0.2411 0.2958 -0.0546 22.1380 1 729.37 0.0000 
ESO 0.0304 0.0364 -0.0061 16.8100 1 762.53 0.0000 
EXSO 0.0045 0.0071 -0.0026 32.7960 1 991.39 0.0000 
EXSOEX 0.0016 0.0028 -0.0012 24.8950 1 1005.89 0.0000 
LTIP 0.0012 0.0014 -0.0001 0.5900 1 745.77 0.4430 
MO 0.0247 0.0360 -0.0112 4.5630 1 923.65 0.0330 
STRUST 0.0081 0.0066 0.0014 3.3460 1 686.00 0.0680 
Asymptotically F distributed. 
Re-purchasers->N=330 obs 
Non re-purchasers->N=686 obs 
Small significance values (<.05) indicate group differences. 
Description of variables: SIZE=Log of market value, DEBT=Long-term debt / market value, 
OPINCOME=Operating income / market value, RETURN= (Log RI y, - Log RI yo), EPS=Eamings per 
share, DPS=Dividend per share, MSH=Number of shares held by major shareholders / number of shares 
outstanding, ESO=Number of shares underlying total options / number of shares outstanding, 
EXSO=Number of shares underlying executive options / number of shares outstanding, EXSOEX=umber 
of shares underlying exercisable executive options/ number of shares outstanding, LTIP=Number of shares 
underlying long-term plans / number of shares outstanding, MO=Number of shares help by executive 
directors / number of shares outstanding, STRUST=Number of shares held in trusts / number of shares 
outstanding. 
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Table 3-4: Industrial composition of samples 
Total sample Re-purchasers Non re-purchasers 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Cyclical services 393 38.7 128 38.8 265 38.6 
Basic industries 130 12.8 39 11.8 91 13.3 
Non-cyclical consumer goods 106 10.4 44 13.3 62 9.0 
General Industrials 95 9.4 12 3.6 83 12.1 
Financials 70 6.9 27 8.2 43 6.3 
Resources 57 5.6 20 6.1 37 5.4 
Infonnation techinology 56 5.5 11 3.3 45 6.6 
Utilities 44 4.3 20 6.1 24 3.5 
Non-cyclical services 43 4.2 15 4.5 28 4.1 
Cyclical consumer Goods 22 2.2 14 4.2 8 1.2 
Total 1016 100 330 100 686 100 
Table 3-5: Differences in industrial composition- comparing the group of re-purchasers to that of non 
re-purchasers 
Industry Re-purc/)asers 
Observed N Expected N Residual 
Cyclical services 128 127.253 0.747 
Non-cyclical consumer goods 44 29.670 14.330 
Basic industries 39 43.846 -4.846 
Financials 27 20.769 6.231 
Resources 20 17.802 2.198 
Utilities 20 11.538 8.462 
Non-cyclical services 15 13.516 1.484 
Cyclical consumer Goods 14 3.956 10.044 
General industrials 12 39.890 -27.890 
Information technology 11 21.758 -10.758 
Total 330 
Chi-Square 
Asymp. Sig. 
df = 9 
66.2891 
0.0000 
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Table 3-6: Correlation matrix for the explanatory variables (total sample, N=1016) 
SIZE DEBT OPINCOME RETURN MB EPS DPS MSH ESO EXSO EXSOEX 
DEBT Pearson Corr 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
-0.145 
0.000 
OPINCOME Pearson Corr 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
0.034 
0.278 
-0.170 
0.000 
RETURN Pearson Corr 
Sig. (2-talled) 
-0.230 
0.000 
0.078 
0.013 
0.127 
0.000 
'^B Pearson Corr 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
0.030 
0.341 
-0.022 
0.491 
-0.008 
0.809 
-0.044 
0.162 
EPS Pearson Corr 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
0.120 
0.000 
-0.173 
0.000 
0.332 
0.000 
0.091 
0.004 
0.043 
0.172 
DPS Pearson Corr 0.285 -0.076 0.148 0.140 0.055 0.553 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.079 0.000 
Pearson Corr -0.333 0.026 -0.006 0.088 0.000 -0.066 -0.167 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.405 0.858 0.005 0.994 0.036 0.000 
;HSO Pearson Corr -0.166 -0.041 -0.163 -0.112 -0.027 -0.223 -0.244 0.115 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.196 0.000 0.000 0.386 0.000 0.000 0,000 
lEXSO Pearson Corr -0.363 0.001 -0.053 -0.019 -0.002 -0.108 -0.247 0.281 0.562 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.985 0.092 0.540 0.954 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
•EXSOEX Pearson Corr -0.253 -0.051 -0.077 -0.042 -0.017 -0.066 -0.177 0.183 0.412 0.675 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.106 0.014 0.182 0.580 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
..TIP Pearson Corr -0.130 -0.049 0.074 0.070 0.004 0.015 -0.115 0.095 -0.034 -0.013 -0.012 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.115 0.018 0.025 0.906 0.642 0.000 0.002 0.283 0.669 0.711 
MO Pearson Corr -0.209 -0.075 -0.082 -0.036 0.051 0.014 -0.102 0.108 -0.039 0,046 -0.016 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.017 0.009 0.246 0.107 0.651 0.001 0.001 0.215 0,140 0.615 
STRUST Pearson Corr 0.015 -0.098 0.017 -0.021 0.006 -0.042 0.035 0.047 0.167 0.007 -0.066 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.632 0.002 0.581 0.509 0.857 0.176 0.271 0.132 0.000 0.818 0.036 
MO 
-0.049 
0,116 
0.177 0.016 
0.000 0.621 
i)escription of variables: SIZE=Log of market value, DEBT=Long-term debt / market value, OPINCOME=Operating income / market value, RETURN= (Log RI y, - Log RI 
:'o), EPS=Eamings per share, DPS=Dividend per share, MSH=Number of shares held by major shareholders / number of shares outstanding, ESO=Number of shares 
underlying total options / number of shares outstanding, EXSO=Number of shares underlying executive options / number of shares outstanding, EXSOEX=umber of shares 
underlying exercisable executive options/ number of shares outstanding, LTIP=Number of shares underlying long-term plans / number of shares outstanding, MO=Number of 
! hares help by executive directors / number of shares outstanding, STRUST=Number of shares held in trusts / number of shares outstanding. 
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Table 3-7: Correlation matrix for the explanatory variables in the re-purchasers and the non re-purchasers samples 
SIZE DEBT OPINCOME RETURN MB EPS DPS MSH ESO EXSO EXSOEX LTIP MO STRUST 
SIZE Pearson Corr -0.154 0.081 -0.265 0.027 0.098 0.288 -0.308 -0.126 -0.358 -0.259 -0.155 -0.177 0.066 
Sig. {2-tailed) 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.482 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.085 
DEBT Pearson Corr -0.103 -0.180 0.068 -0.016 -0.184 -0.070 0.009 -0.035 -0.016 -0.074 -0.056 -0.068 -0.107 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.061 0.000 0.076 0.673 0.000 0.067 0.815 0.365 0.677 0.053 0.145 0.075 0.005 
OPINCOME Pearson Corr -0.313 0.111 0.109 -0.005 0.363 0.144 0.002 -0.177 -0.054 -0.081 0.095 -0.097 0.008 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.045 0.004 0.894 0.000 0.000 0.967 0.000 0.155 0.034 0.012 0.011 0.844 
RETURN Pearson Corr -0.235 0.212 0.364 -0.050 0.114 0.131 0.071 -0.128 -0.033 -0.050 0.089 -0.030 -0.042 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.193 0.003 0.001 0.063 0.001 0.395 0.188 0.020 0.439 0.277 
MB Pearson Corr 0.107 -0.156 -0.068 0.021 0.042 0.046 -0.007 -0.036 -0.001 -0.015 0.002 0.049 0.005 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.051 0.004 0.217 0.704 0.266 0.227 0.852 0.344 0.990 0.697 0.966 0.196 0.905 
SPS Pearson Corr 0.077 -0.139 0.428 0.017 0.111 0.570 -0.040 -0.204 -0.087 -0.045 0.041 0.020 -0.055 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.161 0.011 0.000 0.764 0.044 0.000 0.292 0.000 0.023 0.237 0.282 0.608 0.150 
DPS Pearson Corr 0.207 -0.036 0.220 0.162 0.205 0.488 -0.166 -0.195 -0.240 -0.174 -0.088 -0.109 0.042 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.509 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.004 0.276 
\^SH Pearson Corr -0.337 0.045 0.018 0.190 0.057 -0.054 -0.097 0.093 0.251 0.190 0.070 0.101 0.020 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.414 0.740 0.001 0.304 0.325 0.078 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.066 0.008 0.599 
lESO Pearson Corr -0.191 -0.177 -0.066 -0.032 0.028 -0.225 -0.307 0.117 0.574 0.445 -0.069 -0.044 0.106 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.001 0.232 0.564 0.617 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.248 0.005 
;EXSO Pearson Corr -0.388 0.013 0.082 0.103 -0.040 -0.105 -0.209 0.352 0.502 0.688 -0.006 0.047 -0.008 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.816 0.139 0.061 0.466 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.881 0.221 0.833 
•EXSOEX Pearson Corr -0.253 0.075 0.114 0.064 -0.089 -0.074 -0.137 0.092 0.241 0.535 -0.010 -0.023 -0.064 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.177 0.038 0.243 0.107 0.180 0.013 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.803 0.553 0.095 
. .T IP Pearson Corr -0.084 -0.042 -0.050 0.006 0.024 -0.028 -0.171 0.156 0.055 -0.067 -0.045 -0.077 0.166 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.127 0.452 0.361 0.917 0.658 0.608 0.002 0.005 0.316 0.226 0.412 0.043 0.000 
tAO Pearson Corr -0.295 -0.190 0.115 -0.057 0.081 0.038 -0.051 0.102 -0.056 -0.010 -0.028 0.045 -0.006 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.001 0.037 0.302 0.144 0.488 0.360 0.065 0.313 0.854 0.618 0.410 0.869 
: : ;TRUST Pearson Corr -0.105 -0.050 0.077 0.041 0.025 -0.048 -0.012 0.145 0.358 0.111 -0.054 0.211 0.105 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.057 0.368 0.163 0.459 0.654 0.389 0.830 0.008 0.000 0.043 0.331 0.000 0.057 
R E P U R Pearson Corr -0.016 -0.015 0.071 0.001 -0.015 0.043 -0.013 -0.023 0.017 -0.049 -0.040 -0.013 0.000 -0.025 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.774 0.784 0.198 0.991 0.787 0.432 0.818 0.678 0.756 0.380 0.472 0.810 0.996 0.656 
v.'ALREP Pearson Corr -0.041 0.000 0.114 0.061 -0.011 0.028 0.003 -0.029 0.001 -0.050 -0.039 -0.013 0.008 -0.033 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.460 1.000 0.039 0.272 0.841 0.613 0.952 0.600 0.982 0.365 0.480 0.813 0.884 0.555 
Sample of re-purchasers (bottom half of the matrix, N=330) Sample of non re-purchasers (Top half of the matrix, N=686) 
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Figure 3-9: Industrial composition of the F T S E 350 as at 04/04/05 
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Figure 3-10: Industrial composition of the sample 
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Table 3-8: Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
This table reports the result of the Levene test for homogeneity of variances between the one-off re-
purchasers and the frequent re-purchasers. 
Levene df1 df2 Sig. 
Statistic 
SIZE 21.44 1 328 0 
DEBT 0.793 1 328 0.374 
OPINCOME 2.039 1 328 0.154 
RETURN 6.562 1 328 0.011 
MB 1.346 1 328 0.247 
EPS 0.051 1 328 0.822 
DPS 18.29 1 328 0 
MSH 1.81 1 328 0.179 
ESO 0.161 1 328 0.688 
EXSO 7,238 1 328 0.008 
EXSOEX 0.85 1 328 0.357 
LTIP 0.023 1 328 0.88 
MO 2.689 1 328 0.102 
STRUST 7.376 1 328 0.007 
Table 3-9: Robust Tests of Equality of Means: one-off re-purchasers vs. frequent re-purchasers 
Mean Mean Difference Welcti 
statistic^ 
dfl df2 Sig. 
One-off (N=142) Freq (N=188) 
SIZE 20.6121 21.6658 -1.0537 47.6700 1 323.4470 0.0000 
DEBT 0.3431 0.3116 0.0316 0.5650 1 298.2330 0.4530 
OPINCOME 0.1106 0.1026 0.0080 1.1700 1 325.5420 0.2800 
RETURN 0.0755 0.0688 0.0067 0.0310 1 265.6450 0.8610 
EPS 0.2134 0.3115 -0.0981 3.6930 1 274.4740 0.0560 
DPS 0.1262 0.1797 -0.0535 17.7750 1 326.7570 0.0000 
MSH 0.2815 0.2106 0.0709 14.9660 1 284.0680 0.0000 
ESO 0.0322 0.0290 0.0032 1.9610 1 311.8560 0.1620 
EXSO 0.0049 0.0041 0.0007 1.4020 1 261.3600 0.2370 
EXSOEX 0.0016 0.0017 -0.0001 0.1490 1 271.2740 0.7000 
LTIP 0.0013 0.0012 0.0001 0.0820 1 311.9000 0.7750 
MO 0.0208 0.0277 -0.0069 0.9170 1 319.3720 0.3390 
STRUST 0.0095 0.0070 0.0025 3.6500 1 246.2600 0.0570 
' Asymptotically F distributed. 
Re-purchasers^N=330 observations 
Non re-purchasers->N=686 observations 
Small significance values (<.05) indicate group differences. 
Description of variables: SIZE=Log of market value, DEBT=Long-term debt / market value, 
OPINCOME=Operating income / market value, RETURN= (Log R] y, - Log RI yo), EPS=Eamings 
per share, DPS=Dividend per share, MSH=Number of shares held by major shareholders / number of 
shares outstanding, ESO=Number of shares underlying total options / number of shares outstanding, 
EXSO=Number of shares underlying executive options / number of shares outstandmg, 
EXSOEX=umber of shares underlying exercisable executive options/ number of shares outstanding, 
LTIP=Number of shares underlying long-term plans / number of shares outstanding, MO=Number of 
shares help by executive directors / number of shares outstanding, STRUST=Number of shares held in 
trusts / number of shares outstanding. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In the literature review we examined the main hypotheses put forward and empirically 
tested by finance researchers to explain why firms repurchase their shares. We found 
that although the empirical literature on share buybacks is extensive, virtually all of it 
is restricted to the US and the testing of agency and signalling related hypotheses that 
reflect concerns largely specific to US corporate incentives and governance 
characteristics and practices. As such, neither the results nor the implications of 
these studies can necessarily be generalised to other countries - even, as we shall 
demonstrate, to an institutionally closely related country, such as the UK. 
An additional complication with the existing literature is that several distinct 
motivations for share buybacks appear to enjoy some empirical support. It appears 
that different types of firms may repurchase for different reasons. For example, it has 
been argued that large firms with liquid balance sheets and relatively few investment 
opportunities are most likely to repurchase their shares as a means of returning excess 
cash to their shareholders, while small firms with low financial analysts' coverage 
may wish to repurchase in order to signal their undervaluation to the market. Whilst 
either or both of these hypotheses may be true in relation to some share repurchases, 
as we have seen in the previous chapter, many firms mention repurchasing their 
shares simply in order to enhance their eamings-per-share. As increases in corporate 
leverage and reported earnings per share are a direct and measurable result of any 
share repurchase programme, there is a need to distinguish between this motivation 
and the more complex behavioural hypotheses that suggest that share buybacks have 
additional economic significance, such as reducing agency costs, protecting the value 
of unexercised execufive share options or signalling undervaluation, in relation to 
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firms with particular corporate characteristics and managerial incentives. In terms of 
determining why firms repurchase their shares, this implies that the composition and 
particular characteristics of the research sample are likely to have an influence on 
which hypotheses receive the strongest empirical support. Moreover, as none of these 
individual motivations are actually mutually exclusive, categorising share buyback 
firms on the basis of their characteristics and presumed motivations, is not without 
problems since it is possible for some firms whose characteristics appear to best fit 
one type of motivation to actually repurchase for an entirely different reason. For 
instance, it is possible that a large firm with excess cash (or indeed, any firm with 
unused borrowing capacity) may decide to repurchase its shares to counteract the 
dilution of its EPS resulting from the exercise of employee stock options. 
Despite the above concerns, in this chapter we build on the findings of the exisfing 
published papers that have been summarised in the literature review and, with the aid 
of the univariate analysis of our sample of UK firms presented in the previous chapter, 
empirically evaluate the different motivations that firms in the UK might have to 
repurchase their shares. It is expected that the results of this investigation will 
contribute not only to our general understanding of share buybacks but, due to the 
surprising lack of empirical studies on the UK - which constitutes the largest setting 
for share repurchases in Europe (Lasfer, 2000)- it may also offer a new and more 
complete picture of share repurchase activity in the UK. Apart ft-om Oswald & Young 
(2004a/b), who had first dealt with the topic of share buybacks in response to Rau & 
Vermaelen (2002), the UK has not attracted a great deal of interest fi-om researchers. 
Although Oswald and Young make a very convincing case for the "free cash flow" 
(FCF) hypothesis in their 2004 working paper, they dismiss other motivations. 
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including the stock option hypothesis, without first attempting to investigate their 
possible empirical validity. 
In this chapter we also highlight how differences in corporate governance systems can 
be expected to influence corporate payout strategies. We show that some motivations 
which have received strong support from US studies appear to lack empirical support 
when applied to UK firms and that such differences are due mainly to differences in 
tax and corporate governance across the two countries. 
In addition to enriching the corporate payout policy literature in the UK, this study 
uses a dataset that has been mostly hand collected and thus avoids the biases of 
machine-readable data that many electronic databases are prone to when reporting 
information outside the US (see Oswald & Young, 2004a/b). Moreover, this study, in 
addition to taking into account the major motivations for share repurchases, uses data 
on executive remuneration to control for possible agency effects. To the best of our 
knowledge, no study to date in either the UK or the US, has looked at the motivations 
for share buybacks, and specifically the stock options hypotheses, while controlling 
for the different ownership interests that the decision makers i.e. executives, have in 
their firm. 
The empirical analysis is divided into three main sections. Each of the three sections 
examines a different set of issues that arose out of the empirical findings of the 
univariate analysis concerning the characteristics and distribution of share repurchases 
across our sample of firms presented in the previous chapter. In the first part, the 
focus is on the sub-sample of firms that repurchased their shares at least once during 
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the sample period (re-purchasers). The objective in this section is to identify whether 
any relationships exist within the subset of UK firms that have at any time engaged in 
any share repurchases and the individual variables used to test specific hypotheses or 
control for factors identified in the literature. In the second section, the total UK 
sample of firms is used and divided into the re-purchasers sub-sample used in section 
1, and the remaining firms (non re-purchasers). This secfion uses a binomial Logit 
model to estimate the probability of a firm with particular characteristics being either 
a share repurchaser or a non-share repurchaser. The choice of explanatory variables 
has been based on a combination of the findings of the published literature and the 
findings of the univariate analysis on the characteristics of our sample of UK firms. 
In the last section, the group of non re-purchasers is further divided into firms that 
never repurchased but continuously paid dividends and firms that never repurchased 
and did not continuously pay dividends. Using these two groups together with the 
group of re-purchasers sheds more light on factors that were previously thought to 
encourage firms to repurchase their shares, and which, as we will show, appear to 
equally 'encourage' them not to repurchase. 
The reminder of the chapter is structured as follows. We start with a brief summary of 
the main hypotheses regarding the motivations for share repurchases identified in the 
literature, and then go on to formulate appropriate hypotheses and empirical measures 
that are then used and tested throughout the 3 stage empirical analysis. 
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4.2 Theoretical framework 
In the literature review we found that the main motivations for US share repurchases 
consist of the following: 
• The free cash-flow hypothesis: it is argued that firms repurchase their shares 
when they have excess cash and no profitable investment opportunities; such 
repurchases reduce the agency costs of free cash flow and therefore benefit 
shareholders generally. 
• The signalling hypothesis: this is one of the earliest hypotheses of share 
repurchases; it suggests that repurchases are used by firms to signal their 
undervaluation to the market. Thus managers repurchase the shares of their 
companies when they perceive that these are cheap. 
• The capital structure hypothesis: this hypothesis claims that share repurchases 
are used as a mechanism for adjusting the capital structure of the firm. Of 
course, all share repurchases necessarily change the capital structure (and 
reported earnings per share) of the firm; however, as using excess corporate 
cash to fund share repurchases would also change the asset structure of the 
firm, only repurchases paid for via increasing debt would constitute a pure 
capital structure decision. 
• The employee stock option hypothesis: this is one of the most recent 
hypotheses regarding the motivations for share repurchases. It posits two main 
arguments. The first suggests that firms repurchase their shares in order to 
avoid the dilution of their EPS following the exercise of employee stock 
options; it thus focuses on employee options generally. The second claims that 
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share repurchases are used by managers as a substitute for dividends in order 
to avoid the dilution of their stock options that would result fi-om dividend 
payments. Thus, this second argument focuses on managerial opfions. 
In the literature, we also mentioned several other hypotheses for share buybacks; 
however, none of these alternative ideas have received the same level of support as 
those listed above. 
With several studies already having been published on the motivations for share 
repurchases, our contribution to this literature consists of the following. Firstly, 
although investigations of firms' motivations for repurchasing their shares are 
numerous, many findings come with strong caveats with regard to their methodology 
and/or their data. Secondly, as was mentioned previously, most of these studies 
examine repurchases in the US. While the UK and the US are commonly thought of 
as having similar capital markets, financial institutions and corporate sectors, 
corporate law and governance in the two countries though superficially very similar, 
are in fact very different in ways that render many of the assumptions and findings of 
the US studies inapplicable to the UK. 
I f we take the example of the signalling hypothesis, which claims that firms 
repurchase their shares when these are cheap, we find several inconsistencies in the 
arguments put forward by authors supporting this theory when we try to apply it to the 
UK. For instance, many of these studies, such as Comment & Jarrell (1991) and Li & 
McNally (2000), argue that the most effective type of repurchase that signals to the 
market a firm's undervaluation is a fixed price-tender offer, or a tender-offer in 
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general. While tender-offers do happen in the UK, compared to open market share 
repurchases they are relatively rare. Moreover, Comment and Jarrell (1991) find that 
very large open market repurchases can be just as effective signalling tools as tender-
offers. However, in the UK, the maximum number of shares any firm can repurchase 
with a single authority is 15% of its share capital. As detailed in the univariate 
analysis, many firms typically obtain authority to repurchase less than 10% of their 
share capital, while the actual number of shares repurchased in our sample is on 
average only some 3% of share capital. In addition, as documented by Rau & 
Vermaelen (2002), the regulatory environment in the UK makes it very difficult for 
firms to exploit their share price movements, rendering the signalling argument rather 
weak. 
Moreover, another example of differences in corporate governance between the UK 
and US that can impact on firms' motivafions to repurchase relates to stock options. 
The stock option hypothesis has received a great deal of support from US researchers 
lately, whether in relation to its dividend substitution argument or its EPS dilution 
argument. However, testing this hypothesis in the UK wil l be challenging since the 
value of options granted to UK executives is typically tiny in comparison to that of 
US executives'^. Moreover, until December 2003, any shares bought back by firms in 
the UK had to be cancelled, unlike in the US. Prior to 2004, therefore, share 
repurchases provided UK boards with relatively less flexibility than their US 
counterparts. 
Refer to the paper by Conyon and Murphy (2000) for more information on this. 
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Naturally, firms in the UK must repurchase for a reason, or several reasons. What we 
are suggesting is that these reasons may be different to those driving US share 
repurchases because of differences in the corporate governance systems of the two 
countries. We therefore, analyse firms' motivations to repurchase while controlling 
for the major factors identified in US studies proposed to affect the repurchase 
decision. We focus particularly on the employee/executive stock option hypothesis, 
since the methodology used in several previous papers, such as Weisbenner (1998), 
appears inappropriate and may render their conclusions questionable. Moreover, 
testing the EPS dilution argument in the UK setting offers many advantages. 
According to that argument firms repurchase to counter the dilution of EPS resulting 
from opfion exercises. Theoretically, this can be done either by funding option 
exercises with the shares repurchased, in which case it would not be easy to prove the 
link with EPS. Or it can be done by simply repurchasing shares after the options are 
exercised to enhance the value of EPS. It is not possible, using US data, to distinguish 
between firms that repurchase simply to fund their option exercises and those that do 
so specifically to increase their EPS. In the UK, as firms previous to 2004 were not 
allowed to use the shares they repurchased to fund option exercises, any link between 
options and repurchases would thus more easily be interpreted as an indication that 
firms repurchase to enhance their EPS. As a matter of fact, we found in the univariate 
analysis that some 20% of our sample firms report repurchasing their shares primarily 
to enhance the value of their EPS. Comparable figures for the US are not possible to 
obtain since US firms do not have to publish any reason(s) for repurchasing their 
shares. Therefore, in the UK we have a plausible basis for making the assumption that 
firms (with or without option exercises) repurchase to enhance their EPS. 
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4.2.1 Control Variables 
In order to disentangle the different factors driving the repurchase decision of our 
sample firms, we need to appropriately account for all of these motivations. 
Moreover, given that one of the contributions of this analysis is the fact that it tests the 
stock option hypotheses, we also need to control for other factors related to executive 
remuneration, so that our results are free from any previously identified missing 
variable biases. 
According to the substitution hypothesis, firms have a motive to substitute share 
repurchases for dividends in order to minimise shareholders' tax liability. 
Accordingly, many authors (such as Fenn & Liang 1997, Weisbenner 2000; Grullon 
& Michaely 2000; Aboody & Kasznik 2001; Kahle 2002;) control for investor tax 
implications in their estimation strategies. However, these studies focus on the US, 
where the tax legislation is different from that in the UK. 
As mentioned in the fiscal legislation section in chapter 2, in the UK, it is difficult to 
determine the tax implications of share repurchases to individual shareholders, 
because these very much depend on each individual's capital gains tax liability. It is, 
however, reasonable to assume that, all else being equal, high taxpayers would prefer 
buybacks to dividends because the net present value of the capital gains generated by 
repurchases would tend to be lower than the NPV of the income tax resulting from the 
dividend payments. 
Since the UK tax authorities ehminated all tax credits for dividends, institutional 
shareholders ought to be indifferent between share repurchases and dividends. It is, 
therefore, safe to assume that share repurchases are preferred by investors to dividend 
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payments so long as they do not generate excessively high capital gains tax. Since 
information on the average capital gains to individual investors cannot be obtained, it 
is not possible to determine whether it has an effect on the repurchase activity of our 
sample firms. However, we are able to use a proxy for institutional shareholders tax 
preferences. Although as we have said previously, institutional shareholders should be 
indifferent between share buybacks and dividend payments, in practice it might be a 
different story. Therefore, we hand collected the percentage of shares held in each 
sample firm during every year of the sample period, that were in excess of 3% of the 
total outstanding share capital. This may not be a perfect measure of institutional 
shareholdings, since some institutions may hold less than 3% of the share capital, but 
it is the closest proxy we are able to obtain given the unavailability of this information 
on any financial database. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that institutional shareholders that hold an interest of less than 
3% in sample firms would have a great influence on corporate payout policy. Given 
that we do not know whether UK institutional shareholders have any payout 
preferences, we cannot hypothesise on what the direction of the relationship between 
share repurchases and institutional shareholdings (more appropriately major 
shareholdings) should be, and we use this solely as an empirical control. In addition, 
major shareholdings can also serve as a measure of the extent of agency problems in 
sample firms, or more appropriately, the role of large shareholders in the corporate 
governance of the firms where they hold relatively large ownership stakes. 
We include lagged return as an explanatory variable in order to control for any effects 
arising from the signalling hypothesis. This hypothesis has been extensively tested in 
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the literature and enjoys strong empirical support (Vermaelen, 1981; Comment & 
Jarrell, 1991; Barth & Kasznik, 1999). I f managers repurchase the shares of their 
companies in order to signal to the market their undervaluation, then we should expect 
repurchase announcements to follow poor stock returns. Alternatively, positive stock 
returns followed by share repurchases can be indicative of the increase of the number 
of in-the-money options, which, in turn, increases the probability of option exercises. 
Another factor that may affect managers' payout decision is free cash flow. The FCF 
hypothesis has also received strong backing from researchers in the field and 
managers alike. We have seen in the descriptive statistics section that the most 
commonly cited reason for share repurchases among sample firms is that of 
distributing excess cash to shareholders. The FCF hypothesis predicts a positive 
relationship between share repurchases and free cash flow. There are many ways we 
could measure this relationship. Many like Weisbenner (2000), Quay et al. (2000), 
Jagannathan et al. (2000), Fenn & Liang (1997) and Liljeblom & Pastemack (2002) 
disintegrate cash flow into two components: operating income and non-operating 
income. The hypothesis is that repurchases are preferred to dividends to distribute 
cash flow that is not likely to be sustained in the future. This ties repurchases to 
temporary cash flows, with the latter being identified as non-operating income. In the 
UK, the equivalent of non-operating income would be extraordinary items, yet this 
would be somewhat inappropriate as a measure of temporary income, since the vast 
majority of extraordinary items are negative, i.e., they overwhelmingly represent 
extraordinary losses. As a result, we only use operating income to proxy for cash-
flow. This measure was also found by Oswald and Young (2004b) to be the primary 
driver of share repurchases in the UK. However, in separate estimations, we use 
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estimated values of expected and unexpected earnings. The results of these 
estimations, as will be shown later, do not contradict the findings generated when only 
operating income is used. 
Repurchasing shares out of free cash-flow can also be indicative of managers' 
commitment to reducing the potential agency costs associated with these cash-flows. 
Repurchases associated with high levels of FCF should indicate a lack of good 
investment opportunities. The most frequently used measure for marginal investment 
opportunities is the market to book ratio (Weisbenner, 2000; Kahle, 2001; Ferin & 
Liang, 1997). However, using the market-to-book ratio (MB) as it is reported in most 
databases such as DataStream does not contribute to the explanatory power of our 
models, as will be demonstrated in the results section. 
Other factors suggested in previous work also include firm size and leverage. It is 
argued in the literature that larger firms are more likely to distribute cash in the form 
of dividends because they enjoy more stable earnings, lower levels of information 
asymmetry, and lower financing costs. However, larger firms may also have more 
excess cash, contrary to smaller firms which are more likely to invest in their growth. 
As we have seen in the univariate analysis, the firms that repurchase their shares tend 
to be amongst the largest in our sample, we thus expect a positive relationship 
between share repurchases and firm size, which we measure as the natural logarithm 
of market value. 
Highly leveraged firms are also less likely to make a repurchase since they face a 
higher risk of financial distress. Leverage can also be considered as a substitute to 
cash distributions since it alleviates the agency problems of free cash flow. We expect 
therefore a negative relationship between share repurchases and outstanding debt. 
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The final group of control variables is used to proxy for managerial interests in 
sample firms. Firstly, we use total employee options to test for the EPS dilution 
argument, and we use executive stock options- both the total number and the number 
of options exercisable- to test for the substitution argument. For all the option 
variables we use the actual number of shares underlying the options scaled by total 
shares outstanding at the start of the financial year, since information on the value of 
these options would be problematic to use given that it changes throughout the life of 
the options. 
We control for the number of shares held in trusts designed to fund the exercises of 
options. These trusts were used mainly prior to December 2003"*° to fund different 
employee remuneration schemes. However, their use does not mean that the EPS 
dilution argument does not hold, as was suggested by Oswald and Young (2004b). As 
we have seen in the descriptive statistics section, a large number of firms report 
repurchasing their shares to enhance the value of their EPS. 
Moreover, we control for other interests that executives might have in their firms. 
These are measured with executive directors' beneficial shareholdings in their firms, 
and their interests in long-term incentive plans (LTIPS). These variables are of 
particular importance to the argument presented in this research. According to the 
stock option hypothesis managers have an incentive to repurchase shares instead of 
distributing dividends in order not to dilute their option holdings. However, i f these 
managers also have large stakes in their companies' shares, then their payout decision 
" After this date an amendment to Company Law made it possible for firms to keep the shares they 
repurchase in treasury stock and reissue it at a later date. 
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will certainly be affected by their shareholdings. For instance, Rozeff (1982) finds 
evidence of a negative relationship between dividends and managers' shareholdings. 
Aboody and Kasznik (2001) also use this variable to control for managers' attempt at 
keeping control of their firms when facing takeover threats. At this stage, it is unclear 
what the direction of the relationship between share repurchases and managerial 
shareholdings should be. 
In the robustness checks we also control for dividend changes, which should mostly 
be dividend increases. The purpose of this is to test whether there is a direct 
relationship between share repurchases and dividend increases, which according to the 
substitution hypothesis should be negative. The reason why we do not control for 
dividends in the main estimafions is that we do not expect this relationship, as we will 
show, to be significant, since as we have seen in the descriptive statistics chapter; not 
only do most firms that repurchase also regularly pay dividends, but they are actually 
the largest dividend payers in our sample. 
4.2.2 Methodology 
As was mentioned in the previous section, published studies that have focused on the 
stock option hypothesis have suffered from many inconsistencies, which we try to 
take into consideration in our methodology. Below we briefly review some of these 
problematic issues. 
Firstly, many of these studies, like Weisbenner (1998), Aboody & Kasznik (2001) and 
Bens et al. (2003), use reduced form regressions to study the relationship between 
share repurchases and a set of independent variables, because the dependent variable 
(being some measure of share repurchases) contains many zeros. One has to be very 
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careful when using models such as the Tobit model, since they are specifically 
designed for censored variables and we believe that the definition of a censored 
variable does not apply to share repurchases. We expect that this wil l have introduced 
some degree of bias in the reported results of these studies. 
Secondly, some studies, like Kahle (2002), while they appropriately use logit models 
for decision variables such as repurchasing shares versus increasing dividends, the 
way they measure these decisions is questionable. For instance, Kahle (2002) 
measures the repurchase decision as the announcement of the repurchase rather than 
the actual repurchase. It goes without saying that, as has been documented in the 
literature review, repurchase announcements are not always followed by actual 
repurchases, which also puts into question the validity of any conclusions one can 
draw from these studies. 
Moreover, because of a lack of disclosure requirements, most US based studies only 
use approximate measures of share repurchases that they collect from secondary 
sources. It was found in previous studies (Dittmar, 2000; Stephens & Weisbach, 1998; 
Jagannathan et al., 2000; Oswald & Young, 2004a) that these kinds of measures are 
prone to a great deal of bias. For instance, Jagannathan et al. (2000) find that the 
Compustat measure overstates actual open market repurchases because it is an 
aggregation of several other transactions like conversions of other classes of stock 
into common stock, purchases of Treasury stock (which also include tender offers and 
privately negotiated buybacks), retirements of common or preferred stock, and 
redemptions of redeemable preferred stock. The authors also find several caveats with 
the repurchase data provided by the SDC. Apart from the fact that the SDC reports 
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repurchase announcements and not the actual repurchase transactions, it also 
overstates the value of the announced repurchase programs because it includes 
announcements from a variety of sources which leads to the inclusion of the same 
announcements several times. Finally, the SDC measure also includes privately 
negotiated and withdrawn buybacks, which adds to its biasness. Our analysis is free 
from these problems since we hand collected all the repurchase data from each 
company's annual reports. 
In addition to biases with regard to repurchase data. Many US studies have been over 
reliant upon financial databases to construct their samples, deleting most firms for 
which they do not find observations or patching up data from different sources that 
may not have used the same coding or reporting methods. The result of this is that the 
data collection process defeats the aims of these studies in the sense that they appear 
to generate samples of firms that are unrepresentative of the populations for which 
they want to make statistical inferences. 
In our methodology, we take into account the issues mentioned above. In order to 
examine whether there is a relationship between the number and value of shares 
repurchased and the fraction of shares underlying stock options, we use an OLS for 
panel data rather than a Tobit model, for the reasons mentioned above. The use of 
fixed affects in our models has several advantages. Statistically speaking, fixed effects 
help us deal with firm specific heterogeneity, given that we study the same group of 
firms over the period of fours years, it makes sense to expect firm specific differences 
to drive the results i f these are not controlled for. Several previous studies on share 
repurchases overlook this issue, with the result that they identify several significant 
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relationships, which would not have been significant had firm fixed effects 
differences been properly controlled for (see for example Kahle (2002) and Oswald & 
Young (2004b)). The use of panel data also alleviates the muUicollinearity problem in 
our sample, which ought to allow a more thorough analysis of the dynamics of share 
repurchases" '^. 
Since in the univariate analysis we documented significant differences between the 
sample of re-purchasers and that of non re-purchasers, we empirically invesfigate 
these findings in a multivariate context by using Logit estimations. We start first by 
esfimating the effects of our regressors on the probability of being a re-purchaser vs. 
the probability of being a non re-purchaser. Then we divide the group of non re-
purchasers into those that continuously paid dividends and those that didn't, and we 
then use a multinomial Logit on a three-group decision variable. As our decision 
variables are invariant through time, it is not possible to control for firm specific 
effects in these estimations. Given the complexity of interpreting the log odds 
coefficients of Logit regressions, we only report the marginal effects in our results. 
Throughout the analysis, we only use measures of events when they take place. For 
instance, we do not measure the group of re-purchasers as those that announced a 
repurchase during the sample period, but we only focus on firms that did repurchase 
their shares during the sample period. Thus, we avoid the problem identified in the 
previous chapter whereby many UK firms that announce a repurchase do not actually 
follow through with any share repurchases. 
For a simple overview of panel data estimation refer to Peter Kennedy: A guide to Econometrics, 
fifth edition. 
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All the regression models are estimated three times, first with total options as an 
independent variable (and shares in trusts as a control), then with executive opfions as 
an independent variable (and LTEPs and director shareholdings as controls), and 
finally with executive options exercisable as an independent variable (and LTIPs and 
director shareholdings as controls). We use these option variables in separate 
regressions because they are highly correlated and we are interested to see the 
contribution of each of these variables to our models separately. In the next sections 
we go through the results of all these models, starting with the OLS regression of the 
re-purchasers sample. 
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4.3 Empirical results 
4.3.1 Re-purchasers 
In this section we look exclusively at the sub-sample of firms that repurchased some 
of their shares in the market at least once during the sample period, which extends 
from 2001 to 2004. The reason we focus only on open market repurchases is the rarity 
of tender offers in the UK, combined with the fact that according to US studies, tender 
offers are typically initiated as a takeover defence mechanism, an area beyond the 
scope of this study. 
We measure share repurchases as the value of shares repurchased scaled by the 
market value of the firm at the start of the financial year. However, we also report 
results where we measure share repurchases as the number of shares repurchased 
scaled by total shares outstanding at the start of the financial year. The explanatory 
variables are scaled by market value, except for major shareholdings and variables 
indicating the interests of executives in their firms i.e. options, LTIPS, shares in trusts 
and managerial ownership (MO), which are scaled by lagged total shares outstanding. 
All variables are measured at the start of the financial year except for share 
repurchases. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 330 firm/year 
observations, 176 of which are open market repurchase observations. 
Firstly, we use an OLS with fixed effects to regress the value of shares repurchased on 
a vector of explanatory and control variables, including dummies to control for any 
common time effects. Although using a fixed effects model greatly reduces the 
number of degrees of freedom, our sample is large enough to withstand this 
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drawback^^. Using a fixed effects model also means that we cannot control for 
industry effects, since these are time invariant. However, any industry effects will be 
captured by the firm specific fixed effects. 
We estimate three models, in the first we focus on the EPS dilution hypothesis by 
regressing the value of shares repurchased on total options together with shares held 
in trusts. In the second and third we focus on the substitution argument by regressing 
the value of shares repurchased on executive options and on executive options 
exercisable, while controlling for other managerial interests. 
The results are reported in Table 4-1. They show that, apart fi-om shares held in trusts 
and operating income, none of the independent variables seem to have any 
explanatory power in relation to both the value and fraction of shares repurchased. 
Shares held in trusts seem to be significantly negatively related to the value and the 
fraction of share repurchased. This estimated relationship seems reasonable since 
firms that have a large number of shares held in employee trusts clearly do not need to 
repurchase more shares in order to fund their employee remuneration schemes or in 
order to counter the dilution of earnings resulting from the option exercises arising 
from such schemes. On the other hand, firms that do not operate such trusts or do not 
hold a large number of shares in them appear more likely to repurchase their shares in 
order to counter the devaluation of their EPS resulting from the exercises of different 
employee remuneration schemes. 
Our sample is an unbalanced panel of 330 observations, the number of parameters in our O L S 
estimations is about 96 to 98 parameters, which leaves us with a respectable 234 to 232 degrees of 
freedom. 
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Operating income, which we use as a measure of cash flow, is significantly positively 
related to both the value and fraction of shares repurchased. This confirms the 
findings of previous studies that used US data, and also confirms the findings of 
Oswald & Young (2004b) that firms repurchase their shares to distribute free cash-
flow to shareholders. However, it is still surprising that none of the other variables are 
significant, and their signs in some cases differ from one model to the other. A 
possible explanation for this is that our sample contains many firm/year observations 
where the dependent variable equals zero. A number of repurchase studies, such as 
Weisbenner (2000), Liljeblom & Pastemack (2002) and Aboody & Kasznik (2001), 
chose to use censored model estimations -such as a tobit model- to overcome this 
problem. However, we do not think that using such models is appropriate when the 
share repurchase variable is not a censored variable; for example, it is not possible for 
share repurchases to take negative values. 
Since the only cash measure we include in our models is operating income, we also 
check whether using another measure of cash changes the results. We use an OLS 
regression to estimate an earnings function for our total sample of UK firms. The 
objective of this estimation is to separate earnings into earnings that are expected (the 
predicted values using the parameters of the earnings function) and earnings that are 
unexpected (the unexplained residuals from the earnings fianction estimation). 
We thus use the total sample to regress current net income on lagged net income and 
size, controlling for time and industry effects. The resulting predicted values and 
residuals are saved to be used in the repurchase estimations as expected and 
unexpected earnings respectively. A simple OLS model is used without controlling 
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for fixed effects because we are using a lagged dependent variable as a regressor, in 
which case the use of fixed effects would produce biased estimates. The results of the 
esfimation are reported in the appendix to the chapter. The model seems to explain a 
lot of the variation in the dependent variable, with an adjusted R squared of 0.66, and 
F statistic of 144.31, that is obviously highly significant. Despite the simplicity of this 
model, we believe that the predicted values and residuals obtained are good 
esdmations of expected and unexpected income to be used in our repurchase 
regressions. 
The new results obtained from using these estimations of expected and unexpected 
earnings are reported in Table 4-2. They are almost identical to those reported in 
Table 4-1. Surprisingly, predicted earnings seem to be most significantly posifively 
related to share repurchases, as opposed to unexpected earnings which, although 
positive, are not significant in any of the esfimations. The magnitude of the 
coefficients of expected earnings in the repurchase value estimations is very similar to 
that of the coefficients of operating income shown in Table 4-1. However, in the 
estimations of the fraction of shares repurchased, the coefficients of operating income 
are larger but less significant. 
These results are surprising since the FCF hypothesis predicts that share repurchases 
should be driven by excess cash-flow, while our estimafions seem to suggest that 
share repurchases in our sample are driven by predicted cash flow. An explanation for 
this could be that most of the repurchases in our sample which, as shown in the 
descriptive statistics section, are repeat repurchases, are part of the long-term payout 
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strategies of the sample firms, or that share repurchases are being used primarily as 
substitutes for dividends. 
In order to verify this we re-estimate the same models but using the change in 
dividends (current dividends minus last year's dividends) as an explanatory variable. 
The results are reported in Table 4-15. Although we will come back to them in the 
robustness checks, we can briefly note that the change in dividends is not significant 
in any of the estimations. However, it does have a negative relationship with both the 
value and number of shares repurchased, which may suggest that there is a 
substitution effect that is too small to be of any significance. 
Moreover, our results only seem surprising i f they are compared to the results of 
studies undertaken using US data. They are, however, generally consistent with the 
findings of Oswald and Young (2004b) who also find that share repurchases in the 
UK are more likely to be financed with cash from operating activities, which are 
associated with cash inflows to a greater extent than non-operating activities. 
In order to check the validity of these results further, and to shed more light on why 
none of the option coefficients seem to be significant, we re-estimate all the models 
with new estimated values of options. These are obtained fi-om OLS estimations of the 
total and executive option variables on a vector of control variables; size, debt, return, 
EPS, major shareholdings, and managerial ownership, while controlling for time and 
industry effects. Both estimations of total and executive options result in models that 
explain more than 20% of the variability in the dependent variables, which we believe 
provides strong enough residuals to be used for our repurchase estimations. 
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The reasoning behind the use of estimated residuals of options in the repurchase 
estimations is quite simple. It has become common practice for most firms in the UK, 
whether large or small, to grant stock options to their employees. Given that we 
measure options using the number of shares underlying them rather their value, there 
is a risk that we are losing information on the grounds that a small number of opfions 
in one firm could well be worth much more than a large number of options in another 
firm. Given that we cannot measure the weight of options in each firm, nor their 
importance to each executive, one way to account for these differences is that rather 
than taking the actual number of shares underlying these options, we estimate what 
element of these options is expected, and what element is unexpected. In other words, 
we estimate what constitutes a normal level of option holdings for each firm, and we 
use the residual in our repurchase estimations, to measure the effect of any abnormal 
option holdings on the repurchase activity of the firm. 
The findings, reported in Table 4-3, show similar coefficients to those reported in 
tables I and 2, and again, none of the option variables seem to have any significant 
effect on the value or the fraction of shares repurchased. Even more surprising, is the 
fact that both total and executive options seem to have a negative relationship with 
share repurchases, especially with regard to their value, which was also the case in the 
previous estimations. This suggests that the more options a firm has, especially 
executive options, the smaller the value of shares it tends to repurchase. However, 
given that this relationship is very far from being significant, no inferences can be 
made at this stage of the analysis. 
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What we can retain from this analysis is that the main factor that drives share 
repurchases in our sample is operating income, or expected income. While we found 
that shares held in employee trusts have a negative and significant relationship with 
share repurchases, none of the option variables seem to have a significant effect on 
buybacks. Furthermore, it appears that options generally lead to smaller repurchases, 
even i f this relationship is insignificant. According to the stock option hypothesis, we 
should expect opfions to lead to more repurchases for two reasons; because they 
would counter the dilution of EPS resulting from exercising these opfions, and they 
would avoid the devaluation of executive options that would result from distribufing 
cash in the form of dividends. 
There are two reasons that might explain why this does not seem to be the case for our 
sample. As was mentioned earlier, before December 2003, firms in the UK were not 
allowed to keep the shares they repurchased in treasury stock. Therefore, they did not 
have the option of buying back their shares in order to reissue them at a later date to 
fund the exercises of employee stock options. Moreover, given the fact that many 
firms in our sample had employee trusts whose whole purpose was to fund different 
share-based remuneration schemes, it appears that the EPS dilution argument becomes 
rather weak in these cases. 
However, it is highly likely that after December 2003, as firms start to become aware 
of the new legislafion, they will make use of it and, therefore, the mofivations behind 
share repurchases in the UK may shift more towards the stock option hypotheses. 
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As a quick test of whether we should start to expect more firms to repurchase in order 
to fund their employee stock options, we replicate the previous models but we also 
include two interaction terms between the dummy for the year 2004 and total and 
executive stock options. The results show that, as a matter of fact, both total employee 
and executive options in 2004 are positively related to the value and fraction of shares 
repurchased, while options in the total sample period are still negatively related to the 
value of shares repurchased. Although the differential coefficients of the interaction 
terms are not very significant, their positive sign is a major indication that repurchases 
are starting to be used as a means to fund employee stock options and avoid the 
dilution of EPS. When an interaction term is also used between the dummy for the 
year 2004 and executive options exercisable, we obtain the same result; a positive but 
insignificant relationship. 
It thus appears that, as managers become familiar with the law amendment regarding 
treasury stock, they will be more likely to repurchase to fund their employee stock 
options or to avoid the dilution of their firms' EPS. Such a development, which 
brings the UK rules on repurchases in line with US practices, will tend to align the 
motivations for share repurchases in the two countries and we might therefore 
reasonably expect that future empirical results relating to the UK will become more 
similar to US findings than they have been to date. 
The other facet of the stock option hypothesis that posits that executives have an 
incentive to repurchase shares rather than pay dividends in order to protect the value 
of their options may be quite problematic to prove given the nature of our data. 
Although we specifically use information on the options of executive directors, 
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separating them from other long-term incentive schemes, and though we also use 
information on which of these options are exercisable, this is still not sufficient 
information to reliably indicate whether these options are likely to be exercised in the 
same year as the share repurchase takes place. In other words, options may well be 
exercisable, but they may still not be in the money and therefore not worth exercising. 
It is possible that our models do not adequately capture the relationship between the 
actual decision criteria and the decision variable, i.e., executive options that are in the 
money and share repurchases. 
Finally, another possible explanation for our results is that executives in the UK have 
simply no incentive to repurchase in order to avoid the devaluation of their options. I f 
one compares the value of the options granted to US executives to that of options 
granted to UK executives it becomes very clear that the former have a much stronger 
incentive to find ways to avoid devaluating their options. This is not to say that the 
stock option hypothesis has no explanatory grounds at all in the UK, it simply means 
that its explanatory power is likely to be much more limited than in the US. In 
addition, we have seen from the univariate analysis that share repurchases in our 
sample are concentrated among the largest firms, while smaller firms grant 
significantly more options. This seems to suggest that i f executives in UK have any 
incentive to protect their options from the devaluation caused by dividends, then 
according to our data they are more likely to retain all their earnings rather than to 
simultaneously pay dividends and to repurchase shares. 
Indeed, the mean comparison tests of the group of re-purchasers versus the group of 
non re-purchasers revealed that the former pay significantly more dividends. 
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Therefore, in order to shed more light on this issue, in the next two sections we use 
the total sample of both re-purchasers and non re-purchasers to empirically investigate 
whether options and other selected variables are significantly different among the two 
groups. We thus test whether the payout mode of firms affects or is affected by their 
ownership structure, executive interests, size, profitability etc. 
4.3.2 Re-purchasers vs. Non re-purchasers 
According to the results found using the sample of re-purchasers, options do not seem 
to significantly affect the value or the number of shares repurchased. In fact, the 
results even suggest that i f any relationship exists between the two, it is in the 
opposite direction to our expectations. Therefore, in this section we use the total 
sample to test for any differences in options and other variables among firms that 
repurchase their shares and those that do not. Since the value or the number of shares 
repurchased is no longer the variable of interest, we use a binomial Logit where the 
dependent variable takes the value of one for all firms that repurchased their shares at 
least once during the sample period and zero otherwise. The results are reported in 
Table 4-4. 
For ease of interpretation, we only report the marginal effects on the probability of 
being a re-purchaser (y = 1), which are computed at the means of the explanatory 
variables using all observations. We report results of estimations where we use 
operating income and options as explanatory variables in Table 4-4''^, and results of 
estimafions where we use estimated expected and unexpected earnings in Table 4-5. 
We also report results where we use estimated unexpected options (total and executives) instead of 
the actual observable options (scaled bv shares outstandinsi as exnianatnrv 
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The results of the Logit estimations seem to confirm the findings of the OLS 
regressions. It appears that the probabiHty of being a re-purchaser decreases with the 
increase of the number of shares underlying total options, and the increase in the 
number of shares underlying executive options to a greater extent. Although all option 
variables decrease the probability of being a re-purchaser, the magnitude of their 
marginal effects and their significance levels are quite different. While the marginal 
effect of total employee stock options is of the magnitude of-1.46, significant only at 
the 10% level, executive options have a marginal effect of the magnitude of -6.16 that 
is significant at the 1% level, and executive options exercisable have a marginal effect 
of -12.62, significant at the 5% level. This means that, holding all other variables 
constant at their means, a one unit increase in the number of executive options 
exercisable would result in a decrease equivalent to 12.62 in the likelihood of being a 
re-purchaser. This negative effect that stock options seem to have on the probability 
of being a re-purchaser is also present when we use estimated values of unexpected 
opfions (see models 4 and 5 in Table 4-4). 
Overall, the results confirm the findings of the mean comparison test in the 
descriptive statistics chapter, where we found that the group of re-purchasers and the 
group of non re-purchasers differ significantly in relation to several variables. It 
appears that the probability of being a re-purchaser decreases significantly with the 
increase of majority shareholdings, which we are also using as a proxy for 
institutional shareholdings. This finding can have several interpretations; it is possible 
that institutional shareholders, contrary to our expectations, are not indifferent 
between share repurchases and dividends, and would still rather receive extra cash in 
the form of dividends, or special dividends than in the form of share repurchases. 
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However, we believe that it is much more likely that this negative relationship of 
major shareholdings with the probability of being a re-purchaser is the result of major 
shareholdings capturing differences in size between re-purchasers and non re-
purchasers, despite the fact that we are already directly controlling for size 
differences. In the univariate analysis, we found that re-purchasers are significantly 
larger than non re-purchasers, which is also confirmed in the binomial Logit 
estimations, and we also found that major shareholdings are significantly larger in the 
group of non re-purchasers. Given that larger firms are more likely to have a diverse 
shareholding base, major shareholdings could simply be an indication of the size of 
the firm, hence, their seemingly negative effect on the probability of being a re-
purchaser. 
As mentioned already, it appears that the larger the firm, the more likely it is to be a 
re-purchaser, and the more indebted it is, the less likely it is to be a re-purchaser. This 
latter point is plausible since firms that are already highly leveraged are not likely to 
run the risk of increasing their debt further, thus, increasing their insolvency risk. 
Operating income and return are significantly positively related to the probability of 
being a re-purchaser, at the 1% and 10% levels respectively. When earnings are 
broken up into expected and unexpected, both are found to significantly increase the 
likelihood of being a re-purchaser, although at different significance levels. Holding 
all other variables at their means, a one unit increase in expected income would lead 
to a 1.5 increase in the likelihood of being a re-purchaser, at the 1% level, while a one 
unit increase in unexpected earnings increases the likelihood of being a re-purchaser 
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by about 0.36, significant only at the 10% level. However, when we set all the 
negative values of unexpected income to zero, and re-estimate the same regressions 
we find that the marginal effects of 'posifive' unexpected income on the probability of 
being a re-purchaser is over 0.7, and significant at the 5% (see models 4 to 6 in Table 
4-5). 
To summarise, it appears that the findings of the binomial Logits confirm the previous 
results of the OLS models, indicating that the more options a firm has, the less likely 
it is to repurchase, and the more income it earns, the more likely it is to repurchase. 
We also found that larger firms with smaller debt are significantly more likely to 
repurchase, and that the larger is the share of major shareholders in a company's 
capital, the less likely it is to repurchase. 
Caution has to be exercised when interpreting causality in these results. For instance, 
it would be rather odd for a firm not to repurchase its shares simply because it grants 
many options to its employees. In order to investigate this issue further, in the next 
section we further divide the group of non re-purchasers into those that pay dividends 
regularly, and those that do not. This will allow us to determine whether variables 
such as options really do have an effect on the repurchase activity of sample firms, or 
whether they are simply more associated with earnings' retention. It is possible that 
firms that operate many option schemes, which as we found earlier, tend to be smaller 
firms, are also those that do not pay dividends regularly, so that these firms are 
unlikely to repurchase simply because the value of their executive options will not be 
affected by dividend payments anyway. 
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4.3.3 Re-purchasers vs. Dividend payers vs. Income Retainers 
In this section we divide the total sample into three groups according to whether a 
firm repurchased its shares at all during the sample period (re-purchasers), or whether 
it paid dividends regularly during the sample period (at least three times), or it never 
repurchased and it did not pay dividends regularly (only twice or less). Dividing the 
sub-sample of non re-purchasers according to their dividend policies can allow us to 
see whether options really are negatively related to share buybacks, or whether this 
relationship is simply a residue of an unobserved positive relationship between 
options and earnings retainers. 
We start off with a mean comparison test, the results of which indicate that indeed, all 
selected variables show some significant differences among the three groups (see 
Table 4-6). The most significant and pronounced differences are between the group of 
re-purchasers and the group of retainers. For instance, options are significantly higher 
in the group of retainers than in the other two groups, and so are executive and 
majority shareholdings. The statistics also confirm that retainers are the smallest of 
the three groups, with the largest debt to market value. Interestingly, it appears that 
operating income and return are not only significantly lower for the group of retainers, 
but on average, they are actually negative, suggesting that these firms are not very 
profitable, that they are investing heavily in themselves, or that they are undervalued. 
Next, we conduct a multinomial logit where the dependent variable takes the value of 
'0' for firms that never repurchased and never paid dividends or paid dividends 
irregularly (only twice or less during the sample period), ' 1 ' for firms that never 
repurchased but paid dividends regulariy (at least three times during the sample 
period), and '2' for firms that repurchased their share at least once during the sample 
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period, the vast majority of which also regularly paid dividends"". The results are 
presented in Table 4-7. 
For ease of interpretation, we only report the marginal effects on the probability of the 
dependent variable belonging to one of the three groups while holding the other 
variables at their means. 
The results clearly point to discrepancies between the group of re-purchasers and the 
group of retainers in relation to several variables. Total options have a positive and 
significant effect (at the 1% level) on the probability of not distributing cash to 
shareholders, while it has a negadve and significant effect (at the 5% level) on the 
probability of being a re-purchaser. The effect is also noted with regard to executive 
options, although economically larger. This effect is also much larger in magnitude 
with regard to executive options that are exercisable. Long-term incentive plans do 
not seem to significantly contribute to the probability of occurrence of any of the three 
outcomes, while executives' shareholdings appear to significantly increase the 
likelihood of being a retainer at the 1% level. 
The more shares a firm holds in its employee trusts, the larger its likelihood of being a 
re-purchaser, while the opposite applies to the probability of being a retainer. 
Previously, we found in the OLS estimations that the value of repurchases is 
negatively related to shares in trusts. Thus it would seem that as the number of shares 
in trusts increases, the likelihood of a firm being a re-purchaser increases, but the 
We believe that a multinomial logit is more appropriate for our data than an ordered logit. However, 
we also report summarised results for equivalent ordered logit estimations; we mention their results 
briefly at the end of this section. 
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value of share repurchases decreases the more shares a re-purchaser holds in its 
employee trusts. 
In accordance with the findings of the binomial logits, majority shareholdings appear 
to have a positive and significant marginal effect (at the 1% level) on the likelihood of 
retaining earnings, while they have a negative and significant effect (at the 5% level) 
on the likelihood of repurchasing. In addition, the larger the firm, the more likely it is 
to repurchase, while the smaller it is, the less likely it is to make any cash distribution. 
While it does not appear that an increase in operafing income or return increases the 
probability of being a re-purchaser, it does seem to decrease the probability of 
retaining earnings at the 1% level. For instance, a one unit increase in operating 
income is associated with about 0.45 decrease in the probability of being a retainer. 
When we use estimated values of expected and unexpected earnings instead of 
operating income, we obtain similar relationships and significance levels but with 
slightly different coefficients (see Table 4-8 and Table 4-9). Expected income has a 
positive and significant marginal effect on the probability of being a re-purchaser, 
while it has a negative and significant marginal effect on the probability of being a 
retainer. Although unexpected income was found to significantly increase the 
probability of repurchasing in the binomial logits, this relationship does not appear to 
be significant in the multinomial logits. On the other hand, unexpected income does 
seem significantly negatively related to the probability of retaining earnings. This may 
be due to the fact that unexpected earnings, which are nothing but the residuals 
obtained fi-om the earlier earnings estimations, contain many negative values, which 
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may shadow the positive relationship that this variable is hypothesised to have with 
share repurchases. 
In fact, when we replace unexpected earnings by a variable of positive unexpected 
earnings, the results indicate that, holding all other variables at their means, a one unit 
increase in posidve unexpected earnings leads to an increase of 0.635 in the 
probability of being a re-purchaser, significant at the 10% level. 
Using the estimated unexpected values of options in the multinomial logits results in 
mostly similar results, except for slightly smaller marginal coefficients for the option 
variables (see Table 4-10). Total options also lose their significant effect on the 
probability of repurchasing, although this effect remains negative. On the other hand, 
the marginal effect of executive options on the probability of being a re-purchaser 
increases both in value and in significance. It thus appears that, holding all other 
variables constant at their means, a one unit increase in the fraction of unexpected 
options results in a decrease of 5.5 in the likelihood of being a re-purchaser. 
Some may argue that our dependent variable can be ordered, and that using an ordered 
logit model would produce results that are more efficient than those obtained using a 
multinomial logit. Although it may seem that the decision not to distribute any cash to 
shareholders, to distribute only dividends, or to also repurchase shares, follows an 
ordered pattern, we do not think that this calls for the use of an ordered logit for the 
following reasons. 
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Firstly, it seems rather unlikely that managers i.e. the decision makers think of cash 
distribution in this ordered pattern, it is possible that a firm that has never paid 
dividends decides to repurchase, despite this not being common in our sample, thus 
moving fi-om one end of the spectrum to the other end. Moreover, the assumption of 
proportional odds, or parallel regressions of the ordered logit models seems untenable 
in the case of our data. For instance, the effect that operating income has on the 
cumulative odds of repurchasing vs. paying dividends is unlikely to be the same as 
that of paying dividends vs. not distributing any cash. 
Thus, it seems much more appropriate to use a Multinomial logit at the risk of losing 
some efficiency, rather than to use an ordered logit at the risk of obtaining biased 
results. Nevertheless, we do report summarised results where we use ordered logit 
models, these are reported in Table 4-11, and they are qualitatively the same as those 
obtained using multinomial logits''^ 
•'^  Note that only the loeit coefficients are rennrtp.H here nnt thf marqjnal effect^ 
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4.4 Robustness checks 
Previously, we mentioned that several papers on share repurchases used the market to 
book (MB) rafio to control for investment opportunities. We have not included this 
variable in any of the regressions reported in this paper, because, as we mentioned 
earlier, the values of MB reported in DataStream are very extreme, which made us 
question the comparability of the reporting of US and UK data. However, to make 
sure that we are not missing any information, we transformed the MB ratio into an 
indicator variable that takes the value of one for all observations where MB is greater 
than the total sample median (that is 1.86), and zero otherwise. This transformation 
allows us to capture only the information we need i.e. where each firm stands in terms 
of its MB ratio in relation to the rest of the sample. 
We replicated all the models reported in the analysis with the MB indicator as an extra 
control. The results, which are not reported here to save space, did not show the 
indicator as being of any significance in any of the models. Overall, the MB dummy 
does not contribute to the explanatory power of the models, and its inclusion or 
exclusion does not materially change any of the reported results. 
Although we use market value as the scaling variable throughout the analysis, the 
results are not very different when we scale by total assets instead. These results are 
reported in Table 4-12 and Table 4-13 The logit estimations show mostly similar 
relationships, though the magnitudes of the marginal effects are slightly larger when 
we scale by total assets, especially in the case of operating income. The OLS results 
on the whole do not show significant relationships with the dependent variable apart 
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from shares in trusts and size. Unlike when we scale by market value, operating 
income is not significantly positively related with the value or the fraction of shares 
repurchased. Although our reason for scaling the variables is purely statisfical, using 
market value for that matter is much more in line with the matter we are analysing 
here, since the value of shares repurchased ultimately depends on the value of these 
shares before the repurchase takes place, hence the use of market value as a scaling 
variable makes more sense than using total assets. 
It could be argued that the manner in which we constructed our dependent variable in 
the multinomial logits is inappropriate. We divide observations according to firm 
payout behaviour throughout the sample period. Therefore, i f a firm has made a 
repurchase any time during the sample period, then it would automatically belong to 
the group of re-purchasers during all sample years, and the same goes for the other 
two groups. Constructing the dependent variable in this way enables us to avoid 
losing information about individual firms by letting them shift from one group to the 
other. Nonetheless, we also conduct multinomial logits where we specifically look at 
the payout mode of sample firms in any one year, rather than throughout the whole 
sample period. The results are reported in Table 4-14, and as is immediately apparent, 
they are generally the same as what we found previously. 
Finally, we have menfioned in the methodology section that we do not include 
dividends as a regressor in our estimations because we do not expect it to have a 
significant impact on the decision to repurchase, not because we believe that firms are 
unlikely to use repurchases as subsfitutes for dividends, but rather because i f this 
substitution effect exists than it might be quite difficult to disentangle using our 
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current sample. Firstly, because most firms that repurchase their shares in our sample 
are also amongst the largest dividend payers. Secondly, because the length of our 
sample period (being four years) does not allow for an extensive time series study of 
the relationship between dividend payments and share repurchases. 
Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, we do report results of the main models 
estimated throughout the analysis but using the change in dividends as an extra 
explanatory variable. 
The results, reported in Table 4-15 through to Table 4-17, indicate that dividend 
changes are negatively, though insignificantly, related to the value/fraction of shares 
repurchased, and they are also negatively but insignificantly related to the probability 
of repurchasing. This result is consistent throughout all the estimations, and had this 
relationship been significant, it would have been a clear indication that firms that 
repurchase their shares do so at the expense of dividend increases. 
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4.5 Summary and conclusions 
Although several papers have been written on share repurchases, they mostly focus on 
the US. Given that several regulatory tax and corporate governance aspects of 
buybacks are different across the two countries, and given that the UK is the second 
largest market for share buybacks, it is indispensable for our understanding of 
corporate payout policy and corporate governance to determine what motivates 
managers in the UK to repurchase, rather than pay dividends. 
In this chapter, we explored the different motivations for share repurchases in the UK. 
We used a dataset drawn from the FTSE 350 excluding the financial sector spanning 
over four years (from 2001 to 2004). While controlling for the major motivations that 
have been found to affect the repurchase decision in previous studies, we explored 
which - i f any - of these motivations had any significant explanatory power in respect 
of UK corporate repurchase behaviour. 
Given the growing support that the stock option hypothesis has been enjoying lately, 
we collected several variables from company annual reports in order to empirically 
evaluate its relevance in relation to UK share repurchase activities. Our empirical 
analysis of this issue goes farther than most other studies as we not only control for 
the number of total opfions, but we also specifically use information about executive 
opfions and exercisable executive options. We also control for other executive 
shareholdings that most other studies overlook. 
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We first examined the sub-sample of firms that repurchased at least once during the 
sample period. While most other studies ignore firm-specific fixed effects, we 
specifically control for them. Our results indicate that share repurchases in the UK are 
mainly driven by operating income, which lends support to the free cash-fiow 
hypothesis. Although we do not find support for the stock option hypothesis, our 
results show a clear change in the direction of the relationship between the value of 
shares repurchased and stock options after December 2003. This means that firms in 
the UK may begin repurchasing their shares to fund employee stock options now that 
UK company law has been amended to allow shares repurchased to be kept in 
treasury stock. 
Then, we used binomial and multinomial logits to measure the relationship between 
our explanatory variables and the probability of repurchasing versus just paying 
dividends versus retaining earnings. We found that the probability of retaining 
earnings increases with options, director, and majority holdings and debt, while it 
decreases with size, operating income and return. 
Although it might be reasonable to suppose that firms will tend to retain their earnings 
in order not to devaluate their executive options, in practice this is not very likely. It 
seems more reasonable that these firms, which also happen to be relatively small and 
lacking cash, are in fact growth firms that need to retain talented employees by 
granfing them stock options. Thus the reason why they do not pay dividends is 
because they do not have sustainable cash resources rather than because they are 
avoiding the devaluafion of their executive options. 
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We have made a case in the Hterature review of the differences in corporate 
governance between the U K and the US. It is highly Hkely that the results obtained 
from our analysis are simply a reflection of these differences. We hypothesised that 
given the shareholder led corporate governance system in the U K we should expect 
the repurchase behaviour of U K corporations to be less driven by agency problems, 
and our results seem to confirm this. 
Thus, we have found that share repurchases in the U K appear not to be motivated by 
any need to protect executive options from being devaluated following dividend 
payments. It is possible that in future, firms will repurchase to fund their employee 
stock options, but we have no reason to believe that they will repurchase to avoid the 
devaluation of their stock options. 
Moreover, according to our results, the most likely motivation for share repurchases 
in the U K is to distribute excess cash, which is more in line with shareholders' 
interests. However, this finding is rather intriguing when we consider that these re-
purchasers seem to be distributing 'excess' cash mainly from expected income. In 
other words, it does seem rather odd that most firms in our sample are using their 
expected income to repurchase their shares, while the theory suggests that share 
repurchases ought to be more closely related to unexpected income. 
This, combined with the finding that re-purchasers are large firms that also pay 
dividends, suggests that there may be a substitution effect taking place. In other 
words, it is very likely that these firms are distributing cash in the form of share 
repurchases that, traditionally, they would have distributed as dividends. The reasons 
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for this substitution would be very obvious, given the flexibihty and 'no string 
attached' nature of repurchases. 
In order to verify whether this is the case, in the next chapter we investigate the 
impact of share repurchases on U K corporate total (i.e., dividends and share 
repurchases) payout policies. We apply traditional dividend behavioural models to 
explain total payouts in order to determine whether the determinants of dividend 
payments and share repurchases differ substantially. In the case where these models 
are still able to predict corporate payouts, then this would be a clear indication that 
share repurchases are more than a tool to distribute temporary cash flow, since they 
also contain an element of predictability that, until recently, was exclusive to 
dividends. 
154 
Chapter 4: Investigation of the motivations of share repurchases in the U K 
4.6 Appendix 
Deflnition of variables 
Firm characteristics: 
All these var iables (apart f rom major shareho ld ings) have been col lected fo rm DataSt ream at 
the start of each f inancial year. 
Market value (data i tem MV) : the share pr ice mul t ip l ied by the number of ordinary 
shares in issue. 
Long- term debt (data i tem W C 0 3 2 5 1 ) : all interest bear ing f inancial obl igat ions, 
exc lud ing amoun ts due within one year. It is shown net of p remium or discount. 
Operat ing income (data i tem W C 0 1 2 5 0 ) : represents the d i f ference be tween sa les and 
total operat ing expenses , net of income taxes. 
Total assets (data i tem W C 0 2 9 9 9 ) : the s u m of total current assets , long term 
rece ivables, investment in unconso l ida ted subsid iar ies, other inves tments , net 
proper ty plant and equ ipment and other assets . 
Return: is ca lcu la ted as the Log (Rl in year1)- log (Rl in year 0) , where Rl is the return 
index. 
Earn ings per share (data i tem W C 1 8 1 9 3 ) 
Div idend per share (data i tem W C 0 5 1 0 1 ) : total d iv idends per share dec lared dur ing 
the f iscal year. It includes extra d iv idends dec lared dur ing the year. 
Major shareho ld ings %: the aggregat ion e f f r ac t i ons of shares exceed ing 3 % of 
outs tand ing shares owned by individuals or corporat ions. Th is var iable is co l lected 
main ly f rom annual reports at the start of each f inancial year. 
Net income: 
Repurcliase variables: 
T h e s e var iables have been col lected f rom annual reports, and represent repurchases m a d e 
dur ing each f inancial year. 
• Fract ion of shares repurchased %: the number of shares repurchased dur ing the year 
d iv ided by the number of shares outs tand ing at start of the f inancial year, all 
mult ipl ied by a hundred . 
• Va lue of repurchases ( thousands £) : the pound va lue of the shares repurchased as 
reported in the f inancial s ta tements . 
Employee compensation: 
These variables have been collected from annual reports, and represent values at the start of 
each financial year 
Tota l opt ions %: (Number of shares under ly ing total opt ions / number of shares 
ou ts tand ing ) * ! 00 
Execut ive opt ions %: (Number of shares under ly ing execut ive opt ions / number of 
shares outs tand ing)*100 
Exerc isable execut ive opt ions %: (Number of shares under ly ing exerc isable execut ive 
opt ions/ number of shares ou ts tand ing) * ! 00 
Long- term incent ive p lans %: (Number of shares under ly ing other long- term plans / 
number of shares ou ts tand ing) * ! 00 
Manager ia l ownersh ip %: (Number of shares held by execut ive di rectors / number of 
shares ou t s tand ing ) * ! 00 
Shares in trust %: (Number of shares in trust / number of shares ou ts tand ing) * ! 00 
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Codification of variables 
E S O = Total options % , E X S O = Executive options %, E X S O E X = Executive 
options exercisable %, L T I P = Long-term incentive plans %, MO = Managerial 
ownership %, S T R U S T = Number Shares in trust %, MSH = Major shareholdings % 
S I Z E = Log of market value, D E B T = Long-term debt / market value, 
OPINCOME = Operating income / market value, R E T U R N = (Log RI y, - Log RI yo) 
OLS Earnings estimation: 
Income i = 0.1437 + 0.4110 Income i-i - 0.0066 Size - 0.2261 Positive Income ,-1 
Std.Err. 0.0818 0.2469 0.0037 0.2474 
t-ratio 1.7561 1.6647 -1.7822 -0.9140 
Adj R squared 0.66 
F statistic 144.31 
N 1016 
Including year and industry controls 
Income ,.i = lagged net income scaled by lagged market value 
Income , = current income (at the start o f the financial year) scaled by lagged market value 
Positive Income,.; = is a variable that equals Income when the latter is greater than zero and equals 
zero otherwise. 
OLS Options estimations 
T Options = 0.1197 - 0.0023 Size - 0.0001 Debt - 0.0038 Return - 0.0066 EPS + 0.0126 MSH - 0.0254 MO 
Std.Err. 0.0152 0.0007 0.0008 0.0031 0.0018 0.0045 0.0081 
t-ratio 7.8531 -3.3927 -0.1719 -1.2343 -3.5910 2.8066 -3.1420 
Year and industry controls 
Adj R squared 0.27 
F statistic 21.97 
N 1016 
Exec Options = 0.0559 - 0.0021 Size - 0.0007 Debt - 0.0019 Return - 0.0004 EPS + 0.0073 MSH - 0.0058 MO 
Std.Err. 0.0064 0.0002 0.0004 0.0014 0.0005 0.0014 0.0029 
t-ratio 8.7431 -8.6591 -1.7973 -1.4331 -0.7771 5.2335 -1.9888 
Adj R squared 0.22 
F statistic 16.48 
N 1016 
Including year and industry controls 
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Table 4 - 1 : Est imat ions of the value and f rac t ion of shares repurchased using the re-purchasers 
sample 
This table reports the results o f OLS regressions with f ixed effects on the value and fraction o f shares 
repurchased using different combinations o f the fo l lowing variables: 
ESO = Total options % , EXSO = Executive options %, EXSOEX = Executive options exercisable %, 
LTIP = Long-term incentive plans %, M O = Managerial ownership %, STRUST = Number Shares in 
trust %, M S H = Major shareholdings %, SIZE = Log o f market value, DEBT = Long-term debt / 
market value, OPINCOME = Operating income / market value, RETURN = (Log RI y, - Log RJ yo). 
This definit ion o f variables applies throughout the rest o f the tables, except where indicated otherwise 
( in the robustness checks). Time effects are controlled for throughout all the tests without exception. 
Included in the sample are all f irms that repurchased their shares at least once during the period 2001 to 
2004, which make up a total o f 330 observations. The constant in the case o f the fixed effects models 
refers to the intercept resulting f rom the equivalent model without the use o f f ixed effects. 
* * indicates a significance level o f 1 % or below, * indicates a significance level between 1 and 5%. 
Sample of re-purchasers N = 330 
Y = Value of repurchases Y = Fraction of repurchases 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Constant Coeff. 0.0280 0.0308 0.0269 0.0165 0.0232 0.0201 
Std.Err. 0.0261 0.0277 0.0268 0.0255 0.0272 0.0263 
t-ratio 1.0736 1.1108 1.0048 0.6481 0.8537 0.7654 
ESO Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-0.0251 
0.1283 
-0,1954 
-0.0087 
0.1453 
-0.0596 
EXSO Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-0.2992 
0.3258 
-0.9185 
-0.0773 
0.2942 
-0.2628 
EXSOEX Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-1.1488 
0.6903 
-1.6642 
-0.9440 
0.6408 
-1.4732 
LTIP Coeff. -0.0131 -0.0079 0.0009 0.0108 
Std.Err. 0.6254 0.6277 0.6149 0.6166 
t-ratio -0.0209 -0.0125 0.0015 0.0175 
MO Coeff. -0.0354 -0.0259 -0.0083 0.0014 
Std.Err. 0.0455 0.0483 0.0468 0.0486 
t-ratio -0.7790 -0.5368 -0.1780 0.0279 
STRUST Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-0.9171" 
0.2825 
-3.2460 
-0.8782** 
0.3360 
-2.6137 
MSH Coeff. 0.0216 0.0149 0.0131 0.0180 0.0122 0.0100 
Std.Err. 0.0175 0.0172 0.0168 0.0156 0.0156 0.0153 
t-ratio 1.2346 0.8630 0.7773 1.1547 0.7831 0.6536 
SIZE Coeff. -0.0081 -0.0064 -0.0073 -0.0003 0.0016 0.0006 
Std.Err. 0.0081 0.0086 0.0086 0.0078 0.0092 0.0093 
t-ratio -1.0086 -0.7463 -0.8410 -0.0443 0.1768 0.0609 
DEBT Coeff. -0.0033 -0.0030 -0.0055 -0.0029 -0.0028 -0.0048 
Std.Err. 0.0076 0.0075 0.0081 0.0075 0.0075 0.0080 
t-ratio -0.4400 -0.3945 -0.6826 -0.3817 -0.3777 -0.5977 
OPINCOME Coeff. 0.0887* 0.0933* 0.1000* 0.0861* 0.0917* 0.0968* 
Std.Err. 0.0428 0.0448 0.0464 0.0433 0.0475 0.0483 
t-ratio 2.0709 2.0832 2.1540 1.9874 1.9319 2.0059 
RETURN Coeff. -0.0029 -0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0061 -0.0058 -0.0057 
Std.Err. 0.0060 0.0061 0.0059 0.0064 0.0064 0.0063 
f-ratio -0.4846 -0.4637 -0.4322 -0.9587 -0.8972 -0.8921 
Adj R squared 0.164 0.137 0.141 0.178 0.150 0.154 
F statistic 1.680 1.550 1.560 1.750 1.610 1.620 
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Table 4-2: Est imat ions of the value and f rac t ion of shares repurchased using the re-purchasers 
sample (using estimated values of earnings) 
This table reports the results o f OLS regressioiis w i th f ixed effects on the value and fraction o f shares 
repurchased using different combinations o f the variables already defined in table 1, wi th the only 
difference that instead o f using actual values o f operating income we use estimated values o f income: 
Expec income = the predicted values obtained from the earnings estimation, Unexp income = the 
residuals obtained f rom the eamings estimations. Time effects are controlled for throughout all the tests 
without exception. The constant in the case o f the fixed effects models refers to the intercept resulting 
from the equivalent model without the use o f f ixed effects. 
* * indicates a significance level o f 1 % or below, * indicates a significance level between 1 and 5%. 
Sample of re-purchasers N = 330 
Y = Value of repurchases Y = Fraction of repurchases 
11] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Constant Coeff. 0.0329 0,0346 0.0307 0.0170 0.0231 0.0202 
Std.Err. 0,0258 0.0274 0,0267 0.0251 0,0268 0.0260 
t-ratio 1.2755 1.2625 1,1523 0.6743 0.8639 0.7762 
ESQ Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-0.0007 
0,1194 
-0,0059 
0.0214 
0,1289 
0,1662 
EXSO Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-0,3477 
0.3362 
-1.0341 
-0.1290 
0.2943 
-0,4384 
EXSOEX Coeff. 
Std.Err, 
t-ratio 
-0,9598 
0,6870 
-1,3972 
-0.7476 
0,6379 
-1.1720 
LTIP Coeff. 0,1668 0,1803 0.1755 0.1901 
Std.Err. 0,6162 0.6183 0,5861 0,5878 
t-ratio 0,2706 0.2916 0.2994 0,3234 
MO Coeff. -0.0392 -0,0331 -0,0103 -0,0038 
Std.Err. 0.0469 0,0489 0,0491 0.0506 
t-ratio -0.8376 -0,6769 -0,2091 -0.0757 
STRUST Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-0.8787" 
0.2688 
-3,2691 
-0.8162** 
0.3109 
-2.6250 
MSH Coeff. 0,0210 0,0147 0,0131 0,0197 0,0144 0,0126 
Std.Err. 0.0168 0,0166 0,0163 0,0152 0,0151 0.0148 
t-ratio 1.2500 0.8842 0,8069 1.2994 0.9519 0.8488 
SIZE Coeff. -0.0100 -0.0091 -0,0097 -0.0026 -0,0015 -0.0023 
Std.Err. 0,0082 0.0085 0.0084 0.0071 0.0078 0,0079 
t-ratio -1,2244 -1.0811 -1.1475 -0.3622 -0,1965 -0,2887 
DEBT Coeff, -0,0017 -0,0012 -0.0032 -0.0018 -0,0015 -0.0030 
Std.Err. 0,0079 0,0078 0,0082 0,0076 0,0076 0.0080 
t-ratio -0,2206 -0.1516 -0,3870 -0.2377 -0,2002 -0.3718 
Expec income Coeff. 0.1058** 0.1155** 0.1148** 0.1399* 0.1489* 0.1485* 
Std.Err, 0,0386 0.0455 0.0461 0.0651 0,0722 0.0727 
t-ratio 2.7372 2.5397 2.4892 2.1493 2.0627 2.0426 
Unexp income Coeff, 0.0101 0.0111 0.0089 0.0209 0.0220 0,0204 
Std,Err, 0.0212 0,0231 0.0237 0.0321 0.0339 0,0343 
t-ratio 0,4752 0,4819 0.3764 0.6522 0,6505 0.5949 
RETURN Coeff. 0,0001 0,0001 0,0007 -0.0039 -0,0036 -0.0032 
Std.Err. 0,0055 0,0055 0,0055 0.0061 0,0062 0.0061 
t-ratio 0,0153 0.0109 0,1247 -0,6356 -0,5889 -0.5312 
Adj R squared 0.17 0.15 0.15 0,20 0.18 0.18 
F statistic 1,70 1,58 1,59 1,86 1.73 1.74 
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Table 4-3: Est imat ions of the value of shares repurchased using the re-purchasers sample (using 
estimated number o f opt ions) 
This table reports the results o f OLS regressions wi th fixed effects on the value and fraction o f shares 
repurchased using different combinations o f the variables already defined in table 1, with the only 
difference that instead o f using actual values of options we use estimated values o f unexpected options: 
TOPTIONS = the residuals obtained f rom the employee stock option (ESO) estimation, EXOPTIONS 
= the residuals obtained from the executive stock option (ESXO) estimation. T ime effects are 
controlled for throughout all the tests without exception. The constant in the case o f the fixed effects 
models refers to the intercept resulting f rom the equivalent model without the use o f f ixed effects. 
* * indicates a significance level o f 1 % or below, * indicates a significance level between 1 and 5%. 
Sample of re-purchasers N = 330 
Y = Value of repurchases Y = Fraction of repurchases 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
Constant Coeff. 0.0235 0.0115 0.0158 0.0079 
Std.Err. 0.0250 0.0266 0.0244 0.0260 
t-ratio 0.9399 0.4339 0.6456 0,3019 
TOPTIONS Coeff. -0.0220 0.0318 
Std.Err. 0.1340 0.1374 
t-ratio -0.1645 0.2316 
EXOPTION Coeff. -0.3001 -0.0634 
Std.Err. 0.3316 0.2996 
t-ratio -0.9048 -0.2116 
LTIP Coeff. -0.0138 0.0003 
Std.Err. 0.6256 0.6153 
t-ratio -0.0221 0.0004 
MO Coeff. -0.0336 -0.0081 
Std.Err. 0.0454 0.0468 
t-ratio -0.7401 -0.1732 
STRUST Coeff. -0.9177" -0.8986** 
Std.Err. 0.2841 0.3377 
t-ratio -3.2306 -2.6606 
MSH Coeff. 0.0213 0.0126 0.0184 0.0118 
Std.Err. 0.0173 0.0167 0.0156 0.0153 
t-ratio 1.2307 0.7564 1.1773 0.7712 
SIZE Coeff. -0.0080 -0.0057 -0.0002 0.0018 
Std.Err. 0.0079 0.0082 0.0080 0.0090 
t-ratio -1.0031 -0.6943 -0.0205 0.2012 
DEBT Coeff. -0.0034 -0.0028 -0.0031 -0.0028 
Std.Err. 0.0075 0.0076 0.0074 0,0075 
t-ratio -0.4482 -0.3692 -0.4095 -0.3732 
OPINCOME Coeff. 0.0896* 0.0940* 0.0852 0.0919* 
Std.Err. 0.0452 0.0450 0.0455 0.0476 
t-ratio 1.9831 2.0862 1.8737 1.9327 
RETURN Coeff. -0.0028 -0.0022 -0.0062 -0,0056 
Std.Err. 0.0059 0.0059 0.0064 0,0063 
t-ratio -0.4797 -0.3828 -0.9747 -0.8972 
Adj R squared 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.15 
F statistic 1.68 1.55 1.75 1.61 
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Table 4-4: B inomia l logit estimations of the p robab i l i t y of repurchasing 
This table reports the results o f binomial logit regressions on the probabil ity that a firm repurchases its 
shares at least once during the sample period (Y = 1) versus the probabil i ty that it does not repurchase 
its shares at all during the whole sample period (Y = 0). The coefficients reported are the marginal 
effects o f each variable on the probabil i ty o f being a re-purchaser while holding the other variables 
constant at their means. The definit ion o f variables used can be found in tables 1 and 3. 
* * indicates a significance level o f 1 % or below, * indicates a significance level between 5 and 1%. We 
control for time and industry effects throughout all the binomial regressions. 
Marginal effects on Prob [Y = 1] N = 1016 
[1] 12] [3] [4] [5] 
Constant Coeff. -1.4171" 1.1367" 1.2048" -1.5830" -1.4813** 
Std.Err. 0.2936 0.3151 0.3053 0.2854 0.2962 
t-ratio -4.8270 -3.6070 -3.9470 -5,5470 -5.0000 
ESO Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-1.4601 
0.7994 
-1.8260 
EXSO Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-6.1608" 
2.5187 
-2.4460 
TOPTIONS Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-1.3886 
0.8070 
-1,7210 
EXOPTION Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-6.0492* 
2.5117 
-2,4080 
EXSOEX Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-12.6189* 
5.2893 
-2.3860 
LTIP Coeff. -2.5374 -2.2960 -2.5419 
Std.Err. 5.1200 5.1036 5.1198 
t-ratio -0.4960 -0.4500 -0.4960 
MO Coeff. -0.2671 -0.2617 -0.2309 
Std.Err. 0.1935 0.1911 0.1930 
t-ratio -1.3800 -1.3690 -1.1960 
STRUST Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
1.9045 
1.2228 
1.5570 
1.8614 
1.2183 
1.5280 
MSH Coeff. -0.2200* -0.1848* -0.1990* -0.2378" -0.2296** 
Std.Err. 0.0921 0.0929 0,0924 0.0923 0.0924 
t-ratio -2.3890 -1.9900 -2.1540 -2.5770 -2.4840 
SIZE Coeff. 0.0630" 0.0497** 0.0525" 0.0660" 0.0630" 
Std.Err. 0.0131 0.0141 0.0138 0.0130 0.0135 
t-ratio 4.8150 3.5220 3.8090 5.0670 4.6780 
DEBT Coeff. -0.1975" -0.2188" -0.2210" -0.2011" -0.2151" 
Std.Err. 0.0480 0.0488 0.0482 0.0480 0,0488 
t-ratio -4.1170 -4.4790 -4.5810 -4,1910 -4.4030 
OPINCOME Coeff. 0.7234" 0.7229" 0.7421" 0.7421" 0.7281" 
Std.Err. 0.2242 0.2235 0.2249 0,2241 0.2236 
t-ratio 3.2270 3.2340 3,3000 3,3120 3.2570 
RETURN Coeff. 0.0828 0.0776 0.0788 0.0873 0.0893* 
Std.Err. 0.0454 0.0452 0.0452 0.0454 0.0453 
t-ratio 1.8240 1.7170 1.7450 1.9240 1,9710 
Log likelihood function -575.25 -573.62 -573.47 -575,44 -573,73 
Restricted log likelihood -640.52 -640.52 -640.52 -640,52 -640,52 
Chi-squared 130.56" 133.81^° 134.11'° 130,17" 133.59'° 
Significance level 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0,0000 0.0000 
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Table 4-5: B inomia l logit estimations of the p robab i l i t y o f repurchasing (using expected and 
unexpected earnings) 
This table reports the results o f binomial logit regressions on the probabil ity that a firm repurchases its 
shares at least once during the sample period (Y = 1) versus the probabil ity that it does not repurchase 
its shares at all during the whole sample period (Y = 0). The coefficients reported are the marginal 
effects o f each variable on the probabil i ty o f being a re-purchaser while holding the other variables 
constant at their means. The definit ion o f variables used can be found in tables 1 and 2. Positive 
unexpected income = unexp income * dummy (equals 1 i f unexp income>0). 
* * indicates a significance level o f 1 % or below, • indicates a significance level between 5 and 1%. We 
control for time and industry effects throughout all the binomial regressions. 
Marginal effects on Prob [Y = 1], N = 1016 
[4] [5] [6] [4] [5] [6] 
Constant Coeff. -1.5263** -1.2211** -1.3107** -1.5999** -1.3004" -1.3939" 
Std,Err, 0.2971 0.3174 0.3082 0.2979 0.3179 0,3096 
t-ratio -5.1380 -3.8470 -4.2530 -5.3710 -4,0910 -4,5020 
ESO Coeff. -1.4794 -1.6147* 
Std.Err. 0.7722 0.7728 
t-ratio -1.9160 -2.0890 
EXSO Coeff. -6.4145** -6.7730** 
Std.Err. 2.4261 2.4252 
t-ratio -2,6440 -2,7930 
EXSOEX Coeff. -12.5932** -13.0185** 
Std,Err, 5,1042 5.0948 
t-ratio -2.4670 -2,5550 
LTIP Coeff, -1,8883 -1.7365 -1,5133 -1.4009 
Std.Err. 5.0443 5.0445 5.0762 5.0762 
t-ratio -0,3740 -0.3440 -0.2980 -0.2760 
MO Coeff. -0.2969 -0.2865 -0.2954 -0.2851 
Std.Err, 0.1910 0.1888 0.1921 0,1899 
t-ratio -1,5540 -1,5170 -1.5380 -1,5020 
STRUST Coeff, 2.4424* 2.4640* 
Std.Err. 1,2370 1.2439 
t-ratio 1.9740 1.9810 
MSH Coeff. -0.2101* -0.1737 -0.1878* -0.2084* -0.1708 -0.1849* 
Std.Err, 0.0904 0,0911 0.0910 0.0908 0,0915 0.0914 
t-ratio -2.3250 -1,9060 -2.0650 -2,2950 -1,8660 -2.0230 
SIZE Coeff, 0.0687** 0.0548** 0.0583** 0.0714** 0.0576** 0.0612** 
StdErr. 0.0133 0,0143 0,0140 0.0133 0.0142 0.0140 
t-ratio 5.1590 3.8460 4,1730 5.3610 4.0400 4,3750 
DEBT Coeff, -0.1413** -0.1646** -0.1634** -0.1541** -0.1778" -0.1757** 
Std,Err. 0.0453 0,0468 0.0460 0,0455 0.0471 0.0462 
t-ratio -3.1170 -3.5160 -3,5540 -3.3900 -3.7760 -3,8060 
Expec income Coeff, 1.5251** 1.5185** 1.5305** 1.5694" 1.5928" 1.5962" 
Std,Err, 0.5108 0.5154 0.5214 0,4815 0.4861 0,4953 
t-ratio 2,9860 2.9470 2.9350 3,2600 3.2770 3.2220 
Unexp income Coeff. 0.3689 0.3689 0.3546 
Std.Err, 0.2011 0.2027 0.2005 
t-ratio 1.8340 1,8200 1,7680 
Positive unexp Coeff. 0.7419* 0.7521* 0.7037 
Income Std.Err. 0.3777 0.3776 0.3789 
t-ratio 1.9640 1.9920 1,8570 
RETURN Coeff. 0.0729 0.0665 0.0707 0.0732 0.0678 0.0730 
Std.Err, 0.0472 0,0475 0.0474 0.0467 0,0463 0.0464 
t-ratio 1.5440 1,4000 1.4890 1.5680 1,4640 1,5730 
Log likelihood function -573.96 -572.34 -572,45 -574.25 -572.54 -572.77 
Restricted log likelihood -640.52 -640,52 -640,52 -640.52 -640,52 -640.52 
Chi-squared 133.13^° 136,38^' 136.14^' 132,54^° 135,96^' 135.52^' 
Significance level 0,0000 0,0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 4-6: Mean comparison test of re-purchasers vs. dividend payers vs. earnings retainers: 
Panel a: Descriptive statistics 
Y N Mean Std. Dev 
ESO 0 1!9 0.0533 0.0369 
1 567 0.0329 0.0195 
2 330 0.0304 0.0207 
Total 10 !6 0.0345 0.0236 
STRUST 0 119 0.0040 0.0068 
1 567 0.0072 0,0129 
2 330 0.0081 0.0114 
Total 1016 0.0071 0.0119 
EXSO 0 119 0,0125 0.0153 
! 567 0.0060 0.0072 
2 330 0.0045 0.0053 
Total 10!6 0.0062 0.0084 
MO 0 119 0.0657 0.1613 
1 567 0.0297 0.0808 
2 330 0.0247 0.0656 
Total 1016 0.0323 0.0906 
SIZE 0 119 20.2789 1.3626 
! 567 20.6812 1.1643 
2 330 21.2124 1.5377 
Total 1016 20.8066 1.3539 
DEBT 0 119 0.9920 2.0707 
1 567 0.3783 0.3884 
2 330 0.3252 0.3757 
Total 1016 0.4329 0.8188 
OPINCOME 0 119 -0.0621 0.5624 
1 567 0.1070 0.0906 
2 330 0.1060 0.0687 
Total 1016 0.0869 0.2141 
RETURN 0 119 -0.1774 0.9852 
1 567 0.0711 0.3736 
2 330 0.0717 0.3337 
Total 1016 0.0422 0.4829 
MSH 0 119 0.3537 0.2392 
1 567 0.2837 0.1736 
2 330 0.2411 0.1657 
Total 1016 0.2780 0.1830 
Panel b: Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
Welch Stat* df1 df2 Sig. 
ESO 20 .571 ! 2 282 0.0000 
STRUST 11.8659 2 425 0.0000 
EXSO 19.9761 2 285 0.0000 
MO 3.7612 2 286 0.0244 
SIZE 22.9471 2 302 0.0000 
DEBT 7.5701 2 271 0,0006 
OPINCOME 5.3383 2 277 0.0053 
RETURN 3.7211 2 279 0.0254 
MSH 13.8973 2 297 0.0000 
* Asymptotical ly distributed. 
Y = 0 for all firms that did not repurchase their shares, and paid dividends less than three times during 
the sample period, Y =1 for all firms that paid dividends at least three times during the sample period 
but never repurchased its shares. Y = 2 for all firms that repurchased their shares at least once during 
the sample period, regardless o f whether they paid dividends or not. 
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Table 4-7: Multinomial logit estimations of the probability of repurchasing (Y=2) vs. only paying dividends (Y=l) 
vs. retaining earnings (Y=0) 
This table reports the results o f mult inomial logit regressions on the probability that a firm repurchases its shares at least 
once during the sample period (Y = 2), the probability that it does not repurchase its shares at all during the whole 
sample period but continuously pays dividends (meaning at least twice during the sample period) (Y = 1), or the 
probability that it retains its eamings (no repurchases at all during the sample period, and no/or irregular dividends) (Y = 
0). The coefficients reported are the marginal effects o f each variable on the probability o f being a retainer (Y = 0), 
dividend payer (Y = 1), or a re-purchaser (Y = 2) while holding the other variables constant at their means. For a brief 
definit ion o f the variables used refer back to table 1. Only time effects are controlled for throughout the mult inomial 
regressions. Y = 0 -> 119 observations, Y = 1 ^  567 observations, Y = 2 -> 330 observations. 
* * indicates a significance level o f 1 % or below, * indicates a significance level between 5 and 1%. 
Marginal affects on Pr [Y = 0], Pr [Y = 1], and Pr [Y = 2] 
[1] [2] [3] 
Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 
Constant Coeff. 0.1235 1.1354** -1.2589** 0,0160 1.1585** -1.1745** 0,1104 1.1075** -1.2179** 
Std.Err. 0.1642 0.2953 0.2819 0.1840 0,3224 0.3080 0,1797 0,3107 0.2965 
t-ratio 0.7520 3.8450 -4.4650 0.0870 3,5930 -3,8140 0,6150 3,5650 -4,1070 
ESQ Coeff. 
Std.Err, 
t-ratio 
1.8909** 
0,3240 
5,8370 
-0,0232 
0,8089 
-0,0290 
-1.8677* 
0.8106 
-2.3040 
EXSO Coeff, 
Std.Err, 
t-ratio 
4.1835** 
0.8889 
4.7060 
0.3187 
2.6688 
0.1190 
-4,5022 
2,7531 
-1,6350 
EXSOEX Coeff. 
StdErr. 
t-ratio 
8.0659** 
1.7915 
4,5020 
2,4054 
5.5072 
0.4370 
-10.4712 
5,7458 
-1,8220 
LTIP Coeff. 1.7366 0,5084 -2,2450 2,4168 -0.2355 -2,1813 
Std.Err, 2,9807 5,5447 5.3936 2,8327 5,4867 5.3525 
t-ratio 0.5830 0.0920 -0.4160 0,8530 -0.0430 -0.4080 
MO Coeff. 0.1880** -0,1318 -0,0562 0.1902** -0.1382 -0,0521 
Std.Err. 0,0763 0.1982 0.1961 0.0740 0.1963 0,1945 
t-ratio 2.4640 -0.6650 -0.2870 2,5710 -0,7040 -0.2680 
STRUST Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-3.0804** 
0.9557 
-3.2230 
0.2152 
1.3747 
0.1570 
2.8652* 
1.2807 
2.2370 
MSH Coeff, 0.1124** 0.1027 -0.2151* 0,0831 0.0969 -0.1799 0.0909* 0.0977 -0.1886* 
Std.Err, 0.0410 0.0945 0.0939 0.0443 0.0963 0.0951 0.0440 0.0954 0,0945 
t-ratio 2.7440 1.0860 -2.2920 1.8730 1.0070 -1,8920 2.0650 1.0240 -1,9970 
SIZE Coeff. -0.0147* -0.0465** 0.0611** -0,0086 -0.0474** 0.0561** -0.0130 -0.0450** 0.0580** 
Std.Err. 0,0076 0,0131 0.0124 0,0085 0.0144 0.0136 0,0083 0.0139 0.0132 
t-ratio -1.9400 -3,5460 4.9190 -1,0230 -3.3030 4.1210 -1,5700 -3.2390 4.4050 
DEBT Coeff. 0.0745** 0,0152 -0.0897* 0.0879** 0.0070 -0.0949* 0.0936** 0.0046 -0.0982** 
Std.Err. 0.0132 0,0386 0.0398 0.0141 0,0383 0.0394 0,0148 0.0386 0.0394 
t-ratio 5,6410 0,3940 -2.2560 6,2170 0.1830 -2.4090 6,3170 0.1190 -2.4900 
OPINCOME Coeff. -0.4473** 0,1600 0.2873 -0.4738** 0.1672 0.3065 -0.4800** 0.1530 0.3271 
Std.Err. 0.0754 0,2002 0.2007 0,0810 0,2013 0.2020 0,0843 0,2017 0.2023 
t-ratio -5.9300 0,8000 1,4320 -5,8470 0,8310 1.5170 -5,6950 0.7590 1.6160 
RETURN Coeff. -0.0783** -0.0150 0,0933 -0.0895** -0,0072 0.0966* -0.0963** -0,0027 9.90E-02* 
Std.Err. 0.0174 0.0487 0,0490 0.0181 0,0478 0,0479 0.0182 0,0479 4,80E-02 
t-ratio -4.4940 -0.3070 1.9020 -4.9540 -0,1500 2,0170 -5.2780 -0,0570 2,061 
Log likelihood function -812.53 -823.61 -822.16 
Restric log likelihood -957,01 -957,01 -957.01 
Chi-squared 288.96^° 266,79^^ 269,70" 
Significance level 0.0000 0,0000 0,0000 
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Table 4-8: Multinomial logit estimations of the probability of repurchasing (Y=2) vs. only paying dividends (Y=l) 
vs. retaining earnings (Y=0) - Using predicted and unpredicted earnings 
Refer to table 6 for a description o f the information reported, and to tables 1 and 2 for a definit ion o f the variables used. 
* * indicates a significance level o f 1 % or below, * indicates a significance level between 5 and 1 % . 
Marg inal effects on Prob [Y = 0,1,2] N = 1016 
[1] [2] [31 
Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 
Constant Coeff. 0.2583 1.1317** -1.3900** 0.0980 1.1720** -1.2701** 0.1828 1.1246** -1.3074** 
Std.Err. 0.1671 0.2957 0.2825 0.1868 0.3210 0.3068 0.1814 0.3099 0.2959 
t-ratio 1.5460 3.8260 -4.9200 0.5250 3.6510 -4.1390 1.0080 3.6290 -4.4180 
ESO Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
1.8092** 
0.3274 
5.5250 
-0.1908 
0.7966 
-0.2400 
-1.6184* 
0.7954 
-2.0350 
EXSO Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
4.6591** 
0.9052 
5.1470 
-0.2515 
2.6394 
-0.0950 
-4.4076 
2.7084 
-1.6270 
EXSOEX Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
9.3366** 
1.8902 
4.9400 
1.3366 
5.5265 
0.2420 
-10.6733 
5.7117 
-1.8690 
LTIP Coeff. 1.7360 1.0478 -2.7838 2.4091 0.3477 -2.7569 
Std.Err. 2.9179 5.4941 5.3404 2.7923 5.4479 5.3095 
t-ratio 0.5950 0.1910 -0.5210 0.8630 0.0640 -0.5190 
MO Coeff. 0.2293** -0.1546 -0.0748 0.2345** -0.1634 -0.0712 
Std.Err. 0.0761 0.1977 0.1953 0.0732 0.1961 0.1941 
t-ratio 3.0140 -0.7820 -0.3830 3.2040 -0.8330 -0.3670 
STRUST Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-3.7069** 
0.9795 
-3.7850 
0.4870 
1.3750 
0.3540 
3.2199** 
1.2722 
2.5310 
MSH Coeff. 0.1206** 0.0880 -0.2086* 0.0893* 0.0862 -0.1755 0.0956* 0.0864 -0.1820* 
Std.Err. 0.0410 0.0928 0.0921 0.0444 0.0946 0.0933 0.0437 0.0940 0.0929 
t-ratio 2.9380 0.9490 -2.2660 2.0110 0.9110 -1.8810 2.1880 0.9190 -1.9580 
SIZE Coeff. -0.0211** -0.0446** 0.0656** -0.0129 -0.0466** 0.0595** -0.0167* -0.0444** 0.0611** 
Std.Err. 0.0076 0.0131 0.0124 0.0085 0.0143 0.0136 0.0083 0.0138 0.0131 
t-ratio -2.7580 -3.4030 5.2820 -1.5130 -3.2600 4.3860 -2.0090 -3.2100 4.6550 
DEBT Coeff. 0.0456** 0.0188 -0.0644 0.0571** 0.0128 -0.0699 0.0633** 0.0083 -0.0716 
Std.Err. 0.0114 0.0370 0.0382 0.0124 0.0371 0.0382 0.0127 0.0373 0.0382 
t-ratio 3.9890 0.5080 -1.6850 4.6150 0.3450 -1.8280 4.9920 0.2240 -1.8750 
Expec Coeff. -0.5843** -0.2234 0.8076** -0.6439** -0.1940 0.8379** -0.6832** -0.1797 0.8628** 
income Std.Err. 0.1190 0.2985 0.3036 0.1249 0.2962 0.3023 0.1302 0.3012 0.3055 
t-ratio -4.9100 -0.7480 2.6600 -5.1570 -0.6550 2.7720 -5.2460 -0.5970 2.8240 
Unexp Coeff. -0.2400** -0.0880 0.3280 -0.2762** -0.0534 0.3297 -0.2550** -0.0708 0.3258 
income Std.Err. 0.0674 0.2177 0.2248 0.0715 0.2145 0.2222 0.0711 0.2113 0.2189 
t-ratio -3.5610 -0.4040 1.4590 -3.8630 -0.2490 1.4830 -3.5840 -0.3350 1.4880 
RETURN Coeff. -0.0623** -0.0003 0.0626 -0.0690** 0.0063 0.0626 -0.0767** 0.0095 0.0672 
Std.Err. 0.0183 0.0508 0.0512 0.0192 0.0507 0.0511 0.0192 0.0504 0.0508 
t-ratio -3.4040 -0.0050 1.2220 -3.6020 0.1250 1.2260 -3.9980 0.1890 1.3220 
Log likelihood function -814.56 -822.02 -819.51 
Restric log likelihood -957.01 -957.01 -957.01 
Chi-squared 284.89^^ 269.98" 274.99" 
Significance level 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 4-9: Multinomial logit estimations of the probability of repurchasing (Y=2) vs. only paying dividends (Y=l) 
vs. retaining earnings (Y=0) - Using predicted and positive unpredicted earnings 
Refer to table 6 for a description o f the information reported, and to tables 1 and 2 for a definit ion o f the variables used. 
Positive unexpected income = unexp income * dummy (that equals 1 i f unexp income>0). 
* * indicates a significance level o f 1 % or below, * indicates a significance level between 5 and 1%. 
Marginal effects on Prob [Y = 0, 1,2], N = 1016 
[1] [2] [3] 
Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 Y = 0 Y= 1 Y = 2 
Constant Coeff, 0.3214 1.1194" -1.4408** 0,1970 1.1378" -1.3349** 0.2731 1.1048** -1.3779" 
Std.Err, 0,1663 0,2962 0.2840 0,1840 0,3207 0.3081 0.1777 0,3097 0.2976 
t-ratio 1.9330 3,7790 -5.0740 1,0710 3.5480 -4.3330 1.5360 3,5670 -4.6310 
ESO Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
1.9411" 
0.3344 
5,8040 
-0.1744 
0.7966 
-0.2190 
-1.7667* 
0.7949 
-2,2230 
EXSO Coeff. 
Std,Err, 
t-ratio 
4.8431" 
0.9338 
5.1870 
-0.1662 
2.6304 
-0,0630 
^.6769 
2.6959 
-1.7350 
EXSOEX Coeff, 
Std,Err, 
t-ratio 
9.6108" 
1.8822 
5,1060 
1.3851 
5,5002 
0.2520 
-10.9960 
5.7126 
-1.9250 
LTIP Coeff. 1.0483 1.3534 -2.4017 1,9290 0.4542 -2,3832 
Std.Err. 3.0744 5.5230 5.3565 2.9162 5.4756 5,3279 
t-ratio 0.3410 0.2450 -0,4480 0,6610 0.0830 -0,4470 
MO Coeff, 0.2347" -0,1718 -0.0629 0.2421" -0.1843 -0.0578 
Std, Err, 0.0750 0.1986 0,1964 0.0720 0,1972 0.1955 
t-ratio 3.1310 -0,8650 -0,3200 3.3630 -0,9340 -0.2960 
STRUST Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-3.6348** 
0.9856 
-3.6880 
0.4377 
1.3789 
0,3170 
3.1972** 
1.2760 
2,5060 
MSH Coeff, 0.1075" 0.0972 -0.2047* 0.0733 0.0972 -0.1705 0.0829 0,0952 -0.1781 
Std.Err. 0,0413 0,0929 0,0923 0.0452 0.0948 0.0936 0.0437 0.0942 0,0933 
t-ratio 2.6060 1.0460 -2.2180 1.6220 1.0250 -1.8210 1.8960 1.0110 -1.9090 
SIZE Coeff, -0.0239" -0.0438" 0.0677** -0.0171** -0.0448** 0.0619" -0.0205" -0.0433** 0.0638" 
Std,Err, 0.0076 0.0131 0,0125 0,0084 0.0143 0,0136 0.0082 0.0138 0,0132 
t-ratio -3.1380 -3,3410 5,4300 -2,0310 -3.1440 4.5540 -2,5160 -3.1320 4,8430 
DEBT Coeff, 0.0530" 0,0197 -0.0727 0.0633" 0.0138 -0.0771 0.0677" 0,0105 -0.0782* 
Std,Err, 0,0113 0,0371 0.0383 0,0121 0.0370 0.0383 0.0124 0,0372 0,0383 
t-ratio 4,6860 0.5320 -1.8990 5.2220 0.3730 -2.0150 5,4430 0,2810 -2,0400 
Expec Coeff. -0.6556" -0.2266 0.8822" -0.7326** -0.1873 0.9200" -0.7576 -0.1778 0.9355" 
Income Std.Err. 0.1290 0.3035 0,3052 0.1400 0,3043 0,3052 0,1437 0.3100 0.3100 
t-ratio -5.0820 -0,7470 2,8900 -5,2320 -0,6160 3.0150 -5.2740 -0,5740 3.0180 
Positive unexp Coeff. -0.2767 -0.3586 0.6353 -0.3009 -0,3120 0.6128 -0.2080 -0.3856 0.5936 
income Std,Err. 0,1517 0,3788 0,3753 0.1730 0,3776 0.3738 0.1759 0,3815 0.3734 
t-ratio -1,8240 -0,9470 1,6930 -1.7390 -0,8260 1,6400 -1.1820 -1,0110 1.5890 
RETURN Coeff, -0.0736" 0,0123 0.0614 -0.0842" 0.0198 0,0644 -0.0920" 0,0228 0,0692 
Std.Err. 0.0183 0,0504 0,0508 0.0184 0.0496 0.0498 0,0186 0.0496 0,0499 
t-ratio -4.0180 0,2430 1,2070 -4,5760 0,4000 1.2920 -4,9450 0,4590 1,3860 
Log likelihood function -822.73 -832.24 -828.44 
Restricted log likelihood -957.01 -957.01 -957.01 
Chi-squared 268.55^' 249,53^' 257,13^" 
Significance level 0,0000 0.0000 0,0000 
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Table 4-10: Multinomial logit estimations of the probability of repurchasing (Y=2) vs. only 
paying dividends (Y=l) vs. retaining earnings (Y=0) - Using unexpected options 
Refer to table 6 for a description o f the information reported, and to tables 1 and 3 for a definit ion o f 
the variables used. 
* * indicates a significance level o f 1 % or below, * indicates a significance level between 5 and 1%. 
Marginal effects on Prob [Y = 0, 1,2] N = 1016 
[1] [2] 
Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 
Constant Coeff. 0.3617* 1.0899" -1.4516** 0.2555 1.1616" -1.4171" 
Std.Err, 0.1630 0,2871 0.2740 0.1725 0.2995 0.2853 
t-ratio 2,2190 3.7970 -5,2980 1.4810 3.8790 -4.9670 
TOPTIONS Coeff, 
Std.Err, 
t-ratio 
1.6251" 
0.3553 
4.5740 
-0.3529 
0,8495 
-0,4150 
-1,2722 
0.8440 
-1.5070 
EXOPTION Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
4.1263** 
0.9090 
4,5390 
1.3850 
2.6464 
0.5230 
-5.5113* 
2.7362 
-2.0140 
LTIP Coeff. 
Std.Err, 
t-ratio 
1.5907 
2.9950 
0,5310 
0.7880 
5.5271 
0,1430 
-2.3787 
5.3806 
-0.4420 
MO Coeff, 
StdErr, 
t-ratio 
0.1652* 
0.0757 
2.1820 
-0,1294 
0,1976 
-0.6550 
-0.0358 
0,1958 
-0,1830 
STRUST Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-2.7269" 
0.9782 
-2.7880 
0,2903 
1.3591 
0.2140 
2.4366 
1,2569 
1,9390 
MSH Coeff. 0.1216" 0.1003 -0.2219* 0.1158" 0,1015 -0.2173* 
Std.Err. 0,0422 0,0947 0,0940 0.0443 0.0953 0.0943 
t-ratio 2.8800 1.0590 -2.3600 2.6130 1.0650 -2.3040 
SIZE Coeff. -0.0226** -0.0444** 0.0671" -0.0190* -0.0475" 0.0665** 
Std.Err. 0.0076 0,0130 0,0123 0.0080 0,0135 0,0127 
t-ratio -2,9710 -3,4220 5,4440 -2.3750 -3,5250 5.2150 
DEBT Coeff. 0.0725" 0,0099 •O.0824* 0.0866" 0.0072 -0.0938* 
Std.Err. 0.0128 0.0376 0.0386 0.0142 0.0383 0.0393 
t-ratio 5.6510 0.2630 -2,1330 6.0940 0.1880 -2.3840 
OPINCOME Coeff, -0.4888" 0.1639 0,3249 -0.4957" 0.1579 0.3378 
Std.Err, 0.0792 0,1984 0.1985 0,0827 0,2013 0.2019 
t-ratio -6.1720 0,8260 1.6370 -5.9920 0.7840 1,6730 
RETURN Coeff. -0.0988" -0.0072 0.1060* -0.1009" -0.0088 0.1097* 
Std.Err. 0.0179 0.0483 0.0486 0.0184 0.0479 0.0480 
t-ratio -5.5200 -0.1490 2,1830 -5.4860 -0,1830 2.2830 
Log likelihood function -823,89 -824.66 
Restricted log likelihood -957,01 -957,01 
Chi-squared 266.23^° 264.70" 
Significance level 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 4-11: Robustness checks- Ordered estimations of the probability of repurchasing (Y=2) vs. 
only paying dividends (V=l) vs. retaining earnings (Y=0) 
This table reports the results o f ordered logit regressions on the probabil i ty that a firm repurchases its 
shares at least once during the sample period (Y = 2), the probabil ity that it does not repurchase its 
shares at all during the whole sample period but continuously pays dividends (meaning at least twice 
during the sample period) (Y = 1), or the probabil i ty that it retains its eamings (no repurchases at all 
during the sample period, and no/or irregular dividends) (Y = 0). The coefficients reported are the logit 
coefficients. For a br ief definit ion o f the variables used refer back to table 1. Only time effects are 
controlled for in all the regressions. Y = 0 -> 119 observations, Y = 1 -> 567 observations, Y = 2 -> 
330 observations 
* * indicates a significance level o f 1 % or below, * indicates a significance level between 5 and 1%. 
[1] 
Index function for probability N=1016 
[2] [3] 
Constant Coeff, -3.1608** -2.3044 -2.6474* 
Std,Err. 1.2177 1.2993 1.2272 
t-ratio -2.5958 -1.7736 -2.1573 
ESO Coeff. 
Std.Err, 
t-ratio 
-18.3030** 
2.9715 
-6.1596 
EXSO Coeff. 
Std.Err, 
t-ratio 
-42.6110** 
9.4493 
-4,5094 
EXSOEX Coeff, 
StdErr, 
t-ratio 
-85.4571** 
17,6672 
-4,8371 
LTIP Coeff, -10.9501 -11.1756 
Std,Err, 19,4949 19.6871 
t-ratio -0,5617 -0,5677 
MO Coeff, -1.2460 -1.4195* 
Std.Err. 0.6978 0,6915 
t-ratio -1.7857 -2,0527 
STRUST Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
18.3553** 
5.1683 
3.5515 
MSH Coeff. -1.2683** -0.9424** -1.0568** 
StdErr, 0.3664 0.3750 0.3770 
t-ratio -3.4614 -2.5128 -2.8029 
SIZE Coeff, 0.3021** 0.2465** 0.2617** 
Std,Err. 0,0552 0.0588 0.0561 
t-ratio 5,4715 4.1937 4,6671 
DEBT Coeff, -0.8514** -0.8996** -0.9400** 
Std.Err, 0.1345 0.1287 0.1311 
t-ratio -6.3312 -6.9923 -7.1672 
OPINCOME Coeff. 3.9624** 3.9381** 3.9655** 
Std.Err. 0.6645 0.6571 0.6606 
t-ratio 5,9627 5.9931 6.0030 
RETURN Coeff. 0.8187** 0.8544** 0.8911** 
Std.Err, 0.1646 0,1584 0,1597 
t-ratio 4.9732 5.3941 5.5787 
Threshold Coeff, 3.3162** 3.2913** 3.2956** 
Std.Err. 0,1429 0.1441 0,1441 
t-ratio 23.2005 22.8329 22,8745 
Log likelihood function -837.02 -845.49 -843.33 
Restricted log likelihood -957.01 -957.01 -957.01 
Chi-squared 239.97'° 223.03" 227.35" 
Significance level 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 4-12: Robustness checks: Scaling by total assets- O L S and binomial logit estimations of the 
value of shares repurchased and the probability of being a re-purchaser respectively 
Variables are as defined in table 1, with the only difference that SIZE=log o f total assets, D E B T and 
OPINCOME are scaled by total assets instead o f market value. In the OLS we control for time and 
fixed effects, while in the Binomial logits we control for time and industry effects. 
* * indicates a significance level o f 1 % or below, * indicates a significance level between 5 and 1%. 
OLS of re-purchasers Binomial iogits 
Y = value of shares repurchased Marginal effects on Prob [Y = 1] 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Constant Coeff. -0,0118 0,0156 0,0258 -1.6086" -1.3554" -1.4312" 
Std.Err, 0,0361 0,0394 0,0377 0.3000 0.3219 0.3128 
t-ratio -0,3263 0,3944 0,6846 -5,3630 -4.2110 -4.5760 
ESO Coeff, 
Std.Err, 
t-ratio 
0,1776 
0,1445 
1,2296 
-1.4050 
0.8194 
-1.7150 
EXSO Coeff, 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
0.3776 
0.3743 
1.0088 
-5.6131* 
2.5950 
-2.1630 
EXSOEX Coeff. 
Std.Err, 
t-ratio 
-0,7427 
0.6030 
-1,2318 
-10.4528* 
5.2839 
-1.9780 
LTIP Coeff. 0,7227 0,7102 -2.3529 -2.0164 
Std.Err. 0,8090 0,8085 5.2541 5.2441 
t-ratio 0,8934 0.8784 -0.4480 -0.3850 
MO Coeff, 0.0243 0.0353 -0,3121 -0,3033 
Std.Err. 0.0421 0,0445 0.2029 0,2007 
t-ratio 0.5771 0,7936 -1.5380 -1,5110 
STRUST Coeff. 
Std.Err, 
t-ratio 
-0.7018 
0,3799 
-1.8471 
1.5997 
1.2861 
1.2440 
MSH Coeff. -0.0252 -0,0282 -0.0320 -0.2249* -0.1942* -0.2123* 
Std.Err. 0.0198 0.0195 0.0199 0,0958 0.0966 0,0960 
t-ratio -1,2725 -1.4434 -1,6093 -2,3490 -2.0110 -2,2110 
SIZE Coeff. 0.0120* 0.0150" 0.0131* 0.0710" 0.0587" 0.0619" 
Std.Err, 0.0057 0,0055 0.0055 0.0137 0.0146 0.0143 
t-ratio 2,1001 2.7119 2.3916 5.1950 4.0130 4.3150 
DEBT Coeff, -0,0518 -0,0611 -0.0602 -0.5057** -0.5329" -0.5318" 
Std.Err, 0.0404 0,0416 0.0415 0.1058 0.1058 0,1057 
t-ratio -1.2813 -1.4684 -1.4489 -4.7810 -5,0360 -5,0320 
OPINCOME Coeff, -0.0554 -0.0710 -0.0714 1.4946" 1.4742** 1.4895" 
Std.Err. 0.0769 0.0777 0,0792 0.2431 0,2410 0.2413 
t-ratio -0.7198 -0.9142 -0,9019 6.1490 6,1170 6.1720 
RETURN Coeff. 0,0024 0.0026 0,0034 0.0558 0.0556 0.0540 
Std.Err, 0,0065 0.0063 0,0064 0,0440 0.0443 0.0442 
t-ratio 0,3598 0.4189 0,5267 1.2690 1.2550 1.2210 
Adj R squared 0,42 0,42 0.42 
F statistic 3,54 3,45 3.45 
Log likelihood function -564,44 -562,79 -563.04 
Restricted log likelihood -640.52 -640,52 -640.52 
Chi-squared 152.16'° 155.46^° 154,96^° 
Significance level 0.0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Number of observations 330 330 330 1016 1016 1016 
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Table 4-13: Robustness checks: Scaling by total assets- Multinomial logit estimations of the probability of 
repurchasing (Y=2) vs. only paying dividends (Y=l) vs. retaining earnings (Y=0) 
Variables are as defined in table 1, with the only difference that SIZE=log of total assets, DEBT and OPINCOME are 
scaled by total assets instead of market value. The coefficients reported are the marginal effects of each variable on the 
probability of being a retainer (Y = 0), dividend payer (Y = 1), or a re-purchaser (Y = 2) while holding the other 
variables constant at their means. Only time effects are controlled for throughout the multinomial regressions. Y = 0 
119 observations, Y = 1 -> 567 observations, Y = 2 330 observations. 
** indicates a significance level of 1% or below, * indicates a significance level between 5 and 1%. 
Marginal effects on Prob [Y = 0, 1,2] N=1016 
[5] [6] [7] 
Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 
Constant Coeff. 0.2922* 1.1091" -1.4013" 0.2443 1.0887" -1.3329" 0.2881 1.0678" -1.3559" 
Std.Err. 0.1338 0.2827 0.2789 0.1517 0.3088 0.3046 0.1480 0.2977 0,2931 
t-ratio 2.1850 3.9230 -5.0240 1.6100 3.5250 -4.3750 1.9470 3.5870 -4.6260 
ESQ Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
1.6805" 
0.3120 
5.3870 
0.0762 
0.8058 
0.0950 
-1.7567* 
0.8109 
-2.1660 
EXSO Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
3.1638" 
0.8093 
3.9090 
0.5485 
2.6448 
0.2070 
-3.7123 
2.7445 
-1.3530 
EXSOEX Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
6.1004" 
1.5395 
3.9630 
3.1225 
5.3604 
0.5830 
-9.2229 
5.6407 
-1.6350 
LTIP Coeff. 0.0237 2.7780 -2.8017 0.6500 2.0325 -2.6825 
Std.Err. 2.9475 5.4452 5.3136 2.8542 5.4092 5.2785 
t-ratIo 0.0080 0.5100 -0.5270 0.2280 0.3760 -0.5080 
MO Coeff. 0.1612* -0.0936 -0.0675 0.1731" -0.1066 -0.0664 
Std.Err. 0.0717 0.1968 0.1977 0.0695 0.1955 0.1964 
t-ratio 2.2460 -0.4760 -0.3420 2.4910 -0.5450 -0.3380 
STRUST Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-2.6717" 
0.8880 
-3.0090 
0.1478 
1.3614 
0.1090 
2.5240* 
1.2830 
1.9670 
MSH Coeff. 0.0954" 0.1165 -0.2119* 0.0696 0.1112 -0.1808 0.0742 0.1152 -0.1895* 
Std.Err. 0.0376 0.0935 0.0939 0.0406 0.0954 0.0957 0.0400 0.0943 0.0947 
t-ratio 2.5370 1.2460 -2.2560 1.7130 1.1660 -1.8900 1.8560 1.2210 -2.0020 
SIZE Coeff. -0.0224" -0.0436" 0.0661" -0.0188" -0.0428" 0.0616" -0.0207" -0.0420" 0.0627** 
Std.Err. 0.0062 0.0126 0.0123 0.0070 0.0137 0.0134 0.0068 0.0133 0.0130 
t-ratio -3.6310 -3.4750 5.3660 -2.6970 -3.1250 4.5880 -3,0330 -3.1630 4.8300 
DEBT Coeff. 0.1986" 0.1535 -0.3521" 0.2096" 0.1436 -0.3532** 0.2207" 0.1377 -0.3583" 
Std.Err. 0.0410 0.1002 0.1003 0.0419 0.0988 0.0990 0.0422 0.0989 0.0989 
t-ratio 4.8380 1.5310 -3.5100 5.0050 1.4530 -3.5680 5.2260 1.3920 -3.6240 
OPINCOME Coeff, -0.5791" -0.5426* 1.1216* -0.6469" -0.4962* 1.1430" -0.6708" -0.4860* 1.1569" 
Std.Err. 0.0955 0.2211 0,2235 0.0965 0.2187 0.2229 0.0986 0.2186 0.2218 
t-ratio -6.0640 -2.4540 5,0180 -6.7060 -2.2690 5.1290 -6.8020 -2.2240 5.2150 
RETURN Coeff. -0.0678" 0.0179 0.0499 -0.0781" 0.0213 0.0568 -0.0785" 0.0216 0.0568 
Std.Err. 0.0157 0.0452 0.0457 0.0159 0.0445 0.0450 0.0160 0.0445 0.0450 
t-ratio -4.3220 0.3960 1.0910 -4.9140 0.4780 1.2620 -4.9160 0.4860 1.2630 
Log likelihood function -824.86 -837,05 -835.23 
Restricted log likelihood -957.01 -957.01 -957.01 
Chi-squared 264.30^° 239.92'^ 243.55" 
Significance level 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 4-14: Robustness checks- different sample division: Multinomial logit estimations of the probability of 
repurchasing (Y=2) vs. only paying dividends (Y=l) i'5. retaining earnings (Y=0) 
This table reports the results of multinomial logit regressions on the probability of repurchasing (rather than the 
probability that a firm repurchases its shares at least once during the sample period) (Y = 2), the probability of only 
paying dividends (Y = 1), and the probability of not making any distribution (Y = 0). The coefficients reported are the 
marginal effects For a definition of the variables used refer back to table 1. Only time effects are controlled for 
throughout all the regressions. Y = 0 -> 108 observations, Y = 1 -> 732 observations, Y = 2 -> 176 observations. 
** indicates a significance level of 1% or below, * indicates a significance level between 5 and 1%. 
Marginal effects on Prob [YT = 0, 1,2], N = 1016 
[1] [2] [3] 
Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 
Constant Coeff. 0.0543 0.9383** -0.9926** -0.0036 1.0000** -0.9964** 0.1223 0.8805** -1.0027** 
Std.Err. 0.1651 0.2376 0.1945 0.1799 0.2616 0.2166 0.1766 0.2514 0.2063 
t-ratio 0.3290 3.9490 -5.1030 -0.0200 3.8230 -4.5990 0.6920 3.5020 -4,8610 
ESQ Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
1.5842** 
0.3035 
5.2200 
-0.6396 
0.6279 
-1.0190 
-0.9446 
0.5924 
-1.5950 
EXSO Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
3.3558** 
0.8075 
4.1560 
-1.3537 
2.1453 
-0.6310 
-2.0021 
2.1357 
-0.9370 
EXSOEX Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
4.9346** 
1.4035 
3.5160 
0.3293 
4.1945 
0.0790 
-5.2639 
4.2989 
-1.2240 
LTIP Coeff. 3.9880 -4.3834 0.3954 4.1712 -4.5831 0.4119 
Std.Err. 2.5254 4.4573 3.9586 2.4716 4.4042 3.9233 
t-ratio 1.5790 -0.9830 0.1000 1.6880 -1.0410 0.1050 
MO Coeff. 0.0843 -0.0841 -0.0002 0.0913 -0.0912 -0.0001 
Std.Err. 0.0785 0.1547 0.1440 0.0775 0.1532 0.1423 
t-ratio 1.0740 -0.5440 -0.0020 1.1780 -0.5960 -0.0010 
STRUST Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-2.3478** 
0.9448 
-2.4850 
1.2600 
1.2055 
1.0450 
1.0878 
0.9290 
1.1710 
MSH Coeff. 0.0810 0.0895 -0.1705* 0.0539 0.1040 -0.1579* 0.0679 0.0918 -0.1597* 
Std.Err. 0.0424 0.0766 0.0698 0.0447 0.0785 0.0710 0.0448 0.0776 0.0700 
t-ratio 1.9110 1.1690 -2.4410 1.2050 1.3250 -2.2240 1.5160 1.1830 -2.2810 
SIZE Coeff. -0.0119 -0.0326** 0.0444** -0.0083 -0.0355** 0.0437** -0.0140 -0.0301** 0.0440** 
Std.Err. 0.0075 0.0105 0.0064 0.0082 0.0116 0.0094 0.0081 0.0113 0.0090 
t-ratio -1.5730 -3.0990 5.2880 -1.0020 -3.0470 4.6400 -1.7170 -2.6750 4.8800 
DEBT Coeff. 0.0654** 0.0098 -0.0752* 0.0751** 0.0006 -0.0757* 0.0775** -0.0004 -0.0771* 
Std.Err. 0.0117 0.0308 0.0311 0.0125 0.0310 0.0311 0.0130 0.0309 0.0308 
t-ratio 5.6110 0.3180 -2.4210 6.0130 0.0200 -2.4370 5.9700 -0.0140 -2.5040 
OPINCOME Coeff. -0.5208** 0.2657 0.2551 -0.5645** 0.2955 0.2690 -0.5849** 0.3034 0.2814 
Std.Err. 0.0859 0.1710 0.1612 0.0900 0.1720 0.1612 0.0947 0.1724 0.1595 
t-ratio -6.0620 1.5540 1.5830 -6.2740 1.7180 1.6690 -6.1760 1.7600 1.7640 
RETURN Coeff. -0.0226 -0.0243 0.0469 -0.0326* -0.0175 0.0501 -0.0386* -0.0119 0.0506 
Std.Err. 0.0151 0.0369 0.0361 0.0158 0.0363 0.0352 0.0159 0.0362 0.0351 
t-ratio -1.4960 -0.6580 1.3010 -2.0720 -0.4820 1.4240 -2.4330 -0.3290 1.4410 
Log likelihood function -661.78 -668.99 -671.60 
Restricted log likelihood -790.62 -790.62 -790.62 
Chi-squared 257.69^° 243.26" 238.04" 
Significance level 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 4-15: Robustness checks- O L S estimations of the value and fraction of shares repurchased using the re-purchasers sample- Controlling for dividends 
Variable definition can be found in tables 1, 2 and 3. A Dividend — this year's dividends nomialised by market value at the start of this year minus last year's dividends 
normalised by market value at the start of last year, A DPS = this year's dividends per share minus last year's dividends per share. Fixed and time effects are controlled for in 
all regressions. Number of observations=330. ** indicates a significance level of 1% or below, * indicates a significance level between 5 and 1%. 
Y = Value of repurchases Y = Fraction of repurchases Y = Value of repurchases Y = Fraction of repurchases Y = Value Of repurchases Y = Fraction of repurchases 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] m 18] [9] [10] [111 [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] 
Constant Coeff. 0.0266 0.0297 0.0259 0.0166 0.0228 0.0198 0.0314 0.0335 0.0296 0.0169 0.0230 0.0201 0.0228 0.0111 0.0156 0.0076 
Std.Err. 0.0262 0.0278 0.0269 0.0256 0.0272 0.0263 0.0258 0.0274 0.0267 0.0252 0.0268 0.0261 0.0250 0.0266 0.0245 0.0261 
t-ratio 1.0180 1.0706 0.9636 0.6499 0.8391 0.7534 1.2170 1.2211 1.1069 0.6726 0.8570 0.7694 0.9136 0.4188 0.6384 0.2910 
ESO Coeff. 
Sfd.Err. 
t-ratio 
-0.0303 
0.1289 
-0.2351 
0.0020 
0.1411 
0.0140 
-0.0122 
0.1206 
-0.1012 
0.0345 
0.1263 
0.2731 
i£XSO Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-0.2820 
0.3278 
-0.8604 
-0.0518 
0.2901 
-0.1786 
-0.3192 
0.3386 
-0.9427 
-0.0912 
0.2861 
-0.3187 
TOPTIONS Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-0.0262 
0.1349 
-0.1942 
0.0433 
0.1342 
0.3225 
EXOPTION Coeff. 
Std.En-. 
l-ratio 
-0.2820 
0.3335 
-0.8456 
-0.0376 
0.2964 
-0.1270 
EXSOEX Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
l-ratio 
-1.1240 
0.6911 
-1.6264 
-0.9465 
0.6396 
-1.4798 
-0.9012 
0.6869 
-1.3118 
-0.7509 
0.6364 
-1.1800 
LTIP Coeff. -0.0306 -0.0236 -0.0071 0.0035 0.1467 0.1606 0.1517 0.1668 -0.0313 -0.0077 
Std.Err. 0.6172 0.6192 0.6205 0.6217 0.6092 0.6108 0.5944 0.5956 0.6174 0.6209 
t-ratio -0.0496 -0.0381 -0.0114 0.0056 0.2409 0.2629 0.2553 0.2800 -0.0506 -0.0124 
\A0 Coeff. -0.0343 -0.0250 -0.0092 0.0008 -0.0374 -0.0316 -0.0110 -0.0041 -0.0326 -0.0091 
Std.Err. 0.0448 0.0476 0.0464 0.0481 0.0461 0.0479 0.0483 0.0498 0.0448 0.0465 
t-ratio -0.7640 -0.5253 -0.1980 0.0164 -0.8114 -0.6605 -0.2270 -0.0820 -0.7272 -0.1965 
STRUST Coeff. -0.9069** -0 .8883" -0.8517** -0.8284** -0.9081** -0.9097** 
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Std.Err. 0.2837 0.3370 0.2681 0.3106 0.2858 0.3391 
t-ratio -3.1969 -2 6355 -3.1770 -2.6675 -3.1778 -2.6831 
l/ISH Coeff. 0.0215 0.0149 0.0131 0.0187 0.0129 0.0106 0.0208 0.0147 0.0132 0.0212 0.0158 0.0139 0.0212 0.0128 0.0193 0.0127 
Std.Err. 0.0174 0.0172 0.0168 0.0157 0.0157 0.0154 0.0167 0.0165 0.0162 0.0155 0.0154 0.0151 0.0172 0.0167 0.0157 0.0155 
t-ratio 1.2349 0.8665 0.7795 1.1911 0.8231 0.6901 1.2461 0.8895 0.8144 1.3693 1.0241 0.9192 1.2299 0.7661 1.2242 0.8217 
M Z E Coeff. -0.0084 -0.0068 -0.0076 -0.0007 0.0013 0.0002 -0.0108 -0.0101 -0.0106 -0.0030 -0.0019 -0.0027 -0.0082 -0.0062 -0.0006 0.0014 
Std.Err. 0.0084 0.0088 0.0088 0.0077 0.0090 0.0090 0.0085 0.0086 0.0086 0.0071 0.0077 0.0078 0.0082 0.0085 0.0079 0.0087 
t-ratio -1.0056 -0.7765 -0.8646 -0.0888 0.1477 0.0214 -1.2748 -1.1736 -1.2318 -0.4189 -0.2401 -0.3460 -0.9977 -0.7291 -0.0739 0.1654 
DEBT Coeff. -0.0034 -0.0031 -0.0056 -0.0030 -0.0029 -0.0049 -0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0031 -0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0032 -0.0034 -0.0029 -0.0032 -0.0029 
Std.Err. 0.0076 0.0076 0.0081 0.0075 0.0075 0.0081 0.0079 0.0078 0.0082 0.0077 0.0076 0.0081 0.0075 0.0076 0.0075 0.0075 
t-ratio -0.4419 -0.4076 -0.6878 -0.3964 -0.3856 -0.6028 -0.2166 -0.1610 -0.3815 -0.2825 -0.2341 -0.4017 -0.4510 -0.3836 -0.4234 -0.3832 
OPINCOME Coeff. 0.0904- 0.0967- 0.1030" 0.0821* 0.0884* 0.0933* 0.0914* 0.0973* 0.0806 0.0885* 
Std.Err. 0.0434 0.0448 0.0463 0.0417 0.0456 0.0463 0.0458 0.0451 0.0437 0.0456 
t-ratio 2.0837 2.1570 2.2214 1.9676 1.9383 2.0144 1.9944 2.1597 1.8454 1.9382 
1 -xpec income Coeff. 0 .1113- 0 .1233" 0.1222** 0.1404* 0.1493* 0.1488* 
Std.Err 0.0398 0.0463 0.0469 0.0639 0.0710 0.0715 
t-ratio 2.7953 2.6627 2.6065 2.1979 2.1010 2.0822 
I Inexp income Coeff. 0.0106 0.0118 0.0097 0.0241 0.0249 0.0233 
Std.Err. 0.0212 0.0231 0.0238 0.0318 0.0337 0.0341 
t-ratio 0.5027 0.5108 0.4093 0.7573 0.7372 0.6852 
F'lETURN Coeff. -0.0030 -0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0061 -0.0057 -0.0056 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 -0.0043 -0.0039 -0.0036 -0.0029 -0.0024 -0.0062 -0.0056 
Std.Err. 0.0060 0.0061 0.0059 0.0064 0.0064 0.0063 0.0055 0.0055 0.0054 0.0061 0.0061 0.0061 0.0059 0.0059 0.0064 0.0063 
t-ratio -0.4930 -0.4769 -0.4458 -0.9524 -0.8876 -0.8845 0.0181 0.0212 0.1275 -0.7007 -0.6415 -0.5898 -0.4861 -0.4018 -0.9729 -0.8959 
t. Dividend Coeff. -0.0212 -0.0403 -0.0366 -0.0516 -0.0741 -0.0705 -0.0205 -0.0400 
Std.Err. 0.0837 0.0820 0.0823 0.0893 0.0877 0.0878 0.0837 0.0820 
t-ratio -0.2532 -0.4912 -0.4452 -0.5783 -0.8455 -0.8034 -0.2450 -0.4887 
t. DPS Coeff. -0.0295 -0.0253 -0.0261 -0.0412 -0.0360 -0.0373 -0.0308 -0.0254 
Std.Err. 0.0468 0.0514 0.0514 0.0466 0.0501 0.0504 0.0472 0.0515 
t-ratio -0.6296 -0.4915 -0.5079 -0.8853 -0.7185 -0.7397 -0.6514 -0.4935 
Adj R squared 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.15 
F statistic 1.66 1.53 1.54 1.73 1.59 1.60 1.68 1.56 1.57 1.84 1.72 1.73 1.66 1.53 1.73 1.59 
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Table 4-16: Robustness checks- Binomial logits estimations of the probability of repurchasing- Controlling for dividends 
This table reports the results of binomial logit regressions on the probability that a firm repurchases its shares at least once during the sample period (Y = 1) versus the 
)robability that it does not repurchase its shares at all during the whole sample period (Y = 0). The coefficients reported are the marginal effects of each variable on the 
])robability of being a re-purchaser while holding the other variables constant at their means. The definition of variables used can be found in tables 1, 2 and 3. Positive 
'inexpected income = unexp income * dummy (equals 1 i f unexp income>0). A Dividend = this year's dividends normalised by market value at the start of this year minus last 
year's dividends normalised by market value at the start of last year. We control for time and industry effects throughout all the binomial regressions. ** indicates a 
,;ignificance level of 1% or below, * indicates a significance level between 5 and 1%. 
IVIarqinal effects on Prob [Y = 1] 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 
I 'onstant Coeff. -1.4300" -1.1448" -1 .2132" -1.5368" -1.2262** -1.3172** -1.6121** -1.3066** -1.4014** -1 .5918" -1.4897** 
Std.Err, 0.2938 0.3151 0.3053 0.2972 0,3176 0.3083 0,2980 0.3180 0.3096 0,2855 0,2965 
t-ratio ^ . 8 6 8 0 -3.6330 -3.9730 -5.1700 -3.8610 -4,2720 -5.4100 ^ , 1 0 9 0 ^ . 5 2 6 0 -5.5750 -5.0250 
t;so Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-1.4240 
0.7998 
-1.7800 
-1.4550 
0.7723 
-1,8840 
-1.5892* 
0.7728 
-2,0570 
i;xso Coeff. 
StdErr . 
t-ratio 
-6 .1853" 
2.5263 
-2.4400 
-6.4436" 
2.4345 
-2.6470 
-6.8065** 
2.4327 
-2.7980 
1 Inex ESQ Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-1.3561 
0.8074 
-1.6800 
Unex EXSO Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-6.0567* 
2,5195 
-2,4040 
li lXSOEX Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-12.5648* 
5.2825 
-2.3790 
-12.5936** 
5,0995 
-2.4700 
-13.0263** 
5.0873 
-2,5610 
1 TIP Coeff. -2.8233 -2.5868 -2,1595 -2.0142 -1.7748 -1.6710 -2.8287 
Std.Err. 5.1547 5.1425 5.0821 5,0851 5.1148 5,1181 5.1544 
t-ratio -0.5480 -0.5030 -0,4250 -0.3960 -0,3470 -0.3260 -0,5490 
MO Coeff. -0.2672 -0.2621 -0,2972 -0.2870 -0.2960 -0.2859 -0.2310 
Std.Err. 0.1941 0.1919 0.1917 0.1896 0.1928 0.1906 0.1936 
t-ratio -1.3770 -1,3660 -1.5500 -1,5140 -1.5350 -1.5000 -1.1930 
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STRUST Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
1.9407 
1.2262 
1.5830 
2.4861* 
1.2408 
2.0040 
2.5137* 
1.2476 
2.0150 
1.8991 
1,2217 
1,5540 
Coeff. -0 .2272" -0.1910* -0.2050" -0.2172* -0.1798* -0.1938* -0.2159* -0.1774* -0.1912* -0 .2446" -0.2358** 
Std.Err. 0.0924 0.0932 0.0928 0.0907 0.0914 0.0913 0 0 9 1 1 0,0919 0.0917 0.0926 0.0927 
t-ratio -2.4580 -2.0490 -2.2100 -2.3940 -1.9670 -2.1220 -2.3700 -1,9310 -2.0840 -2.6410 -2,5440 
:3IZE Coeff. 0.0634" 0.0501" 0.0529" 0.0691** 0 .0551" 0.0586** 0.0718** 0.0578" 0.0616** 0.0664** 0.0634" 
Std.Err. 0.0131 0.0141 O0138 0.0133 0.0143 0.0140 0.0133 0.0142 0,0140 0.0130 0,0135 
t-ratio 4.8490 3.5510 3.8370 5.1860 3.8620 4.1930 5.3930 4,0600 4.3990 5.0960 4.7060 
OEBT Coeff. -0.1950" -0.2160" -0.2179" -0.1373* -0.1605" -0.1590** -0 .1503" -0 .1737" -0 .1712" -0.1984** -0 .2123" 
Std.Err. 0.0477 0.0486 0.0480 0.0451 0.0466 0.0458 0.0451 0,0468 0.0458 0.0477 0.0486 
t-ratio -4.0860 -4.4470 -4.5430 -3.0460 -3.4420 -3.4720 -3.3330 -3,7130 -3,7360 ^ . 1 5 8 0 -* ,3710 
OPINCOME Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
0.7428" 
0.2245 
3.3090 
0.7434" 
0.2239 
3.3200 
0.7633** 
0.2253 
3.3890 
0.7613** 
0.2243 
3.3940 
0.7487" 
0.2239 
3,3430 
t ixpec income Coeff. 1.5352** 1.5257** 1.5439" 1.5854** 1.6063" 1.6150" 
Std.Err. 0.5104 0 5 1 4 5 0.5217 0.4791 0,4832 0.4933 
t-ratio 3.0080 2.9660 2.9600 3,3090 3.3250 3.2740 
1 Jnexp income Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
0.3687 
0.2009 
1.8350 
0.3682 
0.2026 
1.8170 
0.3523 
0.2002 
1.7600 
r'ositive Coeff. 0.7611* 0.7710* 0.7218 
Unexp income Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
0.3766 
2.0210 
0,3768 
2,0460 
0,3781 
1.9090 
RETURN Coeff. 0.0862 0.0808 0.0821 0.0762 0.0699 0.0743 0.0759 0,0705 0.0759 0.0906* 0.0925* 
Std.Err. 0.0455 0.0452 0.0453 0.0474 0.0477 0.0476 0.0468 0.0465 0.0465 0.0455 0,0454 
t-ratio 1.8950 1.7850 1.8130 1.6090 1.4670 1.5610 1.6220 1.5190 1.6310 1.9930 2,0380 
A Dividend Coeff. -1.0983 -1.1062 -1.1050 -1.0070 -1.0011 -1.0038 -1.0780 -1.0726 -1,0773 -1.1047 -1.1081 
Std.Err. 0.8379 0,8265 0.8278 0.8385 0.8248 0.8271 0.8503 0.8360 0.8387 0.8370 0,8265 
t-ratio -1.3110 -1.3380 -1,3350 -1.2010 -1.2140 -1.2140 -1,2680 -1.2830 -1.2840 -1.3200 -1.3410 
L og likelihood function -574.31 -572.65 -572.50 -573.17 -571.54 -571.65 -573.38 -571,65 -571.87 -574,49 -572.75 
F^estricted log likelihood -640.52 -640.52 -640.52 -640.52 -640.52 -640.52 -640,52 -640.52 -640,52 -640.52 -640.52 
C^hi-squared"' 132.43^° 135.76^' 136.05^' 134.70^' 137.98^^ 137.74^^ 134.29^' 1 3 7 . 7 5 " 137.32^^ 132,06^° 13555^ ' 
;>ignificance level 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0,0000 0,0000 
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Table 4-17: Robustness checks- Multinomial logit estimations of the probability of repurchasing vs. only paying dividends vs. retaining earnings - Controlling for dividends 
This table reports the results of multinomial logit regressions on the probability that a firm repurchases its shares at least once during the sample period (Y = 2), the probability that it does not 
repurchase its shares at all during the whole sample period but continuously pays dividends (meaning at least twice during the sample period) (Y = 1), or the probability that it retains its 
earnings (no repurchases at all during the sample period, and no/or irregular dividends) (Y = 0). The coefficients reported are the marginal effects of each variable on the probability of being a 
retainer (Y = 0), dividend payer (Y = 1), or a re-purchaser (Y = 2) while holding the other variables constant at their means. For a brief definition of the variables used refer back to table 2. 
Positive imexpected income = unexp income * dummy (equals 1 i f unexp income>0). A Dividend = this year's dividends normalised by market value at the start of this year minus last year's 
dividend;; normalised by market value at the start of last year. Only time effects are controlled for throughout the multinomial regressions. Y = 0 -> 119 observations, Y = 1 ^ 567 
observations, Y = 2 -> 330 observations. 
** indicates a significance level of 1% or below, * indicates a significance level between 5 and 1%. 
[1] [2] [3] ni [2] [3] 
Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 
Constant Coeff. 0.2523 1.1500" -1.4024" 0.0943 1.1827** -1.2769" 0.1821 1.1338" -1.3159** 0.3131 1.1423" -1.4554" 0.1921 1.1519** -1.3440** 0.2712 1.1172" -1 .3884" 
Std.Err. 0.1676 0.2964 0.2828 0.1871 0.3216 0.3070 0.1816 0.3102 0.2961 0 1 6 6 8 0.2970 0.2842 0.1841 0.3213 0.3083 0.1780 0.3100 0.2976 
t-ratio 1.5060 3.8800 -4.9580 0.5040 3.6780 -4.1590 1.0030 3.6550 -<.4450 1.8770 3.8470 -5.1210 1.0440 3.5860 -4.3600 1.5240 3.6040 ^ . 6 6 5 0 
ESC Coeff. 1.8186** -0.2551 -1.5635* 1.9523** -0.2395 -1 .7128" 
Std.Err. 0.3282 0.7983 0.7963 0.3349 0.7981 0.7955 
t-ratio 5.5410 -0.3190 -1.9630 5.8300 -0.3000 -2.1530 
EXSO Coeff. 4.6775** -0.2620 -4.4154 4.8600" -0.1782 -4.6818 
Std.Err. 0.9076 2.6466 2.7161 0.9347 2.6375 2.7029 
t-ratio 5.1540 -0.0990 -1.6260 5.2000 -0.0680 -1.7320 
EXSOEX Coeff. 9.3325" 1.2603 -10.5928 9.6010** 1.3250 -10.9260 
Std.Err. 1.8903 5.5217 5.7036 1.8825 5.4948 5.7031 
t-ratio 4.9370 0.2280 -1.8570 5.1000 O2410 -1.9160 
LTIP Coeff. 1.6880 1.3457 -3.0337 2.4075 0.6326 -3.0402 0.9782 1.6369 -2.6151 1.9117 0.7195 -2.6312 
Std.Err. 2.9347 5.5271 5.3757 2.8003 5.4787 5.3484 3.0914 5.5579 5.3915 2.9264 5.5081 5.3662 
t-ratio 0.5750 0.2430 -0.5640 0.8600 0.1150 -0.5680 O3160 0.2950 -0.4850 0.6530 0 1 3 1 0 -0.4900 
MO Coeff. 0.2301** -0.1541 -0.0761 0.2349** -0.1624 -0.0725 0.2359" -0.1713 -0.0646 0 .2430" -0.1833 -0.0596 
Std.Err. 0.0762 0.1980 0.1957 0.0733 0 1 9 6 4 0 1 9 4 5 0.0750 0.1989 0.1969 0.0721 0.1975 0 1 9 5 9 
t-ratio 3.0220 -0.7780 -0.3890 3.2070 -0.8270 -0.3730 3.1450 -0.8610 -0.3280 3.3710 -0.9280 -0.3040 
STRUST Coeff. -3.7008** 0.4358 3.2651** -3.6261** 0.3774 3.2487" 
Std.Err. 0.9821 1.3775 1.2749 0.9886 1.3816 1.2786 
t-ratio -3.7680 0.3160 2.5610 -3.6680 0.2730 2.5410 
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MSH Coeff, 0.1213** 0.0945 -0.2158* 0.0894* 0.0918 -0.1812* 0.0958* 0.0920 -0.1878* 0 .1085" 0.1037 -0.2122* 0.0735 0.1031 -0.1766 0.0832 0.1010 -0.1842* 
StdErr . 0.0410 0.0931 0.0923 0.0444 0.0949 0.0935 0.0437 0.0943 0.0932 0.0412 0.0932 0.0925 0.0451 0.0951 0.0939 0,0438 0.0945 0.0936 
l-ratio 2.9580 1.0150 -2,3370 2,0120 0.9680 -1.9370 2.1910 0.9760 -2.0150 2.6350 1,1120 -2.2930 1,6280 1.0840 -1.8820 1,9010 1.0690 -1,9690 
SIZE Coeff. -0.0208" -0.0451" 0.0660** -0.0128 -0.0469** 0.0597** •O.0167* -0.0447" 0.0614** -0 .0236" -0.0445** 0 .0681" -0.0169* -0.0453** 0.0622** -0.0205** -0.0436** 0.0641** 
Std.Err. 0,0077 0.0131 0.0124 0.0085 0,0143 0.0136 0.0083 0.0139 0,0131 0,0076 0,0131 0.0125 0,0084 0.0143 0.0136 0,0082 0.0138 0.0132 
t-ratio -2.7240 -3.4390 5.3040 -1.4950 -3,2770 4.3980 -2.0040 -3,2250 4,6720 -3.0930 -3.3880 5.4590 -2.0090 -3,1690 4.5720 -2.5050 -3,1560 4.8650 
DEBT Coeff. 0.0454** 0,0173 -0.0627 0.0570" 0.0117 -0.0686 0.0632** 0.0068 -0.0700 0.0527" 0.0186 -0.0713 0.0629** 0.0132 -0.0761* 0.0674** 0,0094 -0.0768* 
Std.Err. 0.0114 0.0369 0.0380 0.0124 0,0370 0,0381 0.0127 0.0372 0.0381 0,0113 0.0370 0,0381 0.0121 0,0369 0.0381 0.0124 0.0372 0,0382 
t-ratio 3,9830 0.4680 -1,6490 4.6090 0,3160 -1.8020 4.9820 0,1840 -1,8380 4.6670 0.5030 -1.8720 5,2040 0.3570 -1,9980 5.4220 0.2530 -2.0140 
Expec income Coeff. -0 .5788" -0.2232 0.8020** -0.6382** -0,1927 0.8309** -0 .6809" -0.1764 0.8574" -0.6485" -0,2342 0.8827** -0 .7263" -0,1927 0.9190** -0.7545** -0.1809 0.9355** 
Std.Err. 0.1197 0,2984 0,3024 0,1257 0.2961 0.3010 0,1307 0,3011 0.3045 0.1294 0,3035 0.3042 0.1406 0,3045 0.3043 0.1441 0,3101 0,3092 
t-ratio ^ . 8 3 5 0 -0,7480 2,6520 -5.0770 -0.6510 2.7610 -5.2090 -0.5860 2,8160 -5,0120 -0.7720 2.9020 -5,1660 -0.6330 3,0210 -5.2370 -0.5830 3.0260 
Unexp income Coeff. -0 .2379" -0.0899 0.3278 -0.2748** -0.0547 0,3295 -0 .2542" -0,0705 0.3247 
Sid, Err. 0.0674 0.2180 0.2249 0,0717 0,2149 0,2225 0.0712 0,2116 0.2190 
l-ratio -3.5320 -0.4120 1,4580 -3,8350 -0,2550 1.4810 -3.5700 -0.3330 1.4830 
Positive Coeff. •0.2709 -0.3903 0.6612 -0.2952 -0,3435 0.6387 -0,2034 -0,4164 0.6198 
Unexp income Std.Err. 0,1519 0.3797 0.3749 0,1741 0.3790 0,3737 0,1767 0.3826 0 3 7 3 3 
t-ratio -1,7830 -1,0280 1.7640 -1.6960 -0.9060 1.7090 -1,1510 -1.0880 1.6610 
RETURN Coeff, -0.0618** -0.0048 0,0665 -0 .0687" 0.0019 0,0668 -0.0768** 0.0052 0.0716 -0.0729** 0.0086 0,0643 -0 .0839" 0,0164 0,0675 -0.0919** 0,0194 0.0725 
Sid, Err, 0.0184 0.0509 0.0513 0.0192 0.0507 0.0511 0.0192 0.0505 0.0509 0.0183 0.0504 0.0508 0,0184 0.0496 0,0498 0.0186 0,0496 0.0499 
t-ratio -3.3650 -0,0940 1.2980 -3,5870 0.0380 1.3060 -3.9950 0,1030 1.4070 -3,9730 0,1700 1.2660 -4.5630 0.3310 1.3540 ^ . 9 3 8 0 0,3910 1,4530 
A Dividend Coeff. -0.1618 1.3811 -1,2193 -0,1473 1,3678 -1,2205 -0.0368 1,2648 -1.2280 -0.2339 1.5083 -1.2743 -0.2139 1.4822 -1.2683 -0.1144 1.3878 -1,2734 
Std.Err. 0.4032 0.8989 0,8822 0,4459 0,8955 0,8696 0.4465 0.8862 0,8670 0.4153 0,9117 0.8911 0.4600 0.9064 0,8770 0.4624 0.8989 0.8748 
t-ratio -0.4010 1.5360 -1.3820 -0.3300 1.5270 -1.4030 -0,0820 1.4270 -1.4160 -0.5630 1.6540 -1,4300 -0,4650 1,6350 -1,4460 -0,2470 1.5440 -1.4560 
Log likelihood fu.iction -813,27 -820.73 -818.34 -821,22 -830,77 -827.11 
Restricted log lik e lihood -957.01 -957,01 -957,01 -957.01 -957.01 -957.01 
Chi-squared"' 287.47^" 272 .55^ 277.34^^ 271.56^' 252 .46^ 259 .79^ 
Significance lev( 1 0,0000 0.0000 0.0000 0,0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Comparison of selected studies on the motivations for share repurchases'*^ 
'Paper Hypotheses Methodology 
tested 
Findings Caveats 
Comment & 
.(arrell(1991) 
Li and McNally 
•2000) 
D'Mello & Shroff 
.2000) 
Jagannathan et al 
•2000) 
juay and 
iiardford (2000) 
'tVeisbenner 
11998) 
Signalling Focus on the announcement returns of: 
tender offers (TO) versus open market 
repurchases (OMR). 
Signalling Focus only on TO, they estimate the 
economic value (EV) of repurchasing 
firms using earnings forecasts and 
hypothesise that firms repurchase occur 
when their EV is greater than the 
prevailing stock price. 
FCF Focus on the characteristics of firms 
that repurchase vs. those that increase 
dividends vs. those that do both vs. 
those that do neither. 
FCF Focus on the information content of 
repurchases vs. dividends in relation to 
market's expectations of the 
permanence of the cash-flow. 
Options Uses reduced form regression on a 
cross-sectional sample and an 
unbalanced panel to measure the effect 
of total and executive options on 
repurchases, total payouts and earnings 
OMR are associated with the 
smallest announcement returns, 
though i f they are large in value 
they can be as effective in 
signalling undervaluation as TO. 
Repurchasing firms are significantly 
more undervalued than non 
repurchasing firms. 
Dividends are used to pay out 
permanent cash flows while 
repurchases are used to pay out 
temporary cash flows. 
Large dividend increases are 
associated with a larger permanent 
component of cash flow than 
repurchases. 
Stock option programs are 
associated with increased 
repurchases and decreased earnings 
retention. But the larger the 
executive options the more likely a 
In the UK most buybacks are on the market, and the 
maximum number of shares that can be bought with 
a single authority is 15% of share capital. 
The arguments of these studies being mostly based 
on the market reaction to tender offers, their results 
are thus unlikely to apply to the UK. 
They focus their analysis entirely on the FCF 
argument, neglecting to control for factors like 
managerial interests and capital structure. 
They make the implicit assumption that the market 
adjusts its expectations following the announcement 
of the event (repurchase or dividend increase) only 
according to the permanence of cash-flow 
information content of the event. Thus ignoring 
other information. 
The results of this study are unreliable because of 
the unreliability of the data it uses (obvious 
problems with the cross-sectional analysis and 
selection bias in the panel data, not having been 
randomly selected). Moreover, the use of a reduced 
* This table only includes studies that focus on the motivations for share buybacks. Another trend in the share repurchase literature, which we are not concerned with, is the 
.innouncement effect of share repurchases on share prices. 
177 
»..napier 4: mvesiigation 01 tne motivations 01 snare repurcnases in tne UK 
KJiale (2002) 
retention. firm is to retain its earnings 
Options Uses logit models to estimate the 
probability of repurchasing vs. 
increasing dividends. 
Repurchases are significantly 
positively related to total 
exercisable options and repurchase 
announcement retum is 
significantly negatively related to 
total options outstanding. 
form regression is inappropriate since the payout 
variable is not a censored variable. Finally, 
measuring repurchases as any negative change in 
shares outstanding is inappropriate. 
Measuring the decision variable according to the 
announcement of repurchases or dividend increases 
is inappropriate given that announcements are not 
always followed by actual repurchases. 
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5.1 Introduction 
In the literature review chapter we focused on an analysis of the main explanations, 
assumptions, hypotheses and empirical results to be found in the academic literature 
dealing with board/managerial motivations to repurchase their companies' shares. We 
found that the free-cash flow hypothesis, whereby firms with significant free cash 
flows are hypothesised to use share repurchases primarily as a means by which to 
retum some of this surplus cash to their shareholders, enjoys considerable empirical 
support from several US studies. However, several studies have also produced 
conflicting evidence for this hypothesis. In the previous chapter we looked at UK 
firms' motivations to repurchase their shares and, although the FCF hypothesis 
seemed tenable given our results, there remained the issue that most firms seem to 
repurchase not out of excess cash flow, as should be the case according to the 
argument of the FCF hypothesis, but rather out of permanent income. The free cash 
flow model also suggests that this form of distributing (surplus) cash to shareholders 
ought to represent an incremental (additional) distribution rather than being a 
substitute for regular dividend payments. The empirical evidence from both existing 
published studies and the current paper indicates however that some share repurchases 
may be substitutes for dividend payments, or at least, dividend increases. 
The widespread use of share repurchases and the evidence that repurchases are a 
substitute for dividends suggests that the free cash flow hypothesis is not likely to 
account for the majority of these repurchase decisions. Nevertheless, both these 
factors appear to imply that this form of distributing surplus cash to shareholders must 
have attractive additional features relative to the traditional altemative of simply 
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increasing dividend payments on all currently issued shares. Later in the chapter a 
discussion of the inherent (financial) flexibihty of share repurchases vis-a-vis 
dividends is undertaken. Briefly, however, unlike in the case of dividends where the 
market reacts negatively to news of a reduction in dividends, market 
expectations/pressures in regard to firms making regular and/or predictable share 
repurchases are almost non-existent. Indeed, this lack of market expectations 
provides repurchasing firms with significant financial flexibility via their ability to 
choose the fiming and size of their actual trades, including of course the possibility of 
ex post not repurchasing at all irrespective of earlier apparent 
decisions/announcements to the contrary. 
The flexibility of share repurchases vis-a-vis dividends as a method of returning 
apparently "surplus" cash to shareholders is likely to be particularly valuable to firms 
facing uncertainties regarding future income levels and therefore fearful of raising 
unrealisfic expectafions of future dividends. Consequently, it seems plausible to 
model repurchase decisions as simply one element of a firm's overall payout policy 
and to focus the empirical analysis upon evaluating the impact of repurchase activities 
on total payouts, in particular, whether repurchases are primarily substitutes for, or 
complementary to, dividend payments. 
An implication of share repurchases being considered to be an integral part of a firm's 
payout policy, is that repurchases ought to be taken into account when valuing its 
shares, or when predicting its future cash distributions. What is evident from the 
financial literature though, is that dividends are sfill the only form of payout used in 
the standard textbook models of share valuation and future payout estimations. 
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Financial analysts also still use models such as the discounted dividend model (DDM) 
to estimate the value of a firm without taking into account its repurchase policy. Some 
researchers, for example Lamdin (2000) and Randall (2000), have already raised this 
issue and have demonstrated how valuation models can be biased when they do not 
incorporate share repurchases. For instance, Lamdin (2000) found that when the 
traditional DDM is used it results in undervaluation errors that are positively related to 
the extent of the firm's use of share repurchases, meaning that the more a firm 
repurchases its shares the more undervalued it would look i f valued using the DDM. 
Consequently, both Lamdin (2000) and Randall (2000) have proposed modified 
versions of the DDM that take into account cash distributions through share 
repurchases. 
Another example of the confusion caused when a narrow definition of dividends is 
used comes from the stock price volatility literature. Earlier studies such as LeRoy & 
Porter (1981), Shiller (1981) and West (1988) found evidence against the efficient 
market hypothesis primarily because they used a narrow definition of dividends. 
Ackert & Smith (1993) on the other hand, incorporate in their model cash 
distributions through share repurchases and takeover payments. Their results lend 
support to the market efficiency hypothesis as they find that stock prices are not too 
volatile to be explained by the discounted value of total cash flows. 
These studies illustrate that regular dividend payments have become only part of the 
total payouts of many firms; they appear to represent the smooth expectable 
component of the distribution to shareholders. The other part, which could take the 
form of special dividends and/or share repurchases, represents the cyclical more 
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volatile component of the distribution. Hence, analyses that restrict corporate payout 
policy to dividends are effecfively limidng the analysis to just the inherently smoother 
and less flexible component of total payouts. This means that any results will 
automatically be biased against finding any relationship between changes in dividends 
and the uncertain component of current earnings. 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the determinants of total payout policy as 
opposed to just dividends. We start off with Lintner's (1956) model of corporate 
dividend behaviour, apply it to total payouts, and extend it to include other variables 
that have been suggested or found to be influential in respect of corporate payout 
policies. We demonstrate that Lintner's model can still function relatively well when 
total payouts are estimated as opposed to just dividends. We also show that firms that 
repurchase their shares tend to have a smoother dividend policy, as the most volatile 
element of their payouts is captured by share repurchases. This implies that using the 
traditional models of corporate dividend behaviour without taking into account share 
repurchases will tend to yield results that appear to show that current earnings have 
virtually no impact upon current dividends and that the latter can be almost wholly 
explained in terms of lagged dividend payments. In addition, we suggest some 
modifications to Lintner's partial adjustment model, that reflect changes in 
fundamentals of corporate dividend policy over the years, and the unique environment 
in which UK companies operate, which tends to encourage conservatism more than in 
the US (with regard to dividends). 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows; firstly, some background 
literature on dividends is presented, there is no need to do the same for share 
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repurchases as these have been analysed in depth in the previous chapter. The main 
motivations for paying dividends are presented followed by what the literature 
suggests are the detenninants of corporate dividend policy. Secondly, motivations for 
this research are presented with a theoretical framework of how the analysis fits into 
the current spectrum of literature on dividends. This is followed by a brief description 
of the methodology and data used. Finally, the results are presented and discussed and 
conclusions drawn. 
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5.2 Literature review 
Corporate dividends have been at the centre o f an ongoing debate for at least the past 
50 years. This debate has come to be known as the 'dividend puzzle', and at its heart 
are questions like "why do firms choose to pay dividends?" and "why should 
dividends affect the value o f the firm?" Many academicians have attempted to answer 
these and other questions, some advancing strong theories and models to support 
them, others choosing to draw their answers from the mouths o f those who make the 
decisions i.e. directors and senior managers. In either case, the financial literature has 
not reached a consensus over the importance and the relevance o f corporate dividend 
policy. At one extreme, some theorists have asserted that in perfect markets dividend 
policy has no bearing on the value o f the firm (Miller and Modigliani's irrelevancy 
theory, 1961). At the other extreme, other theorists have maintained that markets are 
not perfect, and therefore dividend policy does affect the value o f the firm. 
Numerous hypotheses have been developed to explain why firms choose to pay 
dividends; most are based on some sort o f market imperfection. It would be foolish to 
try to summarise all the literature on the subject, given how large and widespread it is. 
The following is therefore only a taster o f an incredibly rich and "puzzling" literature. 
Given that this literature is usually divided into that which looks at why firms pay 
dividends, and that which looks at what determines the firm's dividend policy, we w i l l 
also divide our preview accordingly. 
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5.2.1 The Motivations for Dividend Payments 
5.2.1.1 The tax clientele hypothesis 
It has been argued that due to differential tax liabilities amongst investors, dividend 
payments create a tax clientele effect. Each clientele is classified according to its tax 
preferences, for instance, individual investors tend to be taxed on income at a higher 
rate than capital gains, this makes them less favourable to dividends, contrary to 
institutional investors like pension funds who ought to be indifferent (at least in the 
U K ) between income gains or capital gains. The result o f this is that high-income tax 
payers would put a smaller value on the shares o f high dividend-paying firms, and 
according to the theory we should expect them to concentrate their investments in 
stocks characterised by share repurchases or income retention instead o f dividend 
payments. The opposite would be true for the case o f low-income tax payers. This is 
consistent with the model put forward by Masulis & Trueman (1988), where the 
segregation o f investors into clienteles minimises the shareholder tax-differences. 
Several authors have come up with models to explain why firms keep paying 
dividends while a large portion o f potential investors would prefer capital gains. 
Farrar & Selwyn (1967) for example present a model in which investors can choose 
the level o f their debt (personal and corporate) and how to receive their returns 
(income or capital gains). They show that instead o f paying dividends firms should 
repurchase their shares to distribute their cash fiows. Brennan (1970) extends this 
model from just a partial to a general equilibrium framework, but essentially comes to 
the same conclusions. Auerbach (1979) argues that firms pay dividends essentially 
because investors tend to underesfimate the value o f long-term corporate capital. 
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Bajaj & V i j h (1990) use the clientele hypothesis to explain the price reactions 
associated with announcements o f changes in dividends. They predict these reactions 
to be affected by the marginal investor's dividend yield preferences, and find that 
indeed the market's reaction to a dividend change is greater the higher the pre-
announcement dividend yield, which they use as a proxy for anticipated dividend 
yield. The reasoning behind this is that, since high yield firms attract low-income tax 
payers, their announcements o f dividend-increases or cuts should induce a greater 
price shock than low-yield firms which mostly attract high-income tax payers. Denis 
et al. (1994) also provide results supportive o f the dividend clientele hypothesis. 
Using a sample o f 6,777 large dividend changes during the period f rom 1962 to 1988, 
they document a positive relationship between announcement period excess returns 
and dividend yield. 
5.2.1.2 The signalling hypothesis 
The idea that dividends are used as a signalling device originated almost as early as 
the debate over dividends itself In fact we can trace this idea back to the seminal 
paper by Lintner in 1956, where he presented his model o f corporate dividend 
behaviour (and which we w i l l come back to later), explicitly suggesting that corporate 
dividends reflect the long-term earnings prospects o f the firm. He argued that firms 
are reluctant to cut their dividends since this would be interpreted by the market as a 
signal o f bad things to come, and are generally caufious about large increases in their 
dividends especially i f these may not be sustainable over the long-term. This is 
reflected in the fact that most firms have a relafively smooth dividend payout policy, 
and gives impetus to the signalling hypothesis; knowing how reluctant corporafions 
are to cut their dividends, the market usually downgrades any firm that does so, 
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similarly, knowing how cautious corporations are about large increases in their 
dividends, the market generally rewards firms that do so. This suggests that dividends 
are indeed used in the financial markets as a channel o f communication between 
insiders and interested outsiders, whether this channel o f communication is used to 
transmit accurate information is at this point irrelevant. 
Numerous studies have empirically tested the signalling hypothesis, though this has 
generally led to conflicting results. Event studies o f the effect o f dividend changes on 
stock returns generally find evidence supporting the signalling hypothesis, as dividend 
cuts are generally followed by large declines in stock prices and vice versa (Aharony 
& Sway, 1980; Asquith & Mullins, 1983; Petitt, 1972; Balachandran et al, 1996). For 
instance, using a sample o f 6,777 large dividend changes between 1962-1988 Denis et 
al. (1994) find that two-day abnormal returns associated with dividend change 
announcements are positively related to the standardised size o f the dividend change. 
They also document significant changes in analysts' earnings forecasts following 
dividend changes. They interpret these findings as being supportive o f the signalling 
hypothesis. 
However, many researchers challenge, not the findings themselves, but the leap from 
such findings to the suggesfion that dividend changes can inform us of the future 
earnings o f the firm. As stated very eloquently by A l i i et al. (1993, p.528): ''Despite 
the significant number of studies showing that dividends convey information, there is 
still considerable controversy about what dividends actually signaF'. In other words, 
although there is much evidence o f the correlation between dividend changes and 
stock prices, it should not be taken to mean that dividend changes actually inform us 
o f the future prospects o f the firm. In fact, there is just as much evidence showing that 
dividend changes can hardly be indicative o f future earnings. Watts (1973) examines 
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the relationship between current dividends and future earnings using a sample o f 310 
firms between 1946 and 1967. He regresses next year's earnings on current year's 
dividends and finds a positive relationship that is statistically insignificant. Gonedes 
(1978) and Penman (1983) find similar results. Benartzi et al. (1997) also reports 
results that are consistent with those o f Watts (1973); namely, there is no significant 
relationship between dividend changes and future earnings. However, they do find 
that dividend changes are indicative o f lagged and current earnings' changes, which 
leads them to conclude that all the information that one can draw from dividend 
changes concerns the permanence or otherwise o f current changes in earnings. 
Kalay (1980) tests the signalling hypothesis using a theory based on the conflicting 
interests o f shareholders and bondholders, where the dividend decision is not left to 
the discretion o f managers but is rather imposed on them as a result o f some 
constraints. He argues that forced dividend reductions (reductions that result f rom an 
existing dividend constraint) cannot convey managers' expectations o f future 
earnings, but finds that only 5% o f dividend reductions he studied were forced 
reductions. This could be interpreted as providing support to the signalling hypothesis. 
Brickley (1983) uses a small sample o f 35 firms that increased their dividends by 
more than 20 percent and finds that earnings increase significantly in the year o f the 
dividend increase and year subsequent to it. Aharony & Dotan (1994) find that 
earning increases continue for a period well over four quarters after the dividend 
increase. 
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Healy & Palepu (1988) find somewhat conflicting evidence. They use a sample o f 131 
firms that initiate dividend payments, and a sample o f 172 firms that omitted a 
dividend payment. Their results show that the sample that initiated dividends 
experienced earnings increases before and after the dividend initiation, while the 
sample that omitted paying dividends experienced earning decreases in the year o f the 
omission announcement but then experienced significant earning increases in the next 
years. These findings both support and dismiss the signalling hypothesis. 
DeAngelo et al. (1992) compare dividend decisions o f 167 NYSE firms that suffered 
at least one annual loss during 1980-1985 to those o f 440 NYSE firms that did not 
suffer any loss during the same period. They find that half o f the loss-firms reduced 
dividends in the initial year o f the loss, while only 1% o f non-loss firms reduced 
dividends during the sample period. They also find that 25% o f loss-firms omit paying 
dividends during the year of the inifial loss, while only one non-loss firm omits to pay 
dividends during the whole sample period. Nevertheless, the authors argue that a 
negafive net income is not always a predictor o f a dividend reduction, since half o f 
loss-firms did not reduce their dividends during the year o f the initial loss. They 
suggest that the use o f net income corrected for extraordinary items should give better 
predictions as to dividend reductions. 
Baker & Powel (1999) conduct a survey on dividend policy which they sent to chief 
execufive officers o f US firms listed on the NYSE, and based on 198 usable responses 
they find that most respondents believe that dividend policy affects the firm's value. 
Moreover, out o f four explanations they gave in their survey for the relevance o f 
dividends, most respondents expressed the highest agreement with the signalling 
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explanations. These results confirm those o f Baker, Farelly & Eldelman (1985) and 
confirm the prediction o f Lintner (1956) regarding managers concern for dividends' 
continuity. 
Instead o f examining changes in earnings following large changes in dividends, some 
researchers choose to study changes in dividends in periods surrounding large changes 
in earnings. Using a sample o f 145 firms that experienced large decreases in their 
earnings after ten consecutive years o f earnings' increases, DeAngelo et al. (1996) 
find that earnings changes precede dividend changes. They suggest that managers do 
not use dividends to signal any negative information they might have about the future 
earnings o f the firm, which may be due to their over optimism or to other agency 
considerations. Brook et al. (1998) use the same type o f methodology on a sample o f 
firms that experienced four years o f flat cash flows followed by a sharp permanent 
increase in cash flow. They find that these firms tend to increase their dividends more 
than benchmark firms before the large cash flow jump. They also find that firms that 
increase their dividends prior to the earnings increase experience much higher 
abnormal returns in the year preceding the earnings' increase than those that do not 
increase their dividend prior to the earnings increase. Although both types o f firms 
eventually experience similar levels o f abnormal returns, the t iming o f these returns is 
different depending on whether the firm increases its dividends prior to the earnings 
increase, in which case it would experience positive abnormal returns at the 
announcement o f the dividend increase, or i f it does not increase its dividends, in 
which case the abnormal returns would be associated directly with the announcement 
of earnings increases. In addition, the authors find that firms that experience only 
short-term earning increases do not tend to increase their dividends in the year prior to 
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the earnings increase nor decrease them afterwards. This comforts the findings o f 
DeAngelo et al. (1996), but overall Brook et al.'s results lend support to the signalling 
hypothesis. 
Some argue that dividend changes can also signal the volatility o f a f i rm's cash flows. 
Kale & Noe (1990) develop such a model and illustrate how firms with volafile future 
cash flows pay less in dividends. However, A l i i et al. (1993) test this model but do not 
find evidence to support it. 
5.2.1.3 The agency theory and managements' entrenchment hypothesis 
Agency theory suggests that paying dividends can help alleviate the agency costs 
arising from the conflicting interests o f managers and shareholders. It is argued that 
this can be achieved in two ways: dividend payments can induce managers to be more 
selective in their investments by l imif ing the funds at their disposal (Jensen, 1986), 
and dividend payments also induce managers to raise external capital and hence 
expose themselves more frequently to the scrutiny o f the market (Easterbrook, 1984). 
Proponents of Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis argue that managers are less likely 
to invest in value-decreasing projects when they distribute the available free cash flow 
to shareholders. However, some researchers have argued that FCF should be primarily 
used for the internal funding o f investment projects, and that i f it is paid to 
shareholders instead then it may not be cost-effective i f the firm ends up going back to 
the market to raise the necessary funds for its investments, given all the transaction 
costs involved in such a process. Yet, supporters o f the agency theory have argued 
that going back to the market to raise funds is not a bad thing in itself; rather, that 
accessing the public debt markets is beneficial for shareholders since the informafion 
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revealed and the attention the firm attracts from market makers tend to result in better 
monitoring and keener pricing o f anticipated risks and returns that benefits all 
stakeholders and the economy in general. Studies by Baghat (1986), Hansen and 
Torregrosa (1992) and Jain and Kin i (1999) all acknowledge the important monitoring 
role o f investment banks in new equity issues (Farinha, 2003). Fluck (1998) and 
Myers (2000) also demonstrated through agency-theoretic models o f dividend 
behaviour how managers could use dividends to avoid being disciplined by 
shareholders (Farinha, 2003). 
One o f the most popular hypotheses developed from the agency theory paradigm is 
the management entrenchment hypothesis. This hypothesis stems fi-om work by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), who argued that managers (the agents) are more prone 
to moral hazard when they have relatively small ownership stakes in the companies 
they run. As these ownership stakes increase, however, managers' behaviour becomes 
more in line with investors expectations, since they are no longer 'pure' agents, but to 
an extent are also principles. Nonetheless, it has been argued (Demsetz, 1983; Fama 
& Jensen, 1983) that managers who own substantial stakes o f the firms where they 
work w i l l no longer operate optimally as they are no longer exposed to takeover 
threats and other disciplining mechanisms o f the market, and are likely to be more risk 
averse because o f their relatively undiversified personal portfolios. For instance, 
Weston (1979) finds that firms with more than 30% insider ownership have never 
been acquired in hostile takeovers, and Morck et al. (1988) and McConnel and 
Servaes (1990) document a bell-shaped relationship between insider ownership and 
firm performance which suggests that managers become entrenched above a certain 
level o f ownership (Farinha, 2003). 
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Rozeff (1982) argues that dividends and insider ownership can be used as substitutes 
in order to reduce agency costs, and considers the optimal dividend policy to be the 
result o f a trade-off between agency costs and transaction costs. He uses a sample of 
one thousand US firms during the period between 1974 and 1980, and finds that 
dividend payments are strongly related to the set o f variables he uses to proxy for 
agency and transaction costs. Crutchley & Hansen (1989) find evidence o f a 
substitution effect between dividends, managerial ownership and debt, each one being 
a means o f corporate monitoring, which lends support to the agency theory ideas. 
In addition, using a sample o f 235 US firms, Schooley & Barney (1994) test the 
hypothesis that the relationship between dividends and CEO share holdings is non-
monotonic. They find that the relationship between dividend yield and CEO 
ownership is parabolic, i.e., when insider ownership is low they document evidence 
consistent with the classical agency theory. They find however that the D Y is 
negatively related to CEO holdings once the latter has increased beyond a certain 
level as the two variables start to increase simultaneously. This led the authors to 
suggest that beyond a certain point CEO ownership no longer reconciles the interests 
o f managers with those o f shareholders. Using a much larger sample (more than 600 
firms) for a two five-year periods, Farinha (1993) tests the management entrenchment 
hypothesis and finds that the coefficient on insider ownership changes fi-om posifive 
to negative after a critical entrenchment level o f insider ownership that he estimates to 
be in the region o f 30%. The author also finds that beneficial interests as well as 
unbeneficial interests that managers have control over (like pension funds, charity 
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trusts and employee stock opfion plans) tend to induce them to behave in a manner 
consistent with the management entrenchment hypothesis. 
Moh 'd , Perry & Rimbey (1995) use a sample o f 341 firms over the period fi-om 1972 
to 1989 to test agency theory predictions. They employ a time-series cross-secfional 
analysis and find that dividend policy is a function o f firm size, its growth rate, its 
operating/financial leverage mix, its intrinsic business risk, and its ownership 
structure. They also find that managers seem to act to minimise agency costs and that 
they adjust dividends in conjunction with the transacfion costs structure o f their firms. 
5.2.1.4 The residual theory of dividends 
Although the theories discussed so far have attempted to explain the market reaction 
fol lowing announcements o f changes in dividend payments, and thus are concerned 
with explaining the paradox o f why dividend policy should affect firm value, the 
residual dividend theory has a very different outlook on the whole dividend issue. In 
fact, it is rather inappropriate to consider it as a theory for explaining the dividend 
puzzle, since at its heart; it does not recognise this puzzle in the first place. However, 
in order to remain consistent with the literature in previous studies, we shall overlook 
this matter. 
It has been argued by A l i i et al. (1993) that the primary objecfive o f firms should be to 
increase shareholder value, and that this can only be done i f managers have an optimal 
investment strategy where they invest all the necessary funds in positive NPV 
projects. Therefore, dividends only come into the equation after all the earnings 
needed to invest in profitable projects have been retained - hence dividends are a 
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residual outcome o f the investment decision. According to Myers & M a j l u f s (1984) 
pecking order argument we should expect high growth firms with large investment 
opportunities to have low payout ratios. Moreover, according to this theory we should 
also observe a negative relafionship between dividend payouts and external financing 
costs, since these would determine whether the firm would resort to the market to 
raise capital for its investments, or use its internal funds ( A l i i et al, 1993, p.527). 
This theory also implies that dividend payments would fluctuate with earnings and 
changes in investment opportunities (Kania & Bacon, 2005). However, given the 
'smoothness' o f corporate dividends we generally observe in the markets, Higgins 
(1972, p. 1527) argues that ''The term residual does not imply that there is no dividend 
decision or that dividend policy does not affect the worth of the firm". He maintains 
that dividend payments, even though secondary to the investment decision, still need 
to be forecasted in order to have a stable dividend policy that would predict future 
dividend payments and secure the necessary funds for these payments. As a 
consequence, the optimal residual dividend policy is one that minimises the costs 
related to underestimating (excess liquidity) or overestimating (external equity 
financing) future dividend payments. 
Higgins (1972) develops a model to test this theory, and applies it to a sample o f 117, 
188 and 123 dividend paying firms during 1961, 1963 and 1965 respectively. He finds 
that inter-temporal differences in corporate dividends are mainly driven by differences 
in earnings and investment opportunities, which he takes as offering weak support to 
the view that dividend policy does not affect firm value. He also finds no support for 
the view that dividends and investment decisions are interdependent, a finding with 
which Fama (1974) strongly agrees, the latter concludes that regardless o f any 
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imperfections that might exist in the market these are not enough to cause his data to 
reject the hypothesis that the dividend decision and the investment decision are 
completely independent o f one another. 
5.2.2 The Empirical Determinants of Corporate Dividend Policy 
There is a large body of empirical studies that has examined corporate dividend 
behaviour fi-om the perspective o f those making the decisions i.e. managers. Most o f 
this literature uses survey and interview methodology, and much o f it confirms the 
hypotheses discussed earlier with the notable exception o f the residual theory o f 
dividends. The first behavioural study, which initiated the whole debate over 
corporate dividends, was undertaken by Lintner in 1956. Using a sample o f 28 firms 
over seven years (from 1947 to 1953), which he selected on the basis o f factors that 
appeared to have an effect on dividend policy, Lintner (1956) conducted field 
interviews with the managers o f these firms. His results indicated a considerable 
heterogeneity among firms' dividend policies. Nonetheless, some common features 
were shared by most o f these firms. For instance, managers largely favoured a steady 
dividend policy, and were generally unwilling to change dividends i f these changes 
were likely to be reversed. Changes in dividends were largely determined by changes 
in permanent earnings, and overall, managers set a target payout ratio which they 
partially adjusted periodically to reflect permanent changes in earnings. This resulted 
in a smooth dividend payout policy and a marked reluctance to cutting dividends for 
most firms. Overall, Lintner's findings suggest that "...dividends represent the 
primary and active decision variable in most situations" (Lintner, 1956, p.97). These 
findings appear to completely contradict the predictions of models based on 
"dividends as residual" theory assumptions. 
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Lintner (1956) formally modelled these findings to produce an empirically testable 
model o f corporate dividend behaviour that he used to predict the dividend behaviour 
of his sample o f firms during 1918 to 1941 (excluding 1936 and 1937). His results 
indicated that his model could explain a significant portion o f dividend changes. 
Lintner's model was later re-examined and extended by Fama & Babiak (1968) and 
several other researchers (Petit, 1972; Watts, 1973 and others) who confirmed his 
findings that managers only partially adjust dividends to levels that would be 
maintained over the long-term. 
A survey o f managers' views on dividend policy was carried out by Baker et al. 
(1985) using a sample o f 315 firms, their results indicate a 'striking' resemblance to 
those o f Lintner (1956), and appear to lend unequivocal support for the signalling and 
clientele dividend hypotheses. Their findings also indicate some differences in 
management's attitudes to, and perceptions o f dividends between regulated and 
unregulated industries. 
Gosh (1993) also carried out a survey o f managers' views on dividends using a 
sample o f over two hundred and fifty firms operating in the NYSE. He found that 
managers would prefer to increase dividends rather than conserve funds for uncertain 
investments, and that they would be wi l l ing to sustain (or be unwilling to cut) future 
dividend payments even i f this implied taking on debt and incurring significantly 
higher costs and financial risk exposure. These findings, again, appear to confirm the 
main empirical predictions o f Lintner's (1956) behavioural model. 
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Using 198 useable responses from a survey sent to CFOs o f American firms listed on 
the NYSE in 1997, Baker & Powel (2000) find that the determinants o f dividend 
policy have not materially changed over time; (smoothed) current and future earnings, 
together with the confinuity o f (i.e., the reluctance to cut) dividends are sfil l the key 
factors influencing managers' decisions with respect to dividends. 
Furthermore, the more recent Brav et al. (2005) survey o f 384 CFOs and treasurers' 
dividend and share repurchase policies reports similar behaviour to previous studies, 
i.e., that mangers smooth dividends over time and are very reluctant to cut them. They 
also find that dividend increases depend primarily upon long-term earnings but to a 
smaller extent than in the past. Instead o f increasing dividends, many firms now 
choose to repurchase their shares; the authors find that managers are attracted to 
repurchases because o f their flexibility, and tend to use them to signal the 
undervaluafion o f their firms or to improve reported EPS. The survey also reveals that 
managers believe that retail investors prefer dividends to share repurchases, while 
institutional investors are largely indifferent between the two forms o f corporate 
payout. 
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5.3 Motivations and theoretical framework 
In recent years, there has been growing evidence o f the decrease in the number o f 
firms that pay dividends, and some evidence o f a substitution o f dividends for share 
repurchases. The leading paper in the debate over dividends' disappearance is by 
Fama & French (2001). They find that over the period 1978 to 1998, the proportion o f 
dividend paying firms (non-financials and non-udlity) decreased from 66.5% to 
20.8%, translafing into a decline o f more than 50%. They argue that this is primarily 
due to the changing composition o f the types o f firms listed on the main US Stock 
Exchanges. For example, currently the main stock indices have a much higher 
proportion o f small growth stocks that by definition can be expected to have a very 
low propensity to pay dividends. Nevertheless, the authors also find evidence that 
regardless o f their type, currently all firms appear to be marginally less likely to pay 
dividends than similar firms twenty years ago. 
Nonetheless, DeAngelo et al. (2003) find that although the number o f dividend paying 
industrial firms decreased over the past two decades, dividend payments by these 
long-standing high dividend paying sectors actually increased both in nominal and 
real terms over the same period. They argue that the decline in dividend payers has 
been primarily due to small firms that generally had low dividends anyway. They 
conclude that large dividend payers have tended to increase their dividend payouts, 
which accounts for the observed increase in aggregate dividends, the increased 
number o f small firms in the population o f listed firms has led to a simultaneous 
decrease in the proportion o f dividend paying firms. The authors use their findings to 
cast doubt on the signalling hypothesis, arguing that i f dividends were used to signal 
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information to the market then these signals ought to be more, rather than increasingly 
less, prominent among small firms with little media coverage. 
Starks & Yoon (2004) study the abnormal returns and operating performance around 
the announcement o f dividend changes over the period 1963-2002 to shed light on any 
changes in the information content o f quarterly dividends. Their results do not 
indicate any material changes in the market reaction to announcements o f dividend 
increases, though they do document a decreased market reaction to dividend cuts. 
They also find that the operating performance o f dividend-increasing firms 
significantly increased over the sample period, and that the operating performance o f 
dividend-decreasing firms towards the end o f the sample period is significantly less 
negative than at the start o f the sample period. Overall, the authors suggest that 
managers have become more reluctant to increase dividends and less reluctant to 
decrease them. These results are consistent with those o f Brav et al. (2005). 
Grullon & Michaely (2000) report that between 1980 and 2000 expenditure on share 
repurchases relative to earnings increased ft^om 4.8 percent in 1980 to 41.8 percent in 
2000, which represents an average annual rate o f increase o f 26.1%, while dividends 
increased by an average annual rate o f only 6.8%. This suggests that share 
repurchases as a percentage o f dividends increased fi-om 13.1%) in 1980 to 113.1% in 
2000. The authors also report that in 1999 and 2000 industrial firms spent more 
money on repurchases than on dividends, a situation which indicates just how popular 
and significant share buybacks have recently become in terms o f US corporate payout 
policies. 
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In order to test the hypothesis that dividends are being substituted for repurchases, 
Grullon & Michaely (2000) use a very large sample constructed o f 15,843 firms over 
the period o f 1972 to 2000, which translates into 134,646 firm-year observations. 
They find evidence that share repurchases have been largely financed with potential 
dividend increases. They also find that the total payout ratio over their sample period 
remained the same despite the decrease in the average dividend payout ratio. 
Consistent with the findings o f Fama & French (2001), Grullon & Michaely (2000) 
find that currently firms have a lower propensity to pay dividends than they did two 
decades ago. Nonetheless, their results contradict Fama & French (2001) in the sense 
that they lend support to the substitution hypothesis. Finally, the authors find that the 
market reaction to the announcements o f dividend cuts is significantly less negative 
for repurchasing firms than for non-repurchasing firms. In fact, for repurchasing firms 
the market reaction to dividend reductions is not significantly different from zero, 
which appears to indicate that the market views share repurchases primarily as 
substitutes for dividends. 
In a recent paper, Ferris, Pen & Hui (2006) examine corporate payout policy in the 
UK. Using a sample period extending from 1988 to 2002, they investigate whether the 
decline in the number o f dividend payers is purely a US phenomenon or is part of a 
global trend. They find that the number o f dividend paying firms in the U K declines 
from 75.9% at the beginning o f the sample period to 54.5% at the end o f the sample 
period. After controlling for firm size, profitability and investment opportunities, the 
authors find a declining propensity to pay dividends over the 1998-2002 subperiod, 
although this decline is neither as sever nor as lengthy as that documented in the US. 
The authors argue that because share repurchases in their sample seemed scarce, it is 
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not hkely that dividends are being substituted for by share repurchases, and that the 
most likely explanation for this declining propensity to pay dividends is a shift in 
catering incentives. However, the authors collect their share repurchase data from the 
SDC, and as was discussed in the previous chapter, this source greatly under estimates 
the share repurchase activity in the U K market, which would explain why they did not 
find it likely that their sample firms were subsfituting dividends for share repurchases. 
Moreover, in another recent study o f U K payout policy patterns, Renneboog & 
Trojanowski (2005) find that, contrary to US evidence and the findings o f Ferris et al. 
(2006), firms in the U K do not display a decreasing propensity to pay cash to 
shareholders; that is, they find that despite the increasing role played by share 
repurchases, dividends still constitute a vast proportion o f total payouts. In addition, 
most firms that repurchase shares also pay dividends. 
Whether or not share repurchases are substitutes for dividends, it is clearly irrefutable 
that nowadays repurchases form a non-negligible form of payouts. Whilst, it is also 
true that they have always been far more popular in the US than in the rest o f the 
world, more and more countries have been introducing legislafion to facilitate 
corporate repurchase activities. 
In Europe, 80% of share repurchase activity has been concentrated in the UK alone 
(Lasfer, 2000). Between January 1995 and December 2000, firms in the U K returned 
the equivalent o f £34 bil l ion in share repurchases, with an increase o f more than 600 
percent on the aggregate value o f share repurchases between 1995 and 2000"* .^ 
Pope, P. and S. Young. (2002). "Executive Remuneration: an investor's guide." 
www.manifest.co.uk/repoits 
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Share repurchases in the U K are set to increase further for two reasons. Firstly, fiscal 
legislation before 1997 made share repurchases unattractive to institutional investors 
who were able to receive tax relief on dividends but not on repurchases. But since 
1997, tax changes have made institutional investors indifferent between dividends and 
repurchases, a development that can be expected to encourage more companies to 
repurchase. Secondly, before December 2003, firms had to cancel any shares they 
repurchased, but new regulations that came into force in December 2003 make it 
possible for firms to keep the shares they repurchase in treasury stock to be reissued at 
a later date or cancelled. This provides U K repurchasing firms much greater flexibility 
than previously. For example, now firms can use buybacks to fund their employee 
stock options instead of, as was the situation prior to the change in the law, having to 
create a separate trust for the sole purpose o f providing shares for their benefit plans. 
These changes in legislation together with the empirical findings highlighted earlier, 
suggesting that repurchases are increasing in popularity at the expense o f dividends, 
raise questions as to the appropriateness o f using dividends as opposed to total 
payouts (dividends plus share repurchases) in different valuation and behavioural 
models. 
Bagwell & Shoven (1989) report that while in 1977 dividend payouts amounted to 77 
percent o f total cash distribufions, in 1987 they represented only 47%. Moreover, 
Randall (2000) reports that in the 1990s the relafive importance o f dividends 
continued to decline with the S&P 500 dividend yield decreasing from 3.66% in 1990 
to 1.41% in 1998. The author also points out that until the early 1990s the S&P 500 
dividend yield was a reasonably good predictor o f the strength o f the stock exchange, 
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with ' low ' yields signalling poor future performance. However, by the end o f the 
1990s the market was performing very well despite unprecedented low levels o f 
dividend yield. 
For a long time, the dividend discount model has been the most widely used share 
valuation model. Its prominence has not been limited to the academic world as 
financial analysts, investors and other financial practitioners also rely on it for many 
investment-related decisions. However, with repurchases becoming an important part 
o f total payouts, it has become questionable whether the D D M is really appropriate 
when it neglects a large part o f payouts. As Lamdin (2000, p.252) remarks: "// is a bit 
of a conundrum that all corporate finance texts discuss repurchases under the rubric 
of dividend policy-noting that repurchases can be used as a substitute for dividends-
however, the impact of repurchases on the DDM is left unexplored". 
Lamdin (2000) demonstrates that when repurchases are not incorporated in the D D M , 
undervaluation errors automatically occur, with the extent o f these errors being 
positively related to the extent of the use o f repurchases. He proposes a modified 
model where the dollar value o f repurchases is added to the dollar value of dividends 
to get total payouts (not the per share value), the total value obtained must then be 
divided by the number o f current outstanding shares to obtain the per-share value. 
Randall (2000) also develops a modified version o f the dividend discount model that 
incorporates the repurchase activity o f the firm. He argues that as repurchases increase 
in popularity and in aggregate value, such modified models w i l l prove very useful in 
estimating current and future stock prices for companies in the habit o f repurchasing 
their shares. 
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Another example o f the bias that can result from using a narrow definifion o f 
dividends is illustrated in the stock price volatility literature. Many o f these stock 
price volatility studies reject the efficient market hypothesis on the premise that prices 
are too volatile to be determined by the expected discounted value o f cash dividends. 
Ackert & Smith (1993) challenge this finding on account o f the narrow definition o f 
dividends they use. The authors argue that dividends should include all cash 
distributions to shareholders, as discussed by Kleidon (1986) and Marsh & Merton 
(1986), and argue that dividend smoothing can lead to changes in future residual 
dividend not reflected in current dividends. Kleidon (1986) also concludes that excess 
stock price volafility can be explained by the fact that most firms smooth their 
dividends. 
Ackert & Simith (1993) use a variance-bound methodology to test the hypothesis that 
stock prices are not too volatile. They use data from the Toronto Stock Exchange for 
the period o f January 1950 to February 1991. They find that when they analyse annual 
and monthly series o f cash dividends their results are similar to previous studies in the 
sense that they reject the null hypothesis; stock prices are too volatile to be explained 
by the discounted dividend valuation model. However, when they redo the tests but 
broadening their definition o f dividends to include share repurchases and cash 
mergers and acquisitions, they find that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected; stock 
prices are not too volatile to be explained by the discounted value o f total cash 
distributions. These results appear to reflect the fundamental difference in roles 
played by dividends and repurchases in firms' total payout policies; namely, 
dividends being a smooth and predictable payout o f sustainable long-term earnings. 
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whilst actual repurchases being driven by a combination o f volatile or unexpected 
earnings outcomes and their ability to help achieve a variety o f short term financial 
objectives such as reducing the agency costs o f FCF, increasing EPS, or the avoidance 
o f employee or managerial share option values. These differences in terms o f the 
respecfive roles o f dividends and repurchases in a firm's total payout policy, coupled 
with differences across firms in their usage o f both dividends and repurchases, means 
that the use o f only dividends instead o f total payouts in stock price volafility studies 
results in ignoring an increasingly important component o f f i rms ' total payouts and 
the loss o f all information related to the volatility o f total payouts that, in the US, is 
largely driven by share repurchases. 
Unfortunately, repurchases have not been neglected only in the share valuation or the 
stock price volatility literature, corporate dividend payout models have also 
traditionally been only applied to dividends. When we consider that repurchases have 
become an integral part o f payouts for many firms we wonder at the usability o f such 
models. Perhaps one reason why share repurchases have not been incorporated with 
dividends in modelling corporate payout behaviour is to do with their volatility. 
It is generally accepted, since Lintner (1956), that firms are reluctant to decrease their 
dividends. The market reaction to dividend cuts has traditionally been very harsh; 
Ghosh & Woolridge (1988) and Denis et al. (1994) document average stock price 
declines o f about 6% on the three days surrounding the announcement o f a dividend 
cut (Jagannathan et al., 2000). Share repurchases, on the other hand, do not carry any 
obligation for the firm to sustain or increase them in the future. In fact, most firms, as 
we have seen in the previous chapter, obtain the authority to repurchase their shares 
but do not use it. Many actually announce repurchase programs but are under no 
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obligation to carry them ful ly or to carry them at all. O f course, getting into the habit 
o f announcing repurchase programs without carrying them through may eventually 
damage a company's reputation. The bottom line is that share repurchases contain an 
element o f flexibility which makes them very attractive to managers when they want 
to signal the undervaluafion o f their firm to the market or simply when they need to 
distribute excess cash flow to shareholders. As a result, for managers, increasing 
dividends carry an element o f risk that they may not be sustainable whilst repurchases 
are free o f any such sustainability expectafions. 
Models that focus on analysing the actual dividend policies o f firms are numerous, 
most o f which are just extensions o f the original Lintner (1956) model. To date, these 
behavioural dividend models have all been used and empirically evaluated in terms of 
dividend payout policies rather than being extended to encompass corporate total 
(dividends plus repurchases) payout policies. 
Lintner (1956) developed his model o f corporate dividend behaviour on the basis o f 
his observations from his field investigations, primarily interviews with managers. He 
subsequently applied this theoretical model to a sample o f data and obtained results 
that were superior to those obtained from the use o f a naive model. In his model, 
Lintner assumes that a firm's dividend level for any year t (D,*), is related to its actual 
earnings (EO by a target payout ratio (r): 
Dt* = rEt (1) 
He also maintains that because earnings are uncertain, firms w i l l want to "play safe" 
and only partially adjust to their target dividend level in any one year. This implies 
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that their dividend payout policy w i l l be a function o f their target payout ratio and the 
speed of adjustment of their current dividends to changes in earnings. Therefore, the 
change in dividends between year t-1 and year t is given by: 
Dt - Dt.i = a + c (Dr - Dt.i) + Ut (2) 
Where a is a posiUve constant that reflects managers reluctance to cut dividends, r is 
the target payout ratio, c is the speed o f adjustment coefficient that reflects managers' 
preferred adjustment to the desired dividend level , D,.i are dividends in year t - 1 , £ , 
are the current year's earnings after tax and w, is the error term. 
Substituting (1) in (2) we obtain: 
ADt = a + crEt- cDt.i + Ut (3) 
which can also be written as 
ADt = a + PiEt + ^2Dt.i+Ut (4) 
Where a = a, pi = or and P2 = -c 
Lintner's model assumes that all changes in earnings are "unexpected" and hence 
results in a uniform partial adjustment o f dividends to total earnings changes. This is 
perhaps somewhat unrealistic given that the earnings o f most firms are highly serially 
correlated over time and that often the best estimate o f next year's earnings is this 
year's earnings. Fama & Babiak (1968) extend Lintner's partial adjustment model by 
incorporating the behavioural assumption that there is an "expected earning" 
component to which there is a fiall adjustment o f dividends and an unexpected 
earnings component to which, as in the Lintner model, dividends only partially adjust 
to. They assume that expected earnings (E*,) in time t are generated as follows: 
E*t=(1+^)Et., (5) 
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where I is an earnings trend factor. Substitufing (1) and (5) in (2) we obtain the Fama 
and Babiak model which includes lagged (i.e., t-1) earnings as a regressor: 
ADt = a + c rEt + rA (1- c)Et-i - c Dt.i + iv, (6) 
(6) can also be written as: 
ADt = a + fSi Et+(S2Et.i+P3Dt.i+Ut (7) 
From the empirical estimates, the fol lowing parameters can be deduced: 
• Speed of adjustment coefficient: c = - P3 
• Target payout ratio: r = (Pi / c) = Pi/(- P3) 
• Rate of growth of earnings: ?L = [P2 / r ( l - c)] = P2 / [Pi ( 1 - P3) /(- P3)] 
Fama & Babiak (1968) also find that Lintner's model performs well relative to other 
models but that suppressing the intercept and adding lagged earnings slightly 
improves the predictive power o f the model. 
The partial-adjustment model in its various forms has enjoyed much support from the 
literature. However, times have moved on, and as we have seen in the literature 
review, the nature and shape of firms operating in today's markets is not exactly the 
same as that o f firms that operated in the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, challenges 
facing today's corporations and the environment within which they operate have 
changed dramatically over the past two decades. A l l this raises questions as to the 
applicability o f Lintner's model. 
When Lintner (1956) conducted his field work on the behavioural determinants o f 
dividend policy, dividends were the main form of payouts to shareholders, share 
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repurchases were not then an issue. Nowadays, however, share repurchases cannot be 
ignored; they have to be incorporated in any payout policy model. 
In a recent survey o f managers' opinions and motives regarding their firms' payout 
policies, Brav et al. (2005) find that managers are still very conservative in their 
dividend policies, which is mainly due to the market's asymmetric reactions to 
dividend increases and decreases. However, contrary to Lintner's findings, Brav et al. 
(2005) find that firms do not place as high an importance on the target payout ratio as 
they used to, and they consider it to be more flexible than they used to. Moreover, the 
authors find that managers view share repurchases as an important form o f payout that 
they prefer to dividends mainly for its flexibility. It is also found that repurchase 
policy is better explained by the framework o f Miller and Modigliani (1961) than is 
dividend policy, in the sense that managers can afford to treat repurchase policy truly 
as a residual to the investment policy o f the firm. 
It would seem that despite their success in modelling corporate dividend behaviour to 
date, the Lintner-type behavioural models may become increasingly irrelevant unless 
they can be adapted to incorporate the increasing and uncertain component o f total 
payouts represented by share repurchases. In addition, the behavioural assumptions of 
the Lintner-type models have become quesfionable as the evidence reviewed earlier 
indicates that firms today tend not to focus on maintaining a fixed target payout ratio 
as much as previously and their reduced reluctance to cut dividends, particularly when 
repurchasing shares are an adequate substitute for the forgone dividend. 
Thus, given the above arguments for a broader definition and understanding o f the 
determinants o f total corporate payout policies beyond merely dividends, our analysis 
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consists o f first determining whether either the original Lintner model or its 
subsequent variations are able to empirically explain U K dividend behaviour and 
second, whether when applied to total payout policies, the partial-adjustment models 
are able to adequately explain total payout (repurchases and dividends) behaviour. 
Our comparative analysis allows the evaluation o f several interesting hypotheses 
regarding the respective roles played by dividends and repurchases in the total payout 
policies o f U K firms. For example, do the original Lintner or Fama & Babiak 
behavioural assumptions still apply to U K corporate dividend policies or can 
alternative earnings benchmarks and behavioural assumptions provide a better 
explanafion?; do these types o f models applied to total payout policies yield plausible 
and/or better or worse empirical estimates than when applied to explaining solely 
dividend payouts?; do firms that pay dividends and repurchase shares adopt a 
smoother dividend payout policy than firms that only pay dividends and, i f so, is there 
evidence that this is because repurchasing firms tend to restrict share repurchases to 
the distribution o f the volatile element o f earnings? 
Given the changed composition o f the listed company population and the ability of 
firms to design corporate payouts in terms o f both dividends and repurchases, the first 
step in our analysis is to ascertain whether the specification o f the partial-adjustment 
models are still appropriate or, alternatively, can be modified to reflect the changes in 
corporate payout behaviour discussed earlier, in a contemporary U K setting. 
To answer these quesfions we use both Lintner (1956) and Fama & Babiak's (1968) 
models as a starting point to analyse the payout policy of an unbalanced panel o f firms 
that represent the FTSE 350 in Apr i l 2004 excluding the financial sector, over a four 
year window (from 2001 to 2004). We model the change in dividends and then the 
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change in total payouts, where we just replace dividends by total payouts (dividends 
and repurchases). We contend that the inclusion o f share repurchases in the traditional 
dividend payout models is legitimate and w i l l enable an evaluafion o f the 
relafionships between dividends and repurchases components o f total payouts and 
whether either or both forms of payout are, as expected, more strongly related to 
various measures o f firms' expected and unexpected earnings. In the following 
section o f this chapter, we develop a general model o f changes in dividend and total 
payouts that is predicated on the assumption that, though the relative payout ratios 
and/or sensitivity o f dividends and repurchases may differ, there is a f u l l adjustment 
to this payout ratio o f either form of payout to expected changes in earnings and a 
partial adjustment to unexpected earnings. We show that the original Lintner and the 
Fama & Babiak dividend models are simply special cases where it is assumed that 
expected earnings are respectively zero and a linear ftmction o f the t-1 reported 
earnings. Our analysis enables us to evaluate whether firms that repurchase their 
shares are able to operate a smoother dividend policy in tandem with a share 
repurchase programme that distributes the volatile element of payouts related to non-
sustainable earnings without affecting dividends. We can also evaluate whether 
managers in the U K operate more conservative dividend policies than their US 
counterparts. I f so, we expect to find that current dividends w i l l depend more on past 
dividends than has previously been documented, and that lagged rather than current 
earnings is the primary driver o f current dividend changes. 
5.3.1 Methodology 
As mentioned earlier, this chapter aims to determine what affects the (dividend and 
total) payout policy o f U K firms. We start o f f by estimafing dividend changes using 
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the traditional corporate dividend models; Lintner's partial adjustment model 
(equation (4)) and its lagged earnings modification by Fama & Babiak (1968) 
(equation (7)) detailed in the previous section. These models are then used to estimate 
the change in total payouts, where we introduce both dividends and repurchases as 
one variable which we refer to as 'total payouts'. An example using Fama and 
Babiak's model is illustrated below: 
ATt = a + c r Et + rA (1- c) Et.i - c Tt.i + Ut (8) 
Where r is the target payout ratio, c is the speed of adjustment coefficient, T/.j are 
total payouts in year t - 1 , E, and £,./ are respectively the current and last year's 
earnings after tax and u, is the error term. 
(8) can also be written as: 
ATt = a + PiEt + IS2Et.i+P3Tt.i+Ut (9) 
From each model we can deduce that the hypothesised parameters are related to the 
empirically esfimated coefficients as follows: 
• Speed of adjustment coefficient: c = - P3 
• Target payout ratio: r = Pi / c = Pi/(- P3) 
• Rate of growth of earnings: ?i = P2 / r ( l - c,) = p2 / [pi ( 1 - P3) /(P3)] 
We have already argued that the partial-adjustment model may not be very adequate 
for explaining the payout policies o f corporations today. We are particularly 
concerned about the assumption that Lintner (1956) makes concerning how a firm's 
dividend level is related to its actual earnings by a target payout ratio. We have seen 
that Brav et al. (2005) found that managers do not attach the same importance to a 
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fixed target payout ratio as they used to. Moreover, it is possible that U K managers 
have become more cautious now that repurchases are possible. For example, as the 
current year's actual earnings are still uncertain when they set the current year's 
dividends, some of which is actually distributed as interim dividend payments prior to 
the end o f the current earnings period, we might expect to find that this year's 
dividends depend primarily upon last year's reported earnings, since these have less 
uncertainty attached to them. In addition, we might also expect that current dividends 
are mostly explained by lagged dividends. Finally, we could expect the estimated 
constant term to be close to zero, especially in the case o f firms that repurchase their 
shares. Lintner (1956) included an intercept in his model to reflect managers' 
reluctance to reduce dividends, Fama & Babiak (1968), however, found that deleting 
the intercept slightly improves the predictive power o f the model. I f we also consider 
the findings that some managers are less reluctant to cut their dividends than they 
once were, we would also expect the estimated constant for the sample as a whole to 
be close to zero, while the inclusion o f firm-specific intercepts (fixed effects) would 
increase the explanatory power o f the empirical estimates. 
5.3.2 Alternative Expected and Unexpected Earnings Models 
As mentioned in the previous section, both the Lintner and Fama & Babiak models 
assume particular benchmark earnings. In the case o f the Lintner model expected 
earnings are assumed to be zero and hence the change in dividends is a partial 
adjustment o f dividends to all changes in earnings. As we have suggested, not all 
earnings w i l l be unexpected and, in the Fama & Babiak model, there is an assumption 
that there w i l l be a fu l l adjustment to expected earnings changes and a partial 
adjustment to unexpected earnings changes. The expected earnings for time t in this 
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model is assumed to be a linear funcfion of the t-1 earnings, which in a cross sectional 
context is equivalent to assuming and testing a sample wide common growth-in-
eamings trend factor. Both these models are in fact simply special cases whereby 
changes in dividends (total payouts) are related to expected and unexpected earnings 
components. Moreover, it may be that neither the assumption that all earnings are 
unexpected nor that there is a common trend in earnings relationship across the 
sample are the most plausible earnings benchmarks. 
To see why, assume that: 
E*t = expected sustainable earnings in time t 
E*t- E,.i = expected change in earnings in time t 
Et- E*, = unexpected change in earnings in time t 
I f we assume a target payout ratio r and a reluctance to reduce dividends (total 
payouts), then changes in dividends (total payouts) are a function o f a fu l l adjustment 
of dividends (total payouts) to expected changes in earnings (E*t- E,.|) and a partial 
adjustment to unexpected earnings (Et- E ' I ) as follows: 
Dt-Dt.i =a+r(Et) + cr(Et-E))-Dt.i (10) 
Empirically, 
Dit - D /M = a, + J3i Eit + P2 (Eit - E ,i) + P3 D.-i + u, (11) 
Where P I = r; P2 = cr; |33 = - 1 . 
The Lintner model assumes that c < 1 and E*it = 0, which reduces equation (11) to the 
original Lintner estimating equation. In the case o f the Fama & Babiak model, 
expected time t earnings ( E ' I ) are assumed to be E*, = (l+X) E,.i, which reduces 
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equation (11) to the familiar Fama & Babiak expressions shown as equations (6) and 
(7) in the previous section. 
The main problem with using the Fama & Babiak expected earnings formulation in a 
cross sectional context is that it is highly unlikely that all the firms in the sample will 
experience an identical earnings trend and hence this imposes an unrealistic restriction 
on the empirical estimates. In order to estimate the alternative benchmark earnings 
assumptions using an expected earnings function that makes use of firm-specific data, 
we need empirical estimates of expected earnings E*( and unexpected earnings ( E j i -
E*it) . We do this by running an OLS regression as follows: 
Et = a+I3i E M + /32 (Ef.i * A / E , , j +133 Size (12) 
Where N E i t . i refers to a dummy that takes one for all the values of Ej t - i that are 
negative and zero otherwise. Both time and industry effects are controlled for. 
We obtain: 
E*t = the predicted value of Et from the above model (i.e., we save the predicted 
values for each firm as a new variable which represents expected earnings given the 
time period and industry, size and last year's earnings of the firms concerned) 
and ( E j , - E*i i ) = the unexpected/unexplained variance from the above model (i.e., we 
save the residuals as a new variable which represents each firm's unexpected time t 
earnings). 
This esfimafion method has other stafistical benefits as by construction E*, and ( E j , -
E*j ,) are uncorrelated with each other and so avoids any potential multicoUinearity 
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problems associated with having both the current and lagged earnings variables in the 
same estimating equations. 
This formulation also allows us to test a range of alternative earnings benchmarks, 
including the special case where E ' j i = E t . i , i.e., where expected earnings are simply 
last year's earnings and equation (11) reduces to: 
DirDit.1 = Qit + A E / M + /?2fE,r E / M J + + u, (13) 
5.3.3 Empirical Estimating Methods 
Ordinary least squares with fixed effects methodology is used to estimate all the 
regressions (unless indicated otherwise), controlling for firm size, merger activity and 
time effects (year dummies). Firm size is controlled for because the dividend as well 
as the repurchase policy of firms may differ systematically according to their size. 
Large firms tend to have larger and more stable cash flows, which means that their 
payouts tend to be larger. According to the free-cash flow hypothesis we should 
expect share repurchases to occur more frequently within large firms with large cash 
flows and fewer investment opportunities than within small firms, which tend to be 
more risky and in need of more not less new capital for financing these growth 
opportunities. Hence, as small firms tend to be less liquid and to have more growth 
opportunities i.e. profitable investments, then we should expect them to pay out little 
or no cash to their shareholders in whatever form. Indeed, as we have seen in the 
previous section, small firms have even less tendency to pay out dividends now than 
they did two decades ago. Although our sample is constituted of firms that paid 
dividends at least once during the sample period, differences in size may sfill arise 
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between firms that pay large dividends and those that pay small dividends, and 
companies that repurchase their shares and those that do not. As a result, it is 
imperative to control for size i f we are not to make the mistake of misinterpreting the 
results. 
In addition, we control for merger activity in order to avoid the effects that such 
activity might have on the dividends and repurchases of sample firms. It is to be 
expected that when two firms merge their dividend payments may be drastically 
changed to reflect the merger, and the same goes for share repurchases. 
As discussed in the previous two chapters, our sample consists of non-financial firms 
that were listed on the FTSE 350 in April 2004 and we collected data for these firms 
from 2000 to 2004. This resulted in an unbalanced paned of 270 firms ft-om which we 
had to drop 15 because they never paid a dividend during the sample period, and a 
further eight because they represented very large outliers in terms of their income or 
their share repurchases''^ The final sample of firms used in the current analysis 
consists of 247 firms (926 observations) that paid dividends at least once during the 
four year sample period. 
The process of data collection was divided into two phases; in the first we collected 
repurchase information from annual reports, consisting of the fraction and pound 
value of shares repurchased. In the second phase we collected dividend and other 
financial information from DataStream, as presented below: 
A total of eight observations were excluded from the sample. Two observations, from the same 
company, were excluded because the company in question suffered exceptionally large losses in one 
sample year. Data for that year and the year before it (lagged) were thus excluded. Six observations 
where sample firms repurchased (either in the current or in the previous year) more than 15% of their 
share capital were also excluded from the sample. Most of these repurchases were tender-offer 
repurchases. 
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• Market value (data item MV): the share price multiplied by the number of 
ordinary shares in issue. 
• Total assets (data item WC02999): the sum of total current assets, long term 
receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net 
property plant and equipment and other assets. 
• Dividends (data item WC05376): represent the total cash common dividends 
paid on the company's common stock during the fiscal year, including extra 
and special dividends''^. 
• Net income (data item WC01751): represents the net income the company 
uses to calculate its earnings per share. It is before extraordinary items. 
• Capital expenditure (data item WC04601): represent the funds used to 
acquire fixed assets other than those associated with acquisitions. 
• Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation- EBITDA (data item 
WC18198): represent the earnings of a company before interest expense, 
income taxes and depreciation. It is calculated by taking the pre-tax income 
and adding back interest expense on debt and depreciation, depletion and 
amortization and subtracting interest capitalized. 
This financial information was used to measure the following variables: 
• D j t : total cash dividends (excluding special dividends) paid during the current 
year normalised by the total assets of the firm at the start of the current 
financial year. 
We obtain information on special dividends from company annual reports and subtract it from the 
DataStream dividends to obtain the dividend variables that we use in this analvsis 
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• Dit-i : total cash dividends (excluding special dividends) paid during the last 
financial year normalised by the total assets of the firm at the start of the 
previous financial year. 
• ADit = Dj, - Dit-i: the change in dividends between this year and last year. 
• REP: the value of shares repurchased during the current year normalised by 
the total assets of the firm at the start of the financial year. 
• TPit : total payouts (dividends and repurchases) paid during the current year 
normalised by the total assets of the firm at the start of the current financial 
year. 
• TPii-i : total payouts (dividends and repurchases) paid during the previous 
financial year normalised by the total assets of the firm at the start of the 
previous financial year. 
• ATPji = TPj, - TPit-i : the change in total payouts between this year and last 
year. 
• Eit-i: net income at the end of the current year normalised by the total assets of 
the firm at the start of the current financial year. 
• Eit-i-i : net income at the end of the previous year normalised by the total assets 
of the firm at the start of the previous financial year. 
• SIZE: the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets at the start of the current 
financial year. 
• MERGER: a dummy variable that takes the value of one in the year of the 
merger/de-merger and the year following it and zero otherwise^^. 
Variations in dividends, total payouts and earnings are easily affected by mergers and acquisitions. 
A dummy was thus created to control for this phenomenon. However, this dummy does not take into 
account just any merger or acquisition (as these happen very often). Only mergers that resulted in the 
creation of an entity that was also listed in the FTSE350 subsequent tn the meroer nr Hp-mft'-qers ih^t 
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To recapitulate, the models that will be empirically estimated are: 
Lintner's model: 
Estimation of dividend changes: ArA, - / = «// + Pi En + PiD u.i + w„ 
Estimation of total payout changes: Tu -Ti,./ = a„ + /?/ En + P2 Tn.i + un 
Fama and Babiak's model: 
Estimation of dividend changes: A,-A;-/ = o.it + Pi En + P2Ei,.i+ P3D u-i + 
Estimation of total payout changes: Tu -Tu-i = a„ + P/ En + P2Ei,-i+ P3 Ti,./ + u,-, 
Special case of the expected and unexpected earnings model: 
Estimation of dividend changes: ArA, - / = OLU + PiEu-i + P2 (En- En-i) + /?j A,,./ + 
Estimation of total payout changes: Tn -Tn-i = a,, + P/ E n-i + p2 (En- En-i) + Ps Tn-i + 
Un 
Alternative expected and unexpected earnings model: 
Estimation of dividend changes: Dn-Dn-i = an + PiE*n + /32(En- E*it) + /^jA/-/ + «// 
Estimation of total payout changes: Tn -Tn-i = a„ + /?/ E*n + P2 (En - E*n) + P3 Tn-i + «,/ 
E* are the estimated predicted earnings. 
In all dividend/payout estimations we control for fixed effects, size, and merger 
activity (refer to the tables in the appendix for more details). 
resulted in the creation of one or two entities that were also listed on the F T S E 350 subsequent to the 
de-merger, were taken into account. 
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5.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5-1 presents descriptive statisfics of the total sample, the sub-sample of firms 
that paid dividends but did not repurchase shares in any of the sample years (div-only 
sample), and the sub-sample of firms that paid dividends and repurchased their shares 
at least once during the sample period (div-rep sample). 
With a mean market value of £7.151 billion and average total assets of £7.240 billion, 
repurchasing firms seem to be much larger than non repurchasing firms which have a 
mean market value of only £1.965 billion and average total assets of £2.491 billion. In 
addition, firms that repurchase their shares seem to have a higher dividend yield than 
those that do not, with median dividend yields of 0.0359 and 0.0297 respectively. 
Descriptive statistics also indicate that the dividend yield of firms that do not 
repurchase is more volatile than that of firms that repurchase; this is reflected in 
standard deviations of 0.0204 for the DY of non-repurchasing firms and 0.0183 for 
the DY of repurchasing firms. However, this changes when we look at total payouts 
instead of just dividends, as the standard deviation of the total payouts yield for the 
repurchasing sample is 0.0324, higher than that of the div-only sample. 
Understandably, this reflects the inclusion of share repurchases which are naturally 
more volatile than dividends. Finally, looking at descriptive statistics of the change in 
dividends and the change in total payouts, it would seem that firms that repurchase 
their shares have a more stable payout policy than those that do not, since the median 
change in both dividends and total payouts is smaller for repurchasing firms than for 
non-repurchasing firms. 
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When these differences between re-purchasers and non re-purchasers are tested using 
a robust test of equality of means (in order to avoid any bias resulting from the 
different sizes of the two samples), we find most of them are significant, as is shown 
below: 
Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
Welch 
Statistic* df1 df2 Sig. 
Ei,.i 19.977 1 798.613 .000 
Di, 23.608 1 623.853 .000 
TPi, 64.741 1 425.631 .000 
SIZE 39.440 1 662.296 .000 
* Asymptotically F distributed. 
Looking at these statistics in light of the means reported in Table 5-1, we can deduce 
that firms that repurchased their shares at least once during the sample period are 
significantly larger, earn significantly more, and distribute significantly more 
dividends than firms that did not. These preliminary stafistics confirm the recent 
findings of Renneboog & Trojanowski (2005), who also find that firms that 
repurchase their shares in the UK usually pay dividends as well. 
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5.5 Empirical Results for the Lintner and Fama and Babiak Models 
applied to Dividend and Total Payout Changes 
Moving on to the multivariate analysis. Table 5-2 reports results of models equivalent 
to Lintner (1956) and Fama & Babiak (1968) applied to our panel data, where we 
model the change in dividends between year t and year t-1, followed by the change in 
total payouts. In specifications (1) to (4) we use the total sample, in specificafions (5) 
and (6) we use the sample of dividend payers only, while in specifications (7) to (10) 
we use the sample of re-purchasers. All variables are scaled by total assets at the start 
of the corresponding financial year while size is the logarithmic value of lagged total 
assets. In all models we control for time and fixed effects. 
The first model indicates that lagged dividends take full credit for explaining the 
change in dividends of sample firms, with a coefficient close to unity. Current 
income, on the other hand, does not seem to have any explanatory power, with a very 
small and insignificant coefficient. When we add lagged income to the explanatory 
variables (specification 2) we improve the fit of the model by 0.03 index points, and 
obtain a coefficient for lagged income equal to 0.029 significant beyond 0.01 
confidence levels. Size is significantly negatively related to the change in dividends in 
all models. This means that larger firms experience smaller proportionate changes in 
their dividend payments. 
The repurchase/no repurchase sub-samples show similar relationships between 
changes in dividends and the explanatory variables. The results also indicate that 
firms that do not repurchase their shares tend to increase their dividends subsequent to 
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mergers/de-mergers, while we do not find a similar relationship for firms that 
repurchase their shares. 
Comparing our equivalents of the Lintner and F&B models of dividend changes 
across the groups of re-purchasers and non re-purchaser reveals that these models fit 
the repurchasing sample better than they do the non-repurchasing sample. This is 
indicated by an adjusted R squared of about 0.61 for the repurchase sample (see 
specificafion 8), higher than that of the non-repurchase sample by 0.09 index points. It 
would therefore seem that our equivalent of the Fama and Babiak's lagged earnings 
model has greater explanatory power when applied on the sample of firms that 
repurchase their shares as well as pay dividends. Whether the results of the model 
would improve further i f we only apply it to firms that repurchase frequently is not 
clear at this stage '^. 
These results suggest that firms that make use of share repurchases tend to have a 
smoother dividend payout policy. This could be due to the fact that they are much 
larger and thus, more capable of maintaining stable dividend payouts, or could be due 
to the fact that they distribute any volatile element of their payouts through share 
repurchases, and distribute the more constant element of payouts through dividends. 
In fact, it is interesting to note that while both re-purchasers and non re-purchasers in 
our sample have a coefficient of lagged dividends that is close to unity; that of firms 
that repurchase their shares slightly exceeds one, while that of firms that do not 
One is tempted to think that firms that repurchase frequently their shares use their repurchase 
programmes in much the same way as their dividend policy, except for a higher degree of volatility in 
the value of the acmal repurchases made. However, an analysis of the frequent-repurchasers sample is 
not feasible with the current dataset, since the sample would be rather small and would not allow for 
any inferences to be made. 
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repurchase is shghtly less than one. This might reflect the over confidence of re-
purchasers in their dividend policy, which may in turn be a reflection of their superior 
profitability. We have seen in the univariate statistics that re-purchasers have 
significantly larger earnings than non re-purchasers, and that they pay significantly 
more in dividends. 
Although we use fixed effects OLS regressions in all our estimations, we also report 
the constant of the equivalent OLS models without fixed effects, in order to verify 
Lintner's assertion that firms are reluctant to cut their dividends. In all the dividend 
changes estimations, the constant is positive and highly significant, except the models 
where the sub-sample of re-purchasers is used (specifications 7 and 8), which show a 
very small positive constant that is insignificant. Although we have no reason to 
expect this constant to be significant, this slight difference between re-purchasers and 
non re-purchasers may be an indication of the latter's greater reluctance to cutting 
their dividends. One might think that firms in the habit of repurchasing their shares 
are less worried about how the market would react to small changes in their dividends, 
contrary to firms that do not repurchase their share. As a matter of fact, in the 
theoretical framework we discussed several studies that find that firms nowadays are 
not as reluctant as they used to be about cutting their dividends. Grullon & Michaely 
(2000) found that for repurchasing firms the market reaction to dividend reductions is 
not significantly different from zero, while Starks & Yoon (2004) argue that managers 
have become more reluctant to increase dividends and less reluctant to decrease them. 
Throughout all the dividend estimations we find that current income is insignificant 
while lagged income is highly significant. Although this does not exacfly conform to 
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Lintner's predictions, it does conform to our predictions. It seems very logical that 
firms would distribute their current dividends out of their realised earnings; hence, 
lagged earnings which in this case are last year's earnings. One can hardly expect 
current earnings to be distributed to shareholders in the current year since their value 
is not certain until the end of the financial year. 
We now move on to investigate whether the different dividend models used above can 
be generalised to include total payouts instead of just dividends. In this case, we use 
specification (9). Naturally, when we try to model total payouts, which for many 
companies are partly distributed through share repurchases, we face the issue of their 
probable volatility. One of the main results obtained by Lintner from his field 
investigation, and over which much of the theory of his dividend behaviour model is 
based, is that firms are very reluctant to cut their dividends, and are also very careful 
about increasing their dividends i f these increases cannot be sustained in the future. 
This means that dividends have traditionally been very stable and in a way 
predictable. I f we just look at our results in Table 5-2 we see that lagged dividends 
explain most of the 'variation' in dividend payments. This can only benefit corporate 
dividend models such as Lintner's. Thus one might wonder what would be the use of 
trying to predict payouts that are naturally unpredictable .i.e. share repurchases. The 
answer to that question is quite simple. Firstly, although the flexibility of share 
repurchases has rendered them quite volatile, they still constitute an important form of 
payout, which, whether we like or not, has to be taken into account when analysing 
any aspect of firms' payouts. Secondly, share repurchases have become increasingly 
popular, and with more countries changing their legislations to facilitate this form of 
payout, they can only continue to increase. The trend in the past has been for 
repurchases to be one-offs and frequently take the form of tender offers. Nowadays, 
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most repurchases take place in the open market, and many are not one-offs. In fact, 
without deviating to the debate of whether dividends are gradually being substituted 
for share repurchases, we can only expect the latter to form a larger part of payouts to 
shareholders, particularly in the UK, where legislation has recently been amended to 
allow companies to keep their repurchased shares in treasury stock. This amendment 
will surely result in more firms repurchasing their shares, whether to distribute free 
cash flow, to fund the exercises of their employee options, or for any other 
motivation. Consequently, it may not be too presumptuous to expect repurchases to 
gradually become a consistent form of distributing cash to shareholders, and even i f 
they remain volafile as to their value, we should expect them to be more regular, 
rather than just one-off payments. 
Results of models that estimate the change in total payouts are presented in Table 5-2. 
In models (3) and (4) we use the total sample and in models (9) and (10) we use the 
repurchase-and-dividend sample. 
Firstly, in estimations that are not reported here, when we estimate the change in total 
payouts using only lagged dividends and current income (i.e., the Lintner model) we 
obtain a very poor model that does not explain much variation in the dependent 
variable. This is of course due to the fact that we purposefully omit to control for 
share repurchases on the right hand side of the equation. When we correct this bias, by 
replacing lagged dividends with lagged total payouts as an explanatory variable, the 
results are very much similar to those where we estimated changes in dividends (see 
specification 3 in Table 5-2). Nonetheless, some slight differences cannot go 
unnoticed. For instance, while lagged dividends in estimation (1) have a coefficient of 
0.9, that of lagged total payouts in estimafion (3) is 1. This reflects the fact that firms 
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in our sample more than fully adjust to their past total payouts. Indeed, firms are 
usually not expected to sustain their repurchase activities in the same way that they 
are expected to sustain their dividend payouts. 
When we add lagged income to the vector of explanatory variables we improve the fit 
of the model by about 0.01 index point; lagged earnings are highly significant with a 
coefficient of 0.04, while current earnings remain insignificant. 
Separating the repurchase/no repurchase samples again shows the same patterns as 
those found previously (when we estimated the change in dividends), except that this 
time the adjusted R squared of the model applied to the div-rep sample is somewhat 
lower than it was when we estimated the change in dividends. When we estimate the 
change in total payouts the adjusted R squared is 0.51 while when we esfimated the 
change in dividends it was 0.61 (see specifications 10 and 8 respectively). This 
decrease in the explanatory power of the model reflects the increased volatility of total 
payouts relative to dividends due to the inclusion of share repurchases. Nonetheless, 
the model applied to the rep-div sample still performs statistically as well as that 
applied to the div-only sample, which again suggests that firms that pay dividends and 
do not repurchase shares tend to have a more volatile dividend payout behaviour than 
firms that both pay dividends and repurchase shares^ .^ In addition, lagged income has 
a slightly bigger coefficient in the case of the repurchase-sample than in the case of 
the div-only sample. This suggests that share repurchases may also have a direct 
relationship with lagged income. 
" It is worth noting here that for the div-only sub-sample we only report one set of results since total 
payouts in the case of this sample would also be iu.st dividends: hence, the resnirs are iHentiral 
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5.5.1 Robustness checks 
Throughout the analysis we scale both the dependent and the explanatory variables by 
total assets of the corresponding firm at the start of each financial year. This was done 
with the objective of normalising the relationships between the dependent variable 
and the different covariates and also to facilitate the comparison of the latter's 
respective coefficients. Nevertheless, our results are robust to the choice of the 
normalising variable. Running the same tests but with the variables being scaled by 
the market value of equity or the market value of the firm (market value of equity plus 
long-term debt) yields the same results^^ Current earnings are not significant in any 
of these tests. This confirms our prediction that changes in dividends may depend 
more on lagged earnings than on current earnings. The results also confirm our 
prediction that lagged dividends constitute the single most powerful determinant of 
current dividends, which indicates the conservatism of UX corporations with regard to 
their dividend policies. 
Running the same models but without controlling for fixed effects reduces the 
adjusted R squared of the models, as would be expected i f as appears to be the case, 
individual firms in the sample have significantly differing propensities to cut 
dividends. The exclusion of the fixed effects also decreases the magnitude of the 
lagged dividend and total payout coefficients from one to about 0.35 and 0.49 
respectively (though they both remain highly significant). In addition, current income 
becomes significant (in most models) while lagged income loses its significance in the 
case of dividend estimations, and the intercept is consistently insignificant and close 
to zero in most models (see Table 5-4). These results do not change much whether we 
" Refer to Table 5-3 for tests where the variables are scaled by the market value of equity. Results 
where the market value of the firm is used as a scalina variable are not reported here 
231 
Chapter 5: Share repurchases, dividends and corporate payout behaviour models 
control for industry differences or not, which demonstrates the importance of 
controlling for firm specific effects in relation to cuts in dividends and/or total 
payouts. 
Our results are also robust to the choice of the earnings variable used. In his original 
model, Lintner (1956) defined earnings as net income after depreciation and taxes i.e. 
earnings distributable to shareholders. This definition of earnings was based on his 
findings in his interviews with managers. However, some may argue that it is actually 
permanent income which really affects the dividend decision; since dividend 
increases/decreases should depend on or reflect the long-term prospects of the firm (at 
least according to the signalling theory and the findings of Lintner (1956)). Brittain 
(1964) took this on board and hypothesised that dividends tend to follow cash-flow -
measured as net income plus depreciation- rather than net earnings. His findings 
support his hypothesis, but it must be said that the period on which he based his 
analysis may have encouraged such results^ "*. 
Although our main results are presented using Lintner's definition of income, we also 
report results where we define income as earnings before interest, tax and depreciation 
in Table 5-5, they are generally similar to those where we use net income. Although 
not reported here, our results are also robust to measuring income as earnings before 
interest, tax and depreciation minus capital expenditure. 
The sample of firms we have used so far is made up of firms that paid dividends at 
least once during the sample period. Although most firms in our sample have paid 
dividends continuously during the sample period, it is possible that a few observations 
Brittain (1964) purposefully estimated his model during the period 1920-1960 (excluding 1936-
1938) in order to include the effects of some major changes on the tax law of depreciation that occurred 
during this period. 
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where dividends were a one-off payment have influenced the results. Therefore, as a 
final test of robustness we re-run the analysis using a slightly different definition for 
our sample; this dme are included in the sample only firms that paid dividends in at 
least two consecutive years of the sample period. This reduces the total sample size 
from 926 to 856 observations. The results are presented in Table 5-6. They indicate 
similar patterns in the relationships between payout policy and the rest of the 
variables. As would be expected, the dividend models fit this dataset better than they 
did the previous dataset; this can be seen from the adjusted R squared values which 
are higher than those we obtained previously. The models fit this data better because 
there is less volatility in dividend payouts. The adjusted R squared of the total payout 
models, on the other hand, drops slightly from an average of 0.51 to about 0.49. 
Interesting to note is the fact that the speed of adjustment coefficient (the coefficient 
of lagged dividends) is closer to unity than it was previously in the case of dividend 
estimations, while it is about 1.1 in the case of total payouts, thus reflecting the extra 
cash payments made in the form of share repurchases. 
Another small difference that arises when we use this dataset is that current income is 
significant in the case of the div-rep sample. For instance, in estimation (8) Table 5-6 
(our equivalent of the Fama and Babiak model), the current earnings coefficient is 
0.0355, significant beyond the 0.01 level, while the coefficient of last year's earnings 
is 0.0354, also significant beyond the 0.01 level. The fact that re-purchasers are more 
profitable (as we found in the univariate statistics) and enjoy greater flexibility in their 
payout strategies thanks to share repurchases, may give them the possibility of using a 
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greater fraction of their current earnings to give back to shareholders, contrary to non 
re-purchasers. 
This adds support to our prediction that current dividends are mostly a function of 
lagged dividends, especially for the case of historically stable dividend payers. 
Repurchases and dividend initiations and omissions, on the other hand, are more 
likely to have a direct relationship with income. 
To summarise, our findings seem to indicate that traditional corporate dividend 
models can be generalised to include total payouts instead of just dividends. The 
argument that repurchases are too volatile to be included in such models does not hold 
since we found that the volatility of repurchases does not greatly affect the power of 
such models in explaining the variation in total payouts. We also found that dividend 
payouts of repurchasing firms tend to be smoother than those of non-repurchasing 
firms, which we interpreted to be an indication that repurchases can be used by 
dividend-paying firms to "get rid o f the unpredictable element of their payouts, 
which leaves their dividends more predictable and less volatile. 
Moreover, consistent with our predictions, we found that British firms are very 
conservafive in their dividend payout behaviour, as they tend to distribute dividends 
out of past income, while current income is generally of no significance in predicting 
current dividends. This also confirms our prediction that dividends are paid out of 
"expected" earnings. As was mentioned in the theoretical framework, Lintner's model 
assumes that all changes in earnings are unexpected, which results in firms partially 
adjusting their dividends to these unexpected earnings. Fama and Babiak, on the other 
1 
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hand, allow for an element of earnings to be unexpected, but assume that all firms in 
the sample share the same earnings trend, which is quite unrealistic. This is why in the 
next section we use the Alternative Earnings Model that we developed in the 
theoretical framework, to empirically prove that payouts generally, and dividends 
particularly, are primarily funded out of expected income, where the latter is 
measured according to the earnings trend of the individual companies making out our 
sample. 
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5.6 Empirical Results for the Alternative Benchmarks of Expected 
and Unexpected Earnings applied to Dividend and Total Payout 
Changes. 
We have seen in the previous section that although the Lintner type models can be 
used to determine the total payout behaviour of firms quite successfully, a slight 
modification in their earnings' assumption might result in better predictors that should 
better reflect the actual relationship between payouts and earnings. 
In the methodology section we developed an alternative model that makes an explicit 
distinction between expected and unexpected income, and unlike Fama and Babiak's 
model, allows for these two types of income to be determined by the earnings trend of 
individual companies. In the alternative model we first run an OLS regression to 
obtain the predicted and unpredicted income of individual companies i.e. predicted 
values and residuals respectively, as has been illustrated in equation (12). Then we use 
these estimates to predict changes in dividends and total payouts. 
Firstly, however, we wil l look at a special case of the Alternative Earnings Model, 
where expected earnings are simply last year's earnings, which means that unexpected 
earnings are the difference between this year's and last year's earnings (see equation 
13). 
As in the previous section, we normalise all variables by total assets, we control for 
year and fixed effects, and apply the models to the total sample followed by the 
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dividend-only sample and the rep-and-div sample. For each sample we first estimate 
the yearly change in dividends and then we estimate the yearly change in total 
payouts. 
The results are presented in Table 5-7. They seem very similar to what we found in 
the previous section. The constant is positive and significant in most of the 
estimations that use the total sample and the dividend-only sample. Size is 
significantly negatively related to changes in dividends and total payouts (except 
changes in total payouts of the re-purchasers sample). This reflects the fact that larger 
firms tend to experience smaller changes in their dividends, and consequently have 
smoother dividend policies. Moreover, the coefficient of lagged dividends in all 
estimations is close to unity, being slightly below one in the dividend estimations and 
slightly above one in the total payouts estimations, except for the div-and-rep sample 
where it is slightly above one in all estimations. We have already said that the fact that 
the constant is closer to zero and less significant when we use the sample of re-
purchasers reflects the latter's comparative boldness in their payout behaviour, this is 
also reflected in their adjusting more than fully to last year's dividend levels. 
It is very interesting to note that the coefficients of the earnings variables are also very 
similar to what we found earlier using the Lintner and the Fama & Babiak models, 
although slightly larger. Lagged earnings are positive and significant beyond the 
conventional 0.01 level, with a coefficient ranging from 0.05 using the re-purchasers 
sample, to 0.03 using the div-only sample. Unexpected earnings, on the other hand, 
are negative and significant in all estimations apart from that of total payouts using 
the sample of re-purchasers. 
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Looking back at Table 5-2, we can see that defining unexpected income as the 
difference between this year's and last year's earnings allows for a more accurate 
estimation of the relationship between this variable and changes in dividends and 
changes in total payouts. Previously, we had found that, estimated individually, the 
coefficient of unexpected income (i.e. current income) is negative, close to zero and 
insignificant, while now we find that it is not that close to zero (it is about 0.02), and 
is negative and significant. 
When we use both expected and unexpected income in the same regression, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, unexpected income loses its significance and becomes positive but 
highly insignificant, and at any rate close to zero, while expected income has a larger 
positive coefficient, which in the case of re-purchasers equals 0.11 (see specification 
15 in Table 5-7). 
It is worth pointing out that these results are also robust to the use of a different 
scaling variable or income variable, though these robustness checks are not reported 
here to save space and avoid confusion caused by the reporting of too many tables. 
However, we do report the results where we include in the sample only firms that paid 
dividends in at least two consecutive years of the sample period, and they naturally 
show relatively larger coefficients (see Table 5-8). However, on the whole they show 
the same patterns and relationships we identified using the larger sample definition. 
238 
Chapter 5: Share repurchases, dividends and corporate payout behaviour models 
Let us now look at how our alternative model, in its more general form, performs. 
Firstly, we estimate predicted and unpredicted earnings according to specificadon 
(12), where current income is mostly a funcfion of last year's income and some 
control variables. The predicted values and residuals obtained from these estimations 
are saved and then used in the payout estimations as expected income and unexpected 
income respectively. Panel data estimation cannot be used to estimate earnings, since 
its use would produce biased results. This is due to the nature of the model being 
estimated, as we are regressing current earnings on last year's earnings; the use of a 
lagged dependent variable as a regressor renders both fixed effects and random 
effects' estimators biased. A Lagrange Multiplier test reveals a value of 0.37 with one 
degree of freedom and a probability value of 0.54. Clearly, such a small L M that is 
quite insignificant favours a classical regression model over the fixed or random 
effects models. Thus, in the earnings estimafion we use the classical OLS model, and 
we only control for time and industry effects. This estimation produces predicted 
values and residuals that are more realistic than what would have been obtained i f 
fixed effects were controlled for^^. 
Estimations where the total sample is used are reported in Table 5-9, while those 
where the sub-samples are used are reported in Table 5-10. The earnings esdmation 
indicates that lagged income contributes greatly to the explanatory power of the 
model, with a coefficient of 0.5 that is highly significant (see specification 1 in Table 
5-9). The model explains a lot of the variation in the dependent variable, with an 
" Fixed effects are not controlled for only in the earnings estimations. However, we do control for 
them in all the dividend and total payouts estimations, since there is no reason why results from these 
estimations will be biased. Moreover, the Lagrange Multiplier tests of these models support the use of 
Fixed Effects. 
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adjusted R squared of 0.36, which allows us to confidently use the resulting residuals 
and predicted values in our payout esfimafions. 
When both expected and unexpected income are used to estimate changes in 
dividends using the total sample (specification 2, Table 5-9), the resulting coefficient 
of expected income appears to be much larger than what we found in the previous 
estimafion where expected income was simply last year's income; coefficients fi-om 
both regressions are 0.07 and 0.03 respectively. Unexpected income, on the other 
hand, is very small and insignificant. 
Although not reported here, when unexpected income is used on its own to predict 
changes in earnings we obtain for it a negafive, though insignificant coefficient. This, 
together with the previous findings where unexpected income (though measured 
differently) has often had a negative coefficient when used separately fi-om expected 
income, raises the question of whether this seemingly negative relationship is in fact 
only capturing the effect of negative unexpected earnings on dividend changes. I f 
unexpected earnings are negative, then it is little wonder that they have a negative 
relationship with dividend increases. In order to control for this possible bias, we 
introduce a new variable that we refer to as positive unexpected income, which could 
be viewed as an interaction term between unexpected income and a dummy that takes 
one for all values of unexpected income that are posifive and zero otherwise. 
This interaction term seems to have a positive relationship with changes in dividends, 
as one would expect, but it is not always significant. The fact that this coefficient is 
significant in specification (5) (Table 5-9) at the 5 percent level may reflect a degree 
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of multicoUinearity between the positive unexpected income and unexpected income 
variables. 
In any case, the relationship of positive unexpected income with changes in dividends 
fits very well with our predictions, since despite the positive nature of this 
relationship; it is significantly weaker than the relationship of expected income with 
changes in dividends, both in terms of the size of the coefficient (or differential 
coefficient) and its significance. 
Similar results are obtained when we use the sub-samples of re-purchasers and non re-
purchasers (see Table 5-10). The following is a brief description of the main 
differences in the results of the two sub-samples: 
• The constant is positive in all the dividend estimations, but is relatively 'large' 
and significant in the group of non re-purchasers while it is close to zero and 
insignificant in the group of re-purchasers. 
• The speed of adjustment coefficient is slightly below one in the group of non 
re-purchasers and slightly above one in the group of re-purchasers. 
• The coefficient of expected income is slightly larger in the case of re-
purchasers. 
• Unexpected income is not significant in any of the estimations, while positive 
unexpected income is insignificant in the non re-purchasers sample, and highly 
significant in the re-purchasers sample, even in the estimation where we 
exclude unexpected earnings. 
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These results further validate our predictions and earlier findings that UK firms are 
quite conservative in their dividend payout behaviour, as lagged dividends consfitute 
the single most important determinant of current dividends, and expected income is a 
more important source of dividend funding than unexpected income. This explains the 
insignificant relationship found earlier between current income and changes in 
dividends using the Lintner model. Indeed, it has become clear that using current 
income by itself to predict changes in dividends is quite uninformafive, since as we 
have seen, current income contains a large element of unpredictability that renders it 
unusable for a firm that is inherently conservative in its dividend payout behaviour. 
This situation, however, is slightly different for firms that repurchase their shares. 
Although it could be argued that these firms tend to be more daring in their dividend 
behaviour because they are more profitable, the fact that they are more inclined to 
repurchase their shares also provides them with some leeway in their payout policy. 
They, thus, can afford not only to fully adjust to their previous dividend levels, but 
they are also able to increase these dividends, and while they still seem reluctant to 
cut their dividends, this reluctance, reflected in the positive constant, is quite 
insignificant compared to that of firms that do not repurchase their shares. Moreover, 
it seems that share re-purchasers, though relying primarily on expected earnings in 
their dividend payouts, are also very likely to use unexpected positive earnings. This 
suggests that these firms are very confident about their earnings and are able to 
maintain their dividends by cutting back on their share repurchases. 
The estimations of total payouts show the same relationships, except that the 
coefficients are generally slightly larger. For instance, expected earnings in the 
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repurchase sample estimations of total payouts show a significant coefficient that 
varies between 0.11 and 0.17, compared to a coefficient that varies between 0.07 and 
0.09 in the dividend estimations. Positive unexpected earnings lose their significance 
in the total payouts estimations, but the size of their coefficient is considerably larger. 
5.6.1 Robustness checks 
When we drop the fixed effects, unexpected income becomes significant in most 
regressions (see Table 5-11), except those where the sample of non re-purchasers is 
used, but expected income remains larger in terms of its size. Furthermore, the results 
are generally robust to the use of the market value of equity or the market value of the 
firm as a scaling variable^^. They are also robust to the use of earnings before interest, 
tax and depreciation instead of net income distributable to shareholders (Table 5-13). 
Finally, when the sample of firms that paid dividends in at least two consecutive years 
is used, the results show the same relationships we identified previously, with sHghtly 
larger coefficients (see Table 5-14 and Table 5-15). 
See Table 5-12 for the results where the market value of equity is used as the scaling variable. Those 
where the market value of the firm is used are not reported here. 
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5.7 Summary and conclusions 
The objective of this chapter was to develop a model of corporate payout policy that 
takes into account changes that occurred over the years in corporate payout trends, 
and allows for a broader definifion of payouts to include dividends as well as 
repurchases, in the conservative UK setting. 
We have argued that share repurchases have become part of the payout strategy of 
many firms that are usually the largest and most profitable in the market. Ignoring this 
form of payout, because empirical models would look better without it, is simply a 
very poor excuse. Thus, we have demonstrated, firstly; that traditional dividend 
models such as Lintner (1956) and Fama & Babiak (1968) can sfill produce good 
estimates when applied to total payouts as opposed to just dividends. Secondly, we 
have shown that these models could be sharpened to reflect changes that occurred 
over recent years in corporate payout policy, such as the fact that firms nowadays are 
not as reluctant to reduce dividends as they used to, especially those that repurchase, 
or that firms no longer have a target payout ratio. We developed an Alternative 
Expected and Unexpected Earnings model where the individual earnings trends of 
firms are used to estimate their expected and unexpected earnings, which in turn are 
used alongside lagged dividends and total payouts to estimate changes in dividends 
and changes in total payouts respectively. 
Our results show that lagged dividends (total payouts) are the most important 
determinant of dividend (total payout) changes. Consistent with our predictions, we 
find that expected earnings, not unexpected earnings as assumed in Lintner's model. 
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are the main source of dividend increases, and share repurchases (although arguably 
to a lesser extent). 
Finally, we find that firms that repurchase their shares tend to be more daring in their 
payout behaviour; although they generally have smoother dividends than firms that do 
not repurchase (at least according to our data), they are more likely to fund a part of 
their dividends or share repurchases out of unexpected earnings than non re-
purchasers. They generally show the type of behaviour that has been documented in 
previous studies, and which we referred to in the literature review. In fact, the results 
appear to offer support for the contention that corporate dividend/payout behaviour is 
changing, with the clear implication that the models that attempt to specify and 
empirically estimate corporate payout behaviour ought also to reflect such changes. 
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5.8 Appendix 
Table 5-1: Descriptive statistics 
This table summarises descriptive statistics of sample firms in relation to the following variables: 
MVO-the market value at the start of the financial year, TA-the book value of total assets at the start of 
the financial year, DY-total dividends scaled by market value at the start of the year, TPY- total 
payouts scaled by market value at the start of the year, En.i-net income at the start of the financial year 
scaled by total assets, Di, -dividends paid during the year scaled by total assets at the start of the year, 
REP 1-the pound value of shares repurchased during the year scaled by market value at the start of the 
year, TPj, -total payouts made during the year (that is dividends and share repurchases) scaled by total 
assets at the start of the year. AD;, -this year's dividends minus last year's dividends both scaled by 
total assets at the start of the corresponding year, ATPj, -this year's total payouts minus last year's total 
payouts both scaled by total assets at the start of the corresponding year. Firstly, descriptive statistics of 
the total sample are presented, followed by statistics of the sample of firms that paid dividends at least 
once during the sample period but never repurchased their shares and the sample of firms that paid 
dividends and repurchased their shares at least once during the sample period. The total sample consists 
of a panel of non-financial firms that were part of the FTSE 350 in 2004 and that paid dividends at least 
once during the sample period, which spans from 2001 to 2004 (with the year 2000 also being an 
estimation period for some variables). For a more detailed description of the variables refer back to the 
empirical estimating methods section in the main text. 
Total sample N = 926 
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Med. Maximum 
MVO (£m) 3978 12430 44 903 124639 
TA (£m) 4,332 13,172 52 1,229 171,699 
DY 0.0329 0.0197 - 0.0320 0.1171 
TPY 0.0383 0.0272 - 0.0354 0.26111 
E,,, 0.0522 0.0860 - 0.5623 0.0505 0.6448 
Di, 0.0291 0.0237 O.OOE+00 0.0243 0.1643 
ADi, -1.80E-04 0.0120 - 0.1118 8.34E-05 0.0731 
TPi, 0.0353 0.0392 O.OOE+00 0.0260 0.5046 
ATPi, 3.56E-04 0.0270 - 0.1945 O.OOE+00 0.3420 
Dividend-only sample N = 567 
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Med. Maximum 
MVO (£m) 1,965 3,252 44 713 23,592 
TA (£m) 2,491 4.103 52 1,058 34,952 
DY 0.0310 0.0204 - 0.0297 0.1171 
E„., 0.0424 0.0873 - 0.5623 0.0412 0.5597 
D„ 0.0260 0.0208 O.OOE+00 0.0224 0.1321 
ADi, -2.34E-04 0.0131 - 0.1118 2.28E-07 0.0731 
Dividend and repurchase sample N = 359 
Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Med. Maximum 
MVO (£m) 7,157 19,130 120 1,446 124,639 
TA (£m) 7,240 20,194 72 1,658 171,699 
DY 0.0359 0.0183 - 0.0359 0.1089 
TPY 0.0497 0.0324 - 0.0451 0.2611 
0.0677 0.0817 - 0.4036 0.0597 0.6448 
Di, 0.0341 0.0269 O.OOE+00 0.0270 0.1643 
ADi, -9.52E-05 0.0102 - 0.0571 1.30E-04 0.0592 
TPi, 0.0500 0.0542 O.OOE+00 0.0348 0.5046 
ATPi, 0.0013 0.0402 - 0.1945 O.OOE+00 0.3420 
REP1 0.0160 0,0371 O.OOE+00 O.OOE+00 0.4117 
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Table 5-2: Lintner and Fama and Babiak's models 
This table presents coefficient estimates and model descriptive statistics for OLS regressions with fixed effects of the change in dividends and change in total payouts, from 
year t-1 to year t, normalised by total assets. The same models are estimated using first, the total sample, then the sample of firms that never repurchased their shares during 
the sample period, and finally the sample of firms that repurchased their shares at least once during the sample period. For more details on our sampling methodology refer 
back to the methodology section. The table reports the coefficient estimate for each covariate followed by its standard deviation and the p-value of the t-statistic. Variables are 
defined as follows: D;,- total cash dividends (excluding special dividends) paid during the current year normalised by the value of the firm's total assets at the start of the 
current year. Dj,.|- total cash dividends (excluding special dividends) paid during the previous financial year normalised by the value of the firm's total assets at the start of the 
previous financial year. ADi, = Dj, - Di,.,: the change in dividends between this year and last year. TPj,- total payouts (dividends and repurchases) paid during the current year 
normalised by total assets at the start of the current year. TP|,.|- total payouts (dividends and repurchases) paid during the previous financial year normalised by total assets at 
the start of the previous financial year. ATPj, = TPi, - TPj,.|: the change in total payouts between this year and last year. E;, - net income at the end of the current year normalised 
by total assets at the start of the current financial year. Ei|. |- net income at the end of the previous year normalised by total assets at the start of the previous financial year. 
SIZE- the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets at the start of the current financial year. MERGER- a dummy that takes the value of one in the year of the merger/de-
nerger and the year following it and zero otherwise. This definition of variables applies throughout the rest of the tables, except where indicated otherwise (in the robustness 
checks). Fixed effects are controlled for throughout the rest of the results except where indicated otherwise. Time effects are controlled for throughout all the tests without 
.exception. 
Total sample Div only sample Div-and-Rep sample 
ADi, ADi, ATPi, ATPi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ATPi, ATP,, 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Constant Coeff. 0.0211" 0.0207** 0.0131 0.0093 0.0366** 0.0359** 0.0030 0,0028 -0.0066 -0.0178 
Std.Err. 0.0059 0.0060 0.0132 0.0132 0.0088 0.0089 0.0078 0.0078 0.0293 0.0292 
t-ratio 3.5633 3.4711 0.9910 0.7058 4.1478 4.0383 0.3843 0.3600 -0.2239 -0.6102 
JIZE Coeff. -0.0098** -0.0096** -0.0060* -0.0059* -0.0100** -0.0092** -0.0096** -0.0109** 0.0013 -0.0012 
Std.Err. 0.0023 0.0023 0.0030 0.0029 0.0029 0.0028 0.0029 0.0028 0.0079 0.0079 
t-ratio -4.2423 -4.2357 -1.9644 -2.0017 -3.4728 -3.2851 -3.3188 -3.8629 0.1625 -0.1527 
Coeff. -0.9278** -0.9674** -0.8872** -0.9210** -1.0217** -1.0815** 
Std.Err. 0.0585 0.0578 0.0792 0.0792 0.0842 0.0829 
t-ratio -15.8730 -16.7449 -11.1986 -11.6291 -12.1341 -13.0491 
"PI,., Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratIo 
-1.0572** 
0.1378 
-7.6738 
-1.0663** 
0.1379 
-7.7309 
-1.0785** 
0.1661 
-6.4927 
-1.0839** 
0.1658 
-6.5366 
'•it Coeff. -0.0018 0.0008 0.0089 0.0115 -0.0079 -0.0050 0.0177 0.0195 0.0581 0.0606 
Std.Err. 0.0091 0.0086 0.0135 0.0130 0.0105 0.0100 0.0111 0.0105 0.0427 0.0418 
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t-ratio -0.1946 0.0907 0.6597 0.8870 -0.7524 -0.4988 1,5909 1,8510 1,3600 1,4500 
Coeff. 0.0295" 0.0401** 0.0283** 0.0333** 0.0524** 
Std.Err. 0.0073 0.0108 0,0109 0,0060 0.0210 
t-ratio 4.0180 3.7034 2.5977 5.5658 2,4897 
Merger Coeff. 0.0141* 0.0154** 0.0162** 0.0175** 0.0273** 0.0281** -0.0012 0.0008 0.0029 0.0055 
dummy Std.Err. 0.0062 0.0058 0.0063 0.0060 0.0087 0.0081 0.0056 0.0053 0.0076 0,0074 
t-ratio 2.2972 2.6311 2.5802 2,9429 3.1308 3.4720 -0.2156 0,1484 0.3843 0.7421 
Adjusted R squared 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.52 0,58 0,61 0,51 0.51 
F statistic 4.70 5.03 4.63 4.73 4.71 4,95 5,79 6.51 4.60 4.63 
Number of obs 926 926 926 926 567 567 359 359 359 359 
** indicates a significance level of 1% or below, * indicates a significance level between 1 and 5% 
The constant in the case of the fixed effects OLS models is the actual constant of the equivalent model but without fixed effect controls. 
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Table 5-3: Lintner and Fama and Babiak's models - Robustness checks- using market value as the scaling variable 
This table presents coefficient estimates and model descriptive statistics for OLS regressions with fixed effects of the change in dividends and change in total payouts, from 
year t-1 to year t, normalised by the market value of equity. The same models are estimated using first, the total sample, then the sample of firms that never repurchased their 
shares during the sample period, and finally the sample of firms that repurchased their shares at least once during the sample period. For more details on our sampling 
methodology refer back to the methodology section. The table reports the coefficient estimate for each covariate followed by its standard deviation and the p-value of the t-
statistic. Variables are defined as follows: Dj,- total cash dividends (excluding special dividends) paid during the current year normalised by the market value of equity at the 
start of the current year. Dj,.|- total cash dividends (excluding special dividends) paid during the previous financial year normalised by the market value of equity at the start of 
the previous financial year. ADj, = Dj, - Di,.|: the change in dividends between this year and last year. TPjt- total payouts (dividends and repurchases) paid during the current 
year normalised by the market value of equity at the start of the current year. TPi,.]- total payouts (dividends and repurchases) paid during the previous financial year 
normalised by the market value of equity at the start of the previous financial year. ATP;, = TPi, - TPi,.|: the change in total payouts between this year and last year. Ej, - net 
income at the end of the current year normalised by the market value of equity at the start of the cunent financial year. Ei,.|- net income at the end of the previous year 
normalised by the market value of equity at the start of the previous financial year. SIZE- the natural logarithm of the firm's market value of equity at the start of the current 
financial year. MERGER- a dummy that takes the value of one in the year of the merger/de-merger and the year following it and zero otherwise. 
Total sample Div only sample Div-and-Rep sample 
AD, ADi, ATPi, ATPi, ADi, AD„ ADi, AD„ ATPi, ATPi, 
11] [2] 13] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Constant Coeff. 0.0060 0.0060 -0.0019 -0.0023 -0.0012 -0.0010 0.0146 0.0146 0.0413 0.0372 
Std.Err. 0.0072 0.0072 0.0114 0.0113 0.0110 0.0110 0.0099 0.0099 0.0230 0.0228 
t-ratio 0.8283 0.8281 -0.1629 -0.2006 -0.1049 -0.0924 1.4819 1.4795 1.7986 1.6316 
5IZE Coeff. -0.0102" -0.0125** -0.0116** -0.0153** -0.0067** -0.0088** -0.0207** -0.0240** -0.0264** -0.0350** 
Std.Err. 0.0018 0.0017 0.0029 0.0029 0.0020 0.0020 0.0029 0.0022 0.0095 0.0084 
t-ratio -5.6151 -7.1847 -3.9456 -5.3614 -3.2947 -4.4738 -7.0358 -10.8380 -2.7965 ^ . 1 5 5 0 
Coeff. -0.9698** -0.9993** -0.9811** -1.0132** -1.0352** -1.0632** 
Std.Err. 0.0491 0.0468 0.0635 0.0598 0.0524 0.0537 
t-ratio -19.7584 -21.3640 -15.4434 -16.9408 -19.7611 -19.8066 
"P,,-, Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-0.9856** 
0.0542 
-18.1678 
-0.9991** 
0.0527 
-18.9490 
-1.0178** 
0.0721 
-14.1166 
-1.0239** 
0.0695 
-14.7231 
Coeff. 0.0067 0.0097 0.0104 0.0154 0.0076 0.0102 -0.0011 0.0028 0.0077 0.0193 
Std.Err. 0.0085 0.0085 0.0101 0.0098 0.0108 0.0107 0.0094 0.0099 0.0187 0.0206 
t-ratio 0.7926 1.1430 1.0359 1.5728 0.7061 0.9500 -0.1172 0.2838 0.4124 0.9381 
Coeff. 0.0313** 0.0507** 0.0323** 0.0328** 0.0895** 
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Std.Err. 0.0076 0.0111 0.0097 0.0122 0.0246 
t-ratio 4.1054 4.5468 3.3252 2.6876 3.6320 
Merger Coeff. 0.0105 0.0124* 0.0120* 0.0152** 0.0299** 0.0309** -0.0115 -0.0082 -0.0070 0.0027 
dummy Std.Err. 0.0061 0.0058 0.0061 0.0056 0.0070 0.0063 0.0063 0.0062 0.0065 0.0068 
t-ratio 1.7148 2.1468 1.9697 2.7298 4.2682 4.9112 -1.8062 -1.3073 -1.0763 0.3918 
Adj R squared 0.53 0.55 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.54 0.67 0.70 0.53 0.56 
F statistic 5.12 5.49 4.81 5.15 4.88 5.20 8.02 8.95 4.93 5.47 
N 927 927 927 927 568 568 359 359 359 359 
* * indicates a significance level of 1% or below, * indicates a significance level between 1 and 5% 
The constant in the case of the fixed effects OLS models is the actual constant of the equivalent model but without fixed effect controls. 
Fixed and time effects are controlled for in all regressions. 
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Table 5-4: Lintner and Fama and Babiak's models - Robustness checks- using market value as the scaling variable and not controlHng for flxed effects 
This table presents coefficient estimates and model descriptive statistics for OLS regressions without fixed effects of the change in dividends and change in total payouts, from 
year t-1 to year t, normalised by the market value of equity. The same models are estimated using first, the total sample, then the sample of firms that never repurchased their 
shares during the sample period, and finally the sample of firms that repurchased their shares at least once during the sample period. For more details on our sampling 
methodology refer back to the methodology section. The table reports the coefficient estimate for each covariate followed by its standard deviation and the p-value of the t-
statistic. Variables are defined as follows: Dj,- total cash dividends (excluding special dividends) paid diuing the current year normalised by the market value of equity at the 
start of the cunent year. Di,.|- total cash dividends (excluding special dividends) paid diuing the previous financial year normalised by the market value of equity at the start of 
the previous financial year. ADi, = Dj, - Di,.|; the change in dividends between this year and last year. TPj,- total payouts (dividends and repurchases) paid during the current 
year normalised by the market value of equity at the start of the current year. TP;,.,- total payouts (dividends and repurchases) paid during the previous financial year 
normalised by the market value of equity at the start of the previous financial year. ATP;, = TP;, - TP|,.|: the change in total payouts between this year and last year. Ej, - net 
income at the end of the current year normalised by the market value of equity at the start of the current financial year. E„.r net income at the end of the previous year 
normalised by the market value of equity at the start of the previous financial year. SIZE- the natural logarithm of the firm's market value of equity at the start of the current 
financial year. MERGER- a dummy that takes the value of one in the year of the merger/de-merger and the year following it and zero otherwise. 
Total sample Div only sample Div-and-Rep sample 
ADi, ATPi, ATPi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ATPi, ATPi, 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Constant Coeff. 0.0060 0.0060 -0.0019 -0.0023 -0.0012 -0.0010 0.0146 0.0146 0.0413 0.0372 
Std.Err. 0.0072 0.0072 0.0114 0.0113 0.0110 0.0110 0.0099 0.0099 0.0230 0.0228 
t-ratio 0.8283 0.8281 -0.1629 -0.2006 -0.1049 -0.0924 1.4819 1.4795 1.7986 1.6316 
SIZE Coeff. 0.0000 0.0001 0.0008 0.0008 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0005 
Std.Err. 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0010 0.0010 
t-ratio 0.1475 0.1529 1.4883 1.5243 0.7393 0.7337 -0.7696 -0.7686 -0.6177 -0.4840 
Coeff. -0.3511" -0.3558" -0.3678" -0.3736" -0.3378" -0.3376" 
Std.Err. 0.0226 0.0230 0.0301 0.0305 0.0344 0.0355 
t-ratio -15.5674 -15.4565 -12.2132 -12.2325 -9.8113 -9.5165 
TP;,., Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-0.4891" 
0.0243 
-20.1141 
-0.5022" 
0.0246 
-20.4378 
-0.6225" 
0.0414 
-15.0353 
-0.6404" 
0.0416 
-15.4090 
Coeff. 0.0191" 0.0169" 0.0305" 0.0200" 0.0186" 0.0151* 0.0198" 0.0199" 0.0440" 0.0268 
Std.Err. 0.0042 0.0047 0.0067 0.0075 0.0055 0.0063 0.0068 0.0073 0.0159 0.0170 
t-ratio 4.5037 3.5628 4.5542 2.6690 3.3972 2.4037 2.9020 2.7213 2.7642 1.5779 
Coeff. 0.0050 0.0235" 0.0074 -0.0001 0.0440" 
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Std.Err. 0.0049 0.0076 0.0066 0.0071 0.0162 
t-ratio 1.0209 3.0910 1,1329 -0.0195 2,7120 
VIerger Coeff. 0.0128" 0.0129" 0.0156" 0.0160" 0.0187" 0.0188" 0.0074 0.0074 0,0091 0.0102 
Jummy Std.Err. 0.0035 0.0035 0.0055 0.0055 0.0053 0,0053 0.0044 0.0044 0.0103 0.0103 
t-ratio 3.6679 3.7029 2.8249 2.9206 3,5623 3.5849 1.6755 1.6699 0.8822 0,9918 
^dj R squared 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.40 0,41 
- statistic 54.57 47.88 65,53 59.07 32.33 28.46 23.80 20.76 34.69 31.82 
N 927 927 927 927 568 568 359 359 359 359 
" * indicates a significance level of 1% or below, * indicates a significance level between 1 and 5% 
Fixed effects are not controlled for in any of the regressions while time effects are. 
The constant in the case of the fixed effects OLS models is the actual constant of the equivalent model but without fixed effect controls. 
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Table 5-5: Lintner and Fama and Babiak's models- Robustness checks- using E B I T D instead of net income 
This table presents coefficient estimates and model descriptive statistics for OLS regressions with fixed effects of the change in dividends and change in total payouts, from 
year t-1 to year t, normalised by total assets. The same models are estimated using first, the total sample, then the sample of firms that never repurchased their shares during 
'Jie sample period, and finally the sample of firms that repurchased their shares at least once during the sample period. For more details on our sampling methodology refer 
Dack to the methodology section. The table reports the coefficient estimate for each covariate followed by its standard deviation and the p-value of the t-statistic. Variables are 
defined as follows: Dj,- total cash dividends (excluding special dividends) paid during the current year normalised by the value of the firm's total assets at the start of the 
:urrent year. D],.,- total cash dividends (excluding special dividends) paid during the previous financial year normalised by the value of the firm's total assets at the start of the 
previous financial year. ADj, = D;, - Di,.|: the change in dividends between this year and last year. TP:,- total payouts (dividends and repurchases) paid during the current year 
lormalised by total assets at the start of the current year. TP|,.|- total payouts (dividends and repurchases) paid during the previous financial year normalised by total assets at 
he start of the previous financial year. ATPj, = TPi,- TPj,.,: the change in total payouts between this year and last year. EBITDj, - earnings before interest, tax and depreciation 
It the end of the current year normalised by total assets at the start of the current financial year. EBlTDi,.!- earnings before interest, tax and depreciation at the end of the 
)revious year normalised by total assets at the start of the previous financial year. SIZE- the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets at the start of the current financial year. 
vIERGER- a dummy that takes the value of one in the year of the merger/de-merger and the year following it and zero otherwise. 
Total sample Div only sample Div-and-Rep sample 
ADi, ADi, ATPi, ATP, ADi, AD„ ADi, AD„ ATPi, ATPi, 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
Constant Coeff. 0.0136* 0.0148** 0.0040 0.0030 0.0261** 0.0279** 0.0036 0.0043 0.0045 0.0022 
Std.Err. 0.0059 0.0058 0.0133 0.0134 0.0089 0.0089 0.0075 0,0074 0.0290 0.0290 
t-ratio 2.3090 2.5409 0.2998 0.2212 2.9221 3.1242 0.4855 0.5901 0.1537 0.0754 
.SIZE Coeff. -0.0065** -0.0075** -0.0040 -0.0057 -0.0073** -0.0077** -0.0065** -0.0088** 0.0000 -0.0035 
Std.Err. 0.0021 0.0022 0.0030 0.0030 0.0027 0.0027 0.0024 0.0023 0.0080 0.0080 
t-ratio -3.0221 -3.4202 -1.3472 -1.9207 -2.6597 -2.8114 -2.6987 -3.8046 0,0015 -0.4420 
Hi,-, Coeff. -0.9388** -0.9960** -0.9019** -0.9514** -1.0139** -1.0955** 
Std.Err. 0.0591 0.0616 0.0817 0.0862 0.0791 0.0821 
t-ratio -15.8801 -16.1636 -11.0405 -11.0411 -12.8221 -13.3385 
-Pi, . , Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-1.0571** 
0.1379 
-7.6634 
-1.0715** 
0.1398 
-7.6643 
-1.0827** 
0,1661 
-6.5173 
-1.0895** 
0,1667 
-6.5365 
E-BITDi Coeff. 0.0224** 0.0204** 0.0209 0.0172 0.0128 0.0119 0.0370** 0.0327** 0.0335 0.0282 
Std.Err. 0,0073 0.0071 0.0123 0.0121 0.0087 0.0084 0.0108 0,0108 0.0385 0.0382 
t-ratio 3.0475 2.8614 1.6994 1.4168 1.4757 1.4214 3.4218 3,0315 0.8690 0.7374 
E.BITD„., Coeff. 0.0223** 0.0294** 0.0213** 0.0246** 0.0327 
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Std.Err. 0.0064 0,0109 0.0087 0,0061 0.0219 
t-ratio 3.5013 2.7069 2.4400 4,0551 1,4937 
Merger Coeff. 0.0140* 0.0147" 0.0155" 0.0160" 0.0275" 0.0277" -0.0014 -0.0001 0,0016 0,0028 
dummy Std.Err, 0.0062 0,0059 0,0062 0.0060 0.0091 0.0086 0.0049 0.0049 0.0069 0,0072 
t-ratio 2.2732 2.4724 2.5039 2.6580 3.0192 3.2396 -0.2792 -0.0117 0.2361 0,3847 
Adj R squared 0,51 0.53 0.50 0,51 0,51 0.52 0.60 0.63 0.50 0.51 
F statistic 4.85 5.09 4.65 4,72 4,74 4.90 6.34 6.86 4.58 4.56 
N 926 926 926 926 567 567 359 359 359 359 
* * indicates a significance level of 1% or below, * indicates a significance level between 1 and 5% 
Fixed and time effects are controlled for in all regressions. 
The constant in the case of the fixed effects OLS models is the actual constant of the equivalent model but without fixed effect controls. 
254 
»^napier D: s n a r e r e p u r c n a s e s , a i v i a e n a s a n a corporate payout oenav iour m o d e l s 
Table 5-6: Lintner and Fama and Babiak's models- Robustness checks- Using the restricted sample of firms that paid dividends in at least two consecutive years 
This table presents coefficient estimates and model descriptive statistics for OLS regressions with fixed effects of the change in dividends and change in total payouts, from 
year t-1 to year t, normalised by total assets. The same models are estimated using first, the total sample, then the sample of firms that never repurchased their shares during 
the sample period, and finally the sample of firms that repurchased their shares at least once during the sample period. For more details on our sampling methodology refer 
back to the methodology section. The table reports the coefficient estimate for each covariate followed by its standard deviation and the p-value of the t-statistic. Variables are 
defined as follows: Dj,- total cash dividends (excluding special dividends) paid during the current year normalised by the value of the firm's total assets at the start of the 
current year. Dn.i- total cash dividends (excluding special dividends) paid during the previous financial year normalised by the value of the firm's total assets at the start of the 
previous financial year. ADj, = D|, - Dj,.,: the change in dividends between this year and last year. TPj,- total payouts (dividends and repurchases) paid during the current year 
aormalised by total assets at the start of the current year. TPi,.i- total payouts (dividends and repurchases) paid during the previous financial year normalised by total assets at 
:he start of the previous financial year. ATP;, = TP;, - TPj,.,: the change in total payouts between this year and last year. Ej, - net income at the end of the current year normalised 
oy total assets at the start of the current financial year. Ei,.r net income at the end of the previous year normalised by total assets at the start of the previous financial year. 
SIZE- the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets at the start of the current financial year. MERGER- a dummy that takes the value of one in the year of the merger/de-
.Tierger and the year following it and zero otherwise. 
Total sample Div only sample Div-and-Rep sample 
ADi, ADi, ATPi, ATPi, ADI , ADi, AD„ ADi, ATP,, ATP,, 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 110] 
Constant* Coeff. 0.0217" 0.0217" 0.0134 0.0112 0.0414" 0.0413" 0.0020 0,0024 -0.0108 -0.0209 
Std.Err. 0,0060 0.0060 0.0138 0.0138 0,0091 0.0091 0,0077 0.0077 0.0295 0.0295 
t-ratio 3,6274 3.6198 0.9725 0.8074 4.5530 4.5282 0,2554 0.3122 -0.3646 -0.7068 
:;iZE Coeff. -0.0151" -0.0157" -0.0117" -0.0125" -0.0177" -0.0172" -0.0114" -0.0137" -0,0002 -0.0039 
Std.Err. 0.0026 0.0025 0.0034 0,0033 0.0035 0,0032 0.0032 0,0031 0,0079 0.0085 
t-ratio -5.7615 -6.2212 -3.4788 -3.7893 -5,0985 -5,3444 -3,5714 -4.4336 -0,0305 -0,4583 
Coeff. -0.9846" -1.0403" -0.9621" -1.0117" -1.0341" -1.1061" 
Std.Err, 0.0605 0.0588 0.0802 0,0786 0.0895 0.0866 
t-ratio -16.2690 -17,6807 -11.9900 -12.8777 -11.5522 -12.7661 
TP,,-, Coeff, 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-1.0862" 
0.1544 
-7.0356 
-1.0989" 
0.1550 
-7.0879 
-1.0981" 
0,1835 
-5.9853 
-1.1066" 
0,1839 
-6,0186 
t^ rt Coeff, 0,0083 0,0111 0.0250 0,0268 -0.0022 0.0012 0.0336" 0.0355" 0,0868 0.0890* 
Std,Err, 0.0110 0,0099 0.0184 0,0173 0.0128 0.0119 0.0131 0,0099 0,0480 0.0458 
t-ratio 0.7536 1.1214 1.3633 1.5477 -0.1754 0.0984 2,5756 3,5988 1.8088 1.9433 
Coeff, 0.0386" 0.0485" 0.0419" 0.0354" 0.0527* 
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Std.Err. 0.0082 0.0139 0.0136 0.0056 0.0247 
t-ratio 4.6931 3.5013 3.0818 6.3217 2.1313 
Merger Coeff. 0.0189** 0.0205** 0.0230** 0.0243** 0.0322** 0.0342** 0.0038 0.0046 0.0127 0.0129 
dummy Std.Err. 0.0074 0.0069 0.0074 0.0069 0.0103 0.0091 0.0065 0.0061 0.0079 0.0078 
t-ratio 2.5517 2.9470 3.1307 3.5146 3.1384 3.7433 0.5885 0.7561 1.6011 1.6593 
*idj R squared 0.54 0.57 0.48 0.49 0.56 0.59 0.58 0.61 0.49 0.49 
F statistic 5.12 5.66 4.28 4.39 5.26 5.77 5.72 6.44 4.29 4.30 
Number of obs 856 856 856 856 513 513 343 343 343 343 
* * indicates a significance level of 1% or below, * indicates a significance level between 1 and 5% 
Fixed and time effects are controlled for in all regressions. 
The constant in the case of the fixed effects OLS models is the actual constant of the equivalent model but without fixed effect controls. 
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Table 5- ': Alternative Expected and Unexpected Earnings models- the special case of expected earnings being last year's earnings 
This tabl; presents coefficient estimates and model descriptive statistics for OLS regressions with fixed effects of the change in dividends and change in total payouts, from year t-1 to year t, 
normalis(.:d by total assets. In these models we assume a special case of the altemative earnings model where expected eamings are last year's earnings, which means that unexpected earnings are 
the diffeience between this year and last year's eamings. The same models are estimated using first, the total sample, then the sample of firms that never repurchased their shares during the 
sample p'jriod, and finally the sample of firms that repurchased their shares at least once during the sample period. For more details on our sampling methodology refer back to the methodology 
section. The table reports the coefficient estimate for each covariate followed by its standard deviation and the p-value of the t-statistic. For a full definition of variables refer back to table 2. 
Total sample Div only sample Div-and-Rep sample 
ADi, ADi, ADi, ATPi, ATPi, ATPi, AD„ ADi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ATPi, ATPi, ATPi, 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
Constani Coeff. 0.0248" 0.0279" 0.0207" 0,0187 0.0328** 0.0093 0.0383" 0.0417" 0.0359** 0,0131 0,0144 0,0028 0.0171 0,0516 -0,0178 
Std.Err. 0,0059 0.0059 0.0060 0,0131 0.0130 0,0132 0,0087 0.0086 0,0089 0,0080 0,0078 0,0078 0.0294 0,0294 0,0292 
t-ratio 4.1873 4.7534 3,4711 1,4281 2.5257 0,7058 4,3754 4,8743 4,0383 1.6270 1,8395 0,3600 0,5825 1,7555 -0,6102 
SIZE Coeff. -0.0096" -0.0115" -0.0096" -0.0071" -0.0091" -0.0059* -0.0086" -0.0108" -0.0092" -0.0128" -0.0136** -0.0109** -0,0071 -0,0071 -0,0012 
Std.Err. 0.0020 0.0022 0,0023 0.0024 0.0027 0.0029 0.0024 0,0026 0.0028 0,0028 0,0030 0,0028 0,0058 0,0069 0,0079 
t-ratio -4.9463 -5.2994 -4,2357 -2,9599 -3,4237 -2.0017 -3.6048 -4,0926 -3.2851 -4,4871 -4,5137 -3,8629 -1,2292 -1,0386 -0,1527 
Di,., Coeff. -0.9671" -0.9443" •0.9674** -0.9245** -0.9014" -0.9210" -1.0817" -1.0529" -1.0815" 
Std.Err. 0.0585 0.0575 0.0578 0,0811 0,0779 0,0792 0.0831 0.0847 0,0829 
t-ratIo -16.5440 -16.4205 -16,7449 -11,4051 -11,5750 -11,6291 -13.0215 -12.4254 -13,0491 
TPi,., Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-1.0667" 
0,1378 
-7,7434 
-1.0631** 
0.1379 
-7.7078 
-1.0663" 
0.1379 
-7.7309 
-1.0939" 
0.1620 
-6.7530 
-1.0932** 
0.1643 
-6,6530 
-1.0839" 
0,1658 
-6,5366 
Ea., Coeff. 0.0295" 0.0303" 0.0396" 0.0516" 0.0287" 0,0233 0.0328" 0.0528" 0.0511* 0.1130" 
Std.Err. 0.0075 0,0101 0,0110 0,0157 0.0110 0,0135 0,0059 0,0137 0.0216 0.0450 
t-ratIo 3.9514 2,9865 3,6004 3,2882 2.6098 1,7319 5,5780 3,8544 2.3670 2.5103 
Elt - Ert-, Coeff, -0.0174" 0,0008 -0.0200* 0,0115 •0.0181* -0,0050 -0.0163" 0,0195 -0,0179 0,0606 
Std.Err. 0.0060 0,0086 0.0087 0,0130 0.0079 0,0100 0.0054 0,0105 0,0210 0,0418 
t-ratio -2.9261 0,0907 -2.2889 0.8870 -2.2792 -0,4988 -3.0350 1,8510 -0,8523 1,4500 
Merger Coeff. 0.0154" 0.0141* 0.0154" 0.0170** 0.0156" 0.0175" 0.0284" 0.0271" 0.0281" 0,0002 -0,0012 0.0008 0.0038 0,0017 0,0055 
dummy Std.Err. 0.0060 0.0059 0.0058 0.0059 0.0058 0.0060 0,0084 0,0081 0.0081 0,0052 0,0054 0,0053 0.0071 0,0072 0,0074 
t-ratio 2.5667 2,4000 2,6311 2.8662 2.6857 2.9429 3,3896 3,3343 3.4720 0,0399 -0,2235 0,1484 0,5288 0,2352 0,7421 
Adj R squared 0.53 0,52 0,53 0.51 0.50 0.51 0,52 0,52 0.52 0,61 0,59 0,61 0,51 0,50 0,51 
F statistic 5.05 4,91 5,03 4.75 4.68 4.73 4,98 4,91 4,95 6,46 5,97 6,51 4,64 4,57 4,63 
N 926 926 926 926 926 926 567 567 567 359 359 359 359 359 359 
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8: Alternative Expected and Unexpected Earnings models- the special case of expected earnings being last year's earnings- Robustness checks- using the restricted sample of 
at paid dividends in at least two consecutive years of the sample period. 
(e presents coefficient estimates and model descriptive statistics for OLS regressions with fixed effects of the change in dividends and change in total payouts, from year t-1 to year t, 
ed by total assets. In these models we assume a special case of the alternative earnings model where expected earnings are last year's earnings, which means that unexpected earnings are 
rence between this year and last year's earnings. The same models are estimated using first, the total sample, then the sample of firms that never repurchased their shares during the 
>eriod, and finally the sample of firms that repurchased their shares at least once during the sample period. For more details on our sampling methodology refer back to the methodology 
fhe table reports the coefficient estimate for each covariate followed by its standard deviation and the p-value of the t-statistic. For a full definition of variables refer back to table 2. 
Total sample Div only sample Div-and-Rep sample 
ADi, ADi, ADi, ATPi, ATPi, ATPi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ATPi, ATPi, ATPi, 
[1] [2] [3] [41 [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
Constant Coeff. 0.0248** 0.0255** 0.0217** 0.0193 0.0294* 0.0112 0.0420** 0.0429** 0.0413** 0.0121 0.0118 0.0024 0.0127 0.0435 -0.0209 
Std.Err. 0.0060 0.0059 0.0060 0.0138 0.0137 0.0138 0.0090 0.0089 0.0091 0.0079 0.0076 0.0077 0.0296 0.0296 0.0295 
t-ratio 4.1376 4.2851 3.6198 1.4029 2.1364 0.8074 4.6594 4.7912 4.5282 1.5361 1.5410 0.3122 0.4280 1.4691 -0.7068 
SIZE Coeff. -0.0164** -0.0174** -0.0157** -0.0143** -0.0152** -0.0125** -0.0173** -0.0190** -0.0172** -0.0160** -0.0153** -0.0137** -0.0098 -0.0074 -0.0039 
Std.Err. 0.0023 0.0026 0.0025 0.0030 0.0034 0.0033 0.0029 0.0033 0.0032 0.0034 0.0036 0.0031 0.0076 0.0084 0.0085 
t-ratio -7.0839 -6.6764 -6.2212 -4.8164 -4.5097 -3.7893 -5.9076 -5.7401 -5.3444 -4.7443 -4.3004 -4.4336 -1.2915 -0.8840 -0.4583 
Di,-, Coeff. -1.0334** -0.9962** -1.0403** -1.0106** -0.9708** -1.0117** -1.1032** -1.0576** -1.1061** 
Std.Err. 0.0591 0.0585 0.0588 0,0797 0.0754 0.0786 0.0889 0.0916 0.0866 
t-ratio -17.4984 -17.0408 -17.6807 -12,6837 -12.8782 -12.8777 -12.4134 -11.5409 -12.7661 
TPi,., Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-1.0977** 
0.1549 
-7.0845 
-1.0897** 
0.1547 
-7.0438 
-1.0989** 
0.1550 
-7.0879 
-1.1146** 
0.1819 
-6.1276 
-1.1086** 
0.1840 
-6.0257 
-1.1066** 
0.1839 
-6.0186 
E,., Coeff. 0.0381** 0.0497** 0.0479** 0.0753** 0.0418** 0.0431** 0.0345** 0.0709** 0.0511* 0.1417** 
Std.Err. 0.0083 0,0113 0.0140 0.0214 0.0137 0.0166 0.0055 0.0121 0.0258 0.0505 
t-ratio 4.5846 4.4012 3.4318 3.5190 3.0483 2.5946 6.2534 5.8773 1.9810 2.8087 
E i t -E „ . , Coeff. -0.0193** 0.0111 -0.0200 0.0268 -0.0233* 0.0012 -0.0123 0.0355** -0.0092 0.0890* 
Std.Err. 0.0070 0.0099 0.0110 0.0173 0.0097 0.0119 0.0068 0.0099 0.0242 0.0458 
t-ratio -2.7655 1.1214 -1.8156 1.5477 -2.3892 0.0984 -1.8107 3.5988 -0.3809 1.9433 
Merger Coeff. 0.0198** 0.0178** 0.0205** 0.0227** 0.0209** 0.0243** 0.0341** 0.0313** 0.0342** 0.0032 0.0023 0.0046 0.0096 0.0091 0.0129 
dummy Std.Err. 0.0070 0.0069 0.0069 0.0067 0.0066 0.0069 0.0093 0.0091 0.0091 0.0061 0.0064 0.0061 0.0079 0.0081 0.0078 
t-ratio 2.8094 2,5693 2,9470 3.3732 3.1637 3.5146 3.6619 3.4397 3.7433 0.5276 0,3617 0.7561 1.2237 1.1290 1.6593 
Adj R sq .iared 0.57 0.55 0,57 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.60 0,57 0.61 0.49 0.48 0.49 
F statistic': 5.66 5.34 5,66 4.39 4.30 4.39 5.82 5,58 5.77 6.13 5,55 6.44 4.27 4.20 4.30 
N 856 856 856 856 856 856 513 513 513 343 343 343 343 343 343 
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Table 5-9: Alternative Earnings Expected and Unexpected Models 
This table presents coefficient estimates and model descriptive statistics for OLS regressions with fixed effects of the 
change in dividends and change in total payouts, from year t-1 to year t, normalised by total assets. In these models we 
assume that changes in dividends and total payouts are a function of lagged dividends and a measure of expected 
earnings, which we estimate according to the following mechanism: E, = a + SIZE + E,.| + Ei,.] * NEi,.| + industry 
dummies + annual dummies, where NEi,.| refers to a dummy that takes one for all the values of Ei,,, that are negative and 
zero otherwise. 
The predicted values and residuals obtained from this estimation are used in the dividend and total payout estimations as 
expected income (Expec Ej,) and unexpected income (Unexp Ej,) respectively. Positive Unexp Ei, is an interaction term 
between Unexp E;, and a dummy that takes one for all values of Unexp Ej, that are positive. Al l the remaining variables 
are as defined before (refer back to table 5-2). For more details on our sampling methodology refer back to the 
methodology section. The table reports the coefficient estimate for each covariate followed by its standard deviation and 
the p-value of the t-statistic. 
Total sample N = 926 
E, ADi, ADi, AD„ ADi, ATPi, ATPi, ATPi, ATPi, 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Constant* Coeff. 0.2162'* 0.0191** 0.0192** 0.0161** 0.0161** 0.0008 0.0016 -0.0069 -0.0071 
Std.Err. 0.0647 0.0064 0.0064 0.0063 0.0063 0.0142 0.0143 0.0141 0.0141 
t-ratio 3.3439 3.0066 2.9936 2.5501 2.5407 0.0570 0.1096 -0.4916 -0.5068 
Ei,., Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
0.5056** 
0.1399 
3.6129 
SIZE Coeff. -0.0109** -0.0088** -0.0089** -0.0079** -0.0090** -0.0049 -0.0061** -0.0039 -0.0051 
Std.Err. 0.0026 0.0022 0.0019 0.0020 0.0022 0.0029 0.0024 0.0028 0.0029 
t-ratio -4.2005 -3.9914 -4.6652 -4.0003 -4.0184 -1.6797 -2.5640 -1.4156 -1.7552 
E«., * N E,., Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
P-value 
-0.1385 
0.2061 
-0.6721 
0.5015 
Di,., Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-0.9718** 
0.0581 
-16.7157 
-0.9714** 
0.0588 
-16.5078 
-0.9744** 
0.0594 
-16.4015 
-0.9684** 
0.0582 
-16.6262 
TP;,., Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-1.0674** 
0.1381 
-7.7287 
-1.0678** 
0.1379 
-7.7409 
-1.0660** 
0.1388 
-7.6814 
-1.0660** 
0.1388 
-7.6776 
Expec Ei, Coeff. 0.0675** 0.0666** 0.0750** 0.0624** 0.1012** 0.0887** 0.1068** 0.0925** 
Std.Err. 0.0173 0.0171 0.0172 0.0181 0.0270 0.0261 0.0262 0.0286 
t-ratio 3.9132 3.8898 4.3616 3.4550 3.7411 3.3988 4.0816 3.2394 
Unexp Ei, Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
0.0008 
0.0086 
0.0953 
-0.0169 
0.0117 
-1.4453 
0.0114 
0.0130 
0.8806 
-0.0198 
0.0158 
-1.2550 
Positive Coeff. 0.0292 0.0514* 0.0649 0.0911 
Unexp Ei, Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
0.0171 
1.7037 
0.0232 
2.2201 
0.0392 
1.6578 
0.0500 
1.8235 
Merger Coeff. 0.0154** 0.0153** 0.0152** 0.0143** 0.0174** 0.0170** 0.0166** 0.0157** 
dummy Std.Err. 0.0058 0.0060 0.0060 0.0056 0.0059 0.0059 0.0060 0.0056 
t-ratio 2.6370 2.5729 2.5424 2.5611 2.9363 2.8610 2.7697 2.7742 
Industry dummies Yes No No No No No No No No 
Fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ad] R squared 0.36 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 
F statistic 34.98 5.03 5.06 5.09 5.11 4.73 4.75 4.78 4.76 
The constant in the case of the fixed effects models refers to the intercept resulting from the equivalent 
model without the use of fixed effects (and without intercept). 
** indicates a significance level of 1% or below, * indicates a significance level between 5 and 1%. 
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Table 5-10: Alternative Earnings Expected and Unexpected Models- using the sub-samples 
Refer to table 5-9 for a brief presentation of the models and a definition of the variables. 
Dividend-only sample N = 567 Dividend-and-Repurctiase N = 359 
ADi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ADI, ADi, ATPi, ATPi, A T P I , A T P I , 
[10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] 
Constant Coeff. 0.0336" 0.0339" 0.0296" 0.0291** 0.0028 0.0087 0.0091 0.0070 -0.0369 -0.0207 -0,0173 -0.0214 
Std.Err. 0.0094 0.0094 0,0096 0.0097 0.0086 0,0089 0,0083 0.0084 0.0320 0.0329 0,0310 0.0313 
t-ratio 3.5670 3.5914 3.0997 3.0179 0.3304 0.9731 1.0971 0,8305 -1.1530 -0.6270 -0.5586 -0.6821 
SIZE Coeff. -0.0083** -0.0078** -0.0073** -0.0083" -0.0102" -0.0121" -0.0105" -0.0109" -0.0001 -0,0060 -0.0014 -0,0017 
Std.Err, 0.0027 0.0024 0,0025 0.0028 0.0028 0,0028 0.0025 0.0027 0,0079 0,0058 0,0067 0,0072 
t-ratio -3.0374 -3,3048 -2,9193 -2.9965 -3.6744 -4.3328 -4.1906 -3.9859 -0,0161 -1.0435 -0,2096 -0.2395 
Di,., Coeff. -0.9251" -0.9285** -0.9310" -0.9249" -1.0876" -1.0878" -1.0769** -1.0757" 
Std.Err. 0,0800 0,0818 0.0814 0.0804 0.0829 0,0831 0.0809 0.0805 
t-ratio -11.5692 -11,3447 -11.4411 -11,5031 -13,1138 -13,0899 -13,3173 -13.3705 
TPi,., Coeff. -1.0844" -1.0944" -1.0834" -1.0838" 
Std.Err. 0.1659 0.1621 0.1667 0.1673 
t-ratio -6.5351 -6,7510 -6.4974 -6,4789 
=xpec Ei, Coeff, 0.0604* 0.0661** 0.0701" 0.0595* 0.0923" 0.0722" 0.0827" 0.0779** 0.1701** 0.1078* 0.1391** 0.1350* 
Std.Err. 0.0261 0.0262 0.0256 0.0265 0,0186 0.0130 0,0146 0.0178 0.0598 0.0492 0.0500 0,0628 
t-ratio 2,3119 2.5291 2.7414 2.2434 4.9609 5.5573 5,6469 4,3861 2.8451 2.1902 2.7821 2.1514 
Unexp Ei, Coeff. -0,0048 -0.0156 0.0193 -0,0057 0.0601 -0.0050 
StdErr . 0.0100 0.0137 0.0104 0.0122 0.0418 0,0368 
t-ratio -0.4787 -1,1435 1.8610 -0,4685 1.4394 -0,1363 
Positive Coeff. 0.0111 0.0332 0.0567" 0.0631" 0.1591 0,1646 
Jnexp Eii StdErr , 0.0204 0.0282 0,0196 0.0256 0.0992 0,1140 
t-ratio 0,5446 1.1754 2.8909 2.4672 1,6033 1.4443 
vlerger Coeff. 0.0280" 0.0283** 0.0282" 0.0270** 0.0008 0,0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0054 0.0037 0.0040 0.0039 
' lummy Std.Err. 0.0081 0.0084 0,0084 0,0079 0,0053 0,0052 0.0052 0.0051 0.0074 0.0071 0,0070 0.0070 
t-ratio 3,4723 3,3918 3,3464 3,4231 0.1614 0.0546 0.0655 0,0348 0.7308 0,5212 0,5759 0,5552 
Adj R squared 0,52 0.52 0,52 0.53 0,61 0,61 0.63 0.62 0,51 0.51 0.52 0.51 
• statistic 4.95 4.98 4.95 4,94 6.53 6,49 6.81 6,73 4.62 4,63 4.70 4.64 
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Table 5-11: Alternative Earnings Expected and Unexpected Models- Comparison of models with and without fixed effects 
Refer to table 5-9 for a brief presentation of the models and a definition of the variables. Time effects are controlled for in all the regressions. 
Total sample N = 926 Div-only N = 567 Div-and-Rep N = 359 Difference 
ADi, ADi, ATPi, ATPi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ATPi, ATPi, ADi, ATPi, 
[2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [7] - [9] [ 7 ] - [ 11 ] 
Constant* Coeff. 0.0191" 0.0191" 0.0008 0.0008 0.0336" 0.0336" 0,0028 0,0028 -0,0369 -0,0369 0.0308 0.0705 
Std.Err, 0.0064 0.0073 0.0142 0.0158 0,0094 0.0092 0,0086 0,0094 0.0320 0,0324 0.0132 0.0337 
t-ratio 3.0066 2.6085 0.0570 0.0512 3,5670 3.6542 0,3304 0,3013 -1.1530 -1,1362 2,3392 2.0903 
SIZE Coeff, -0.0088" -0.0005 -0,0049 0,0014 -0.0083** -0.0011* -0.0102" 0,0000 -0.0001 0.0034* -0,0012 -0.0045 
Std.Err, 0,0022 0,0004 0,0029 0,0009 0,0027 0.0006 0.0028 0,0005 0.0079 0.0018 0,0008 0.0019 
t-ratio -3,9914 -1.1938 -1.6797 1,6281 -3,0374 -1,9719 -3.6744 0,0716 -0.0161 1,9349 -1.5075 -2.4475 
D,,., Coeff. -0.9718" -0.1976" -0.9251" -0.2547" -1.0876" -0.1998" -0.0548 
StdErr, 0,0581 0.0418 0,0800 0.0691 0.0829 0,0448 0,0823 
t-ratio -16,7157 -4.7255 -11,5692 -3.6874 -13.1138 -4,4615 -0,6662 
rPi,., Coeff, 
StdErr , 
t-ratio 
-1.0674" 
0.1381 
-7.7287 
-0.3192" 
0.0557 
-5.7331 
-1.0844" 
0.1659 
-6,5351 
-0.4775" 
0.0545 
-8.7574 
0.2229 
0.0880 
2,5327 
Expected E,, Coeff, 0.0675** 0.0393* 0.1012** 0.1352** 0.0604* 0.0298 0.0923** 0.0623" 0.1701" 0.3631" -0,0325 •0.3333 
Std,Err, 0.0173 0.0155 0.0270 0,0305 0.0261 0.0197 0,0186 0.0207 0,0598 0.0776 0,0286 0,0801 
t-ratio 3,9132 2.5309 3.7411 4,4331 2,3119 1,5126 4,9609 3.0122 2,8451 4.6786 -1,1391 -4,1631 
Jnexpec Ei, Coeff, 0,0008 0.0252" 0.0114 0.0545" -0,0048 0,0107 0,0193 0.0563" 0,0601 0.1779" -0.0456 -0.1672 
Std,Err, 0,0086 0.0098 0.0130 0.0185 0,0100 0,0116 0.0104 0.0126 0,0418 0,0478 0.0171 0.0492 
t-ratio 0,0953 2,5687 0.8806 2,9460 -0,4787 0.9191 1.8610 4,4647 1,4394 3,7190 -2.6617 -3.3973 
\ ierger Coeff, 0.0154" 0,0075 0.0174" 0.0108 0.0280" 0,0158 0.0008 -0,0028 0,0054 -0,0010 0,0186 0.0167 
•iummy Std,Err, 0.0058 0,0095 0.0059 0,0093 0.0081 0,0145 0,0053 0,0101 0,0074 0,0108 0,0177 0.0181 
t-ratio 2.6370 0,7962 2.9363 1.1603 3.4723 1,0881 0,1614 -0.2764 0,7308 -0,0890 1,0502 0.9252 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ndustry dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
i-lxed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Adjusted R squared 0,53 0,146 0.51 0.171 0,52 0,189 0,61 0,147 0,51 0,256 
!- statistic 5,03 10,300 4.73 12.190 4,95 8,780 6,53 4,640 4,62 8,230 
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Table 5-12: Alternative Earnings Expected and Unexpected Models- Robustness checks, using MV as the scaling variable 
This table presents coefficient estimates and model descriptive statistics for OLS regressions with fixed effects of the change in dividends and change in total payouts, from 
year t-1 to year t, normalised by the market value of equity. In these models we assume that changes in dividends and total payouts are a function of lagged dividends and a 
measure of expected earnings, which we estimate according to the following mechanism: E, = a + SIZE + E,.| + E,.; * NEi,.] + industry dummies + annual dummies, where 
NE„.| refers to a dummy that takes one for all the values of E;,.: that are negative and zero otherwise. 
The predicted values and residuals obtained fi-om this estimation are used in the dividend and total payout estimations as expected income (Expec Ej,) and unexpected income 
(Unexp Ei,) respectively. Positive Unexp Ej, is an interaction term between Unexp E|, and a dummy that takes one for all values of Unexp E|, that are positive. Al l the variables 
are scaled by the market value of equity, and are defined as in table 5-3. For more details on our sampling methodology refer back to the methodology section. The table 
reports the coefficient estimate for each covariate followed by its standard deviation and the p-value of the t-statistic. 
Total sample Div only Div&Rep 
El, ADI , ADI , A T P I , A T P I , AD„ ADi, ADi, ADI , ATPrt A T P , 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 
Constant* Coeff, 0.1522" 0,0044 -0.0012 -0.0095 -0.0158 -0.0036 -0.0088 0.0144 0,0070 0.0232 0,0125 
Std,Err, 0,0589 0.0073 0.0075 0,0116 0.0118 0.0112 0.0115 0.0101 0.0101 0.0235 0,0239 
t-ratio 2.5836 0.5977 -0.1568 -0.8223 -1.3450 -0.3196 -0.7651 1,4162 0.6850 0,9859 0,5237 
—rt ' l Coeff. 0.4773" 
StdErr . 0,1041 
t-ratio 4,5847 
3IZE Coeff. -0.0081" -0.0117" -0.0110** -0.0141" -0.0133" -0.0079" -0.0073" -0.0233" -0.0227" -0.0335" -0.0330" 
StdErr . 0,0026 0.0017 0.0018 0.0028 0.0031 0.0019 0.0021 0.0022 0.0022 0.0084 0.0085 
t-ratio -3,0936 -6.8025 -6.2083 -5.0100 -4.2810 -4.1262 -3.5256 -10.5850 -10.5278 -3.9914 -3,8684 
• i , . - , * N E»., Coeff. 
Std.Err, 
t-ratio 
-0,1320 
0.1681 
-0.7852 
• V , Coeff, -0.9984" -0.9974" -1.0107" -1.0101" -1.0672" -1.0612" 
Std.Err. 0.0470 0.0467 0.0597 0,0595 0,0547 0,0526 
t-ratio -21.2368 -21.3573 -16.9235 -16.9697 -19,5218 -20.1822 
•i"Pi,-i Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-0.9985" 
0.0526 
-18.9859 
-0.9979" 
0.0531 
-18.7998 
-1.0248" 
0.0692 
-14.8154 
-1.0204" 
0,0694 
-14.7062 
l-ixpec El, Coeff, 0.0847" 0.0874" 0.1412" 0.1404" 0.0889" 0.0880" 0.0821" 0.1048" 0.2483" 0.2686" 
Std.Err, 0.0228 0.0213 0,0311 0.0293 0.0294 0,0275 0.0319 0,0321 0.0693 0,0624 
t-ratio 3,7199 4.1074 4.5460 4.7871 3.0217 3.2009 2.5743 3,2637 3.5844 4,3078 
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Unexp Eii Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
0.0095 
0.0085 
1.1187 
0.0153 
0.0098 
1.5640 
0.0101 
0.0107 
0.9448 
0.0022 
0.0096 
0.2324 
0.0185 
0.0196 
0.9431 
Positive Coeff. 0.0294 0.0369 0,0233 0.0486* 0.0841 
Unexp Eit Std.Err, 
t-ratio 
0.0154 
1.9034 
0.0233 
1.5853 
0,0182 
1,2797 
0.0216 
2.2465 
0,0535 
1.5736 
Merger Coeff, 0.0125* 0.0123* 0 .0154** 0.0151** 0 .0308** 0.0302** -0.0080 -0.0062 0.0039 0.0059 
dummy Std.Err. 0.0058 0.0057 0.0056 0.0055 0.0063 0.0063 0.0062 0.0062 0.0070 0.0066 
t-ratio 2.1529 2.1639 2.7607 2.7595 4.8991 4.8105 -1.2750 -0.9888 0.5525 0.8872 
Industry dummies Yes No No No No No No No No No No 
Fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R squared 0,27 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.69 0.70 0.56 0.57 
F statistic 24.33 5.44 5.46 5.13 5.13 5,16 5.15 8.82 9.17 5.47 5.52 
M 927 927 927 927 927 568 568 359 359 359 359 
The constant in the case of the fixed effects models refers to the intercept resulting from the equivalent model without the use of fixed effects (and without intercept). 
* * indicates a significance level of 1% or below, * indicates a significance level between 5 and 1%. 
Time effects are controlled for in all the regressions. 
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Table 5-13: Alternative Earnings Expected and Unexpected Models- Robustness checks, using E B I T D instead of net income 
This table presents coefficient estimates and model descriptive statistics for OLS regressions with fixed effects of the change in dividends and change in total payouts, from 
year t-1 to year t, normalised by total assets. In these models we assume that changes in dividends and total payouts are a function of lagged dividends and a measure of 
expected earnings, which we estimate according to the following mechanism: EBITD, = a + SIZE + EBITD,., + EBlTDi,., * NEBITDj,., + industry dummies + annual 
dummies, where NEBITDj,., refers to a dummy that takes one for all the values of EBITDj,., that are negative and zero otherwise. 
The predicted values and residuals obtained fi-om this estimation are used in the dividend and total payout estimations as expected income (Expec Ej,) and unexpected income 
(Unexp Ej,) respectively. Positive Unexp Ej, is an interaction term between Unexp E|, and a dummy that takes one for all values of Unexp Ei, that are positive. Al l the variables 
are scaled by total assets, and are defined as in table 2. For more details on our sampling methodology refer back to the methodology section. The table reports the coefficient 
estimate for each covariate followed by its standard deviation and the p-value of the t-statistic. 
Total sample Div only Div&Rep 
E, ADi, ADi, ATPi, ATPi, AD„ ADi, ADi, ADi, ATPi, ATPi, 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 16] 17] [8] [9] [10] 111] 
Constant* Coeff. 0.3466** 0.0211** 0.0212** 0.0022 0.0023 0.0337** 0.0321** 0.0116 0.0117 -0.0029 -0.0029 
Std.Err. 0.0741 0.0062 0.0062 0.0141 0.0141 0.0094 0.0096 0.0077 0.0077 0.0304 0.0304 
t-ratio 4.6785 3.4195 3.4541 0.1553 0.1619 3.5766 3.3272 1.5016 1.5122 -0.0941 -0.0958 
EBlTDi,., Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
0.5788** 
0.0691 
8.3764 
SIZE Coeff. -0.0163** -0.0068** -0.0068** -0.0048 -0.0048 -0.0070** -0.0069** -0.0081** -0.0081** -0.0023 -0.0026 
Std.Err. 0.0032 0.0021 0.0021 0.0029 0.0029 0.0027 0.0027 0.0023 0.0023 0.0080 0.0078 
t-ratio -5.0265 -3.1857 -3.1874 -1.6400 -1.6446 -2.5976 -2.5904 -3.5279 -3.5581 -0.2927 -0.3412 
:EBITDi,., * Coeff. -0.3173 
•MEBITD Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
0.1949 
-1.6281 
Oi,.i Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-1.0020** 
0.0621 
-16.1320 
-1.0003** 
0.0623 
-16.0480 
-0.9592** 
0.0873 
-10.9857 
-0.9609** 
0.0883 
-10.8857 
-1.0910** 
0.0824 
-13.2355 
•'Pi,-, Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-1.0723** 
0.1401 
-7.6510 
-1.0728** 
0.1402 
-7.6516 
-1.0982** 
0.0822 
-13.3526 
-1.0889** 
0.1668 
-6.5289 
-1.0891** 
0.1668 
-6.5312 
iixpec Ei, Coeff. 0.0635** 0.0613** 0.0719** 0.0690** 0.0551** 0.0567** 0.0768** 0.0728** 0.0825 0.0683 
Std.Err. 0.0136 0.0140 0.0236 0.0243 0.0197 0.0216 0.0145 0.0150 0.0562 0.0592 
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t-ratio 4.6733 4.3853 3.0479 2.8364 2.7956 2.6212 5.2874 4.8394 1.4677 1.1541 
Jnexp Ei, Coeff. 0.0203** 0.0121 0.0171 0.0053 0.0118 0.0118 0.0328** 0.0328** 0.0287 0.0283 
Std.Err. 0.0072 0.0092 0.0121 0.0136 0.0084 0.0084 0.0108 0.0108 0.0382 0.0382 
t-ratio 2.8321 1.3217 1.4044 0.3879 1.4051 1.3999 3.0366 3.0319 0.7521 0.7415 
Positive Coeff. 0.0195 0.0281 -0.0049 0.0234 0.0943 
Unexp Eit Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
0.0166 
1.1747 
0.0306 
0.9159 
0.0154 
-0.3189 
0.0260 
0.8993 
0.0518 
1.8206 
Merger Coeff. 0.0147** 0.0143* 0 0160** 0.0154** 0 .027**7 0.0277** 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0027 0.0025 
dummy Std.Err. 0.0059 0.0059 0.0060 0.0061 0.0085 0.0084 0.0049 0.0049 0.0072 0.0071 
t-ratio 2.4902 2.4027 2.6637 2.5310 3.2752 3.2834 -0.0048 -0.0252 0.3753 0.3546 
Industry dummies Yes No No No No No No No No No No 
-ixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
^dj R squared 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.63 0.63 0.51 0.51 
- statistic 63.17 5.10 5.10 4.71 4.70 4.92 4.88 6.82 6.78 4.55 4.52 
M 926 926 926 926 926 567 567 359 359 359 359 
The constant in the case of the fixed effects models refers to the intercept resulting from the equivalent model without the use of fixed effects (and without intercept). 
"* indicates a significance level of 1% or below, * indicates a significance level between 5 and 1%. 
Time effects are controlled for in all the regressions. 
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Table 5-14: Alternative Earnings Expected and Unexpected Models- Robustness checks, using the restricted sample 
of firms that paid dividends in at least two consecutive years of the sample period 
This table presents coefficient estimates and model descriptive statistics for O L S regressions with fixed effects of the 
change in dividends and change in total payouts, from year t-1 to year t, normalised by total assets. In these models we 
assume that changes in dividends and total payouts are a function of lagged dividends and a measure of expected earnings, 
which we estimate according to the following mechanism: E , = a + S I Z E + E, . ; + Ej , . , * NEi, . | + industry dummies + annual 
dummies, where NEi,., refers to a dummy that takes one for all the values of Ej, . , that are negative and zero otherwise. 
The predicted values and residuals obtained from this estimation are used in the dividend and total payout estimations as 
expected income (Expec Ej,) and unexpected income (Unexp Ei,) respectively. Positive Unexp E;, is an interaction term 
between Unexp Ei, and a dummy that takes one for all values of Unexp E, , that are positive. All the variables are scaled by 
total assets, and are defined as in table 5-2. For more details on our sampling methodology refer back to the methodology 
section. The table reports the coefficient estimate for each covariate followed by its standard deviation and the p-value of 
the t-statistic. 
Total sample N = 856 
Ert ADi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ATPi, ATPi, ATPi, ATPi, 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Constant* Coeff. 0.1605* 0.0217** 0.0216** 0.0192** 0.0188** 0.0064 0.0068 -0.0021 -0.0031 
Std.Err. 0.0687 0.0063 0.0063 0.0062 0.0062 0.0145 0.0146 0.0142 0.0142 
t-ratio 2.3365 3.4573 3.4223 3.1085 3.0516 0.4395 0.4631 -0.1451 -0.2185 
El,, Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
0.5561*" 
0.1515 
3.6700 
SIZE Coeff. -0.0096** -0.0149** -0.0156** -0.0145** -0.0148** -0.0116** -0.0134** -0.0108** -0.0114** 
Std.Err. 0.0028 0.0025 0.0023 0.0023 0.0025 0.0032 0.0029 0.0033 0.0032 
t-ratio -3.3728 -6.0774 -6.9321 -6.3229 -6.0377 -3.6152 -4.6606 -3.3181 -3.5135 
Ei,., * N El,., Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-0.2056 
0.2407 
-0.8545 
Di,., Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-1.0513** 
0.0592 
-17.7506 
-1.0446** 
0.0594 
-17.5884 
-1.0544** 
0.0602 
-17.5120 
-1.0511** 
0.0593 
-17.7366 
TPi,., Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-1.1015** 
0.1555 
-7.0831 
-1.1004** 
0.1554 
-7.0804 
-1.1019** 
0.1561 
-7.0596 
-1.1015** 
0.1562 
-7.0495 
Expec Ei, Coeff. 0.0967** 0.0850** 0.1011** 0.0952** 0.1312** 0.1044** 0.1375** 0.1281** 
Std.Err. 0.0171 0.0171 0.0177 0.0178 0.0346 0.0318 0.0326 0.0361 
t-ratio 5.6406 4.9670 5.7185 5.3468 3.7883 3.2770 4.2134 3.5501 
Unexp Ei, Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
0.0109 
0.0097 
1.1160 
-0.0086 
0.0118 
-0.7253 
0.0261 
0.0172 
1.5169 
-0.0146 
0.0193 
-0.7547 
Positive Coeff. 0.0517** 0.0626** 0.1123* 0.1310* 
Unexp Eit Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
0.0177 
2.9207 
0.0221 
2.8380 
0.0529 
2.1223 
0.0655 
2.0011 
Merger Coeff. 0.0205** 0.0198** 0.0198** 0.0193** 0.0241" 0.0226** 0.0225** 0.0216** 
dummy Std.Err. 0.0069 0.0070 0.0070 0.0066 0.0069 0.0067 0.0067 0.0064 
t-ratio 2.9776 2.8418 2.8525 2.9393 3.5132 3.3764 3.3554 3.3777 
Industry dummies Yes No No No No No No No No 
Fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R squared 0.39 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 
F statistic 36.84 5.73 5.73 5.87 5.85 4.40 4.40 4.48 4.46 
The constant in the case of the fixed effects models refers to the intercept resulting from the equivalent model without the 
use of fixed effects (and without intercept). 
** indicates a significance level of 1% or below, * indicates a significance level between 5 and 1%. 
Time effects are controlled for in all the regressions. 
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Table 5-15: Alternative Earnings Expected and Unexpected Models- Robustness checks, using the restricted sample of firms that paid dividends in at least two 
consecutive years of the sample period- Using the sub-samples 
defer to table 5-14 for a brief presentation of the models and a definition of the variables. 
Dividend-only sample N = 513 Divldend-and-Repurctiase sample N = 343 
ADi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ADi, ATPi, ATPi, ATPi, ATPi, 
[10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] 
Ilonstant* Coeff. 0.0399" 0.0399" 0.0366" 0.0343" 0.0037 0.0100 0.0078 0.0056 -0.0294 -0.0097 -0.0171 -0.0209 
Std.Err. 0.0095 0.0095 0.0095 0.0096 0.0082 0.0085 0.0080 0.0081 0.0314 0.0322 0.0303 0.0306 
t-ratio 4.2162 4.2155 3.8441 3.5721 0.4481 1.1797 0.9767 0.6994 -0.9357 -0.3020 -0.5626 -0.6832 
51ZE Coeff. -0.0161" -0.0161" -0.0152" -0.0156" -0.0132" -0.0155" -0.0139" -0.0133" -0.0030 -0.0089 -0.0040 -0.0034 
Std.Err. 0.0031 0.0028 0.0030 0.0032 0.0030 0.0033 0.0030 0.0030 0.0084 0.0074 0.0082 0.0080 
t-ratio -5.1454 -5.6823 -5.1256 -4.9522 -4.3285 -4.6700 -4.7106 -4.4396 -0.3617 -1.2021 -0.4962 -0.4323 
Oi,., Coeff. -1.0258" -1.0252" -1.0381" -1.0331" -1.1142" -1.1110" -1.1020" -1.1062" 
Std.Err. 0.0795 0.0806 0.0805 0.0795 0.0868 0.0890 0.0862 0.0854 
t-ratio -12.9101 -12.7246 -12.8959 -12.9926 -12.8427 -12.4880 -12.7802 -12.9512 
rPi,.i Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
-1.1077" 
0.1842 
-6.0122 
-1.1156" 
0.1823 
-6.1201 
-1.1080" 
0.1857 
-5.9660 
-1.1073" 
0.1857 
-5.9639 
:xpected Ei, Coeff. 0.1027" 0.1019" 0.1182" 0.1120" 0.1076" 0.0700" 0.0810" 0.0957" 0.1911" 0.0987 0.1340** 0.1469* 
Std.Err. 0.0304 0.0303 0.0307 0.0304 0.0156 0.0112 0.0123 0.0148 0.0669 0.0539 0.0513 0.0761 
t-ratio 3.3836 3.3604 3.8476 3.6784 6.8923 6.2203 6.5950 6.4801 2.8558 1.8314 2.6121 1.9303 
' Jnexpec E,, Coeff. 
Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
0.0008 
0.0117 
0.0651 
-0.0145 
0.0138 
-1.0515 
0.0357" 
0.0096 
3.7066 
0.0171 
0.0098 
1.7498 
0.0891* 
0.0459 
1.9434 
0.0153 
0.0470 
0.3257 
Positive Coeff. 0.0364 0.0586 0.0633" 0.0447* 0.1937 0.1771 
1 Jnexpec Bit Std.Err. 
t-ratio 
0.0295 
1.2336 
0.0346 
1.6942 
0.0195 
3.2491 
0.0225 
1.9848 
0.1036 
1.8696 
0.1263 
1.4023 
h^erger Coeff. 0.0340" 0.0339" 0.0337" 0.0323" 0.0047 0.0033 0.0041 0.0045 0.0130 0.0097 0.0121 0.0124 
clummy Std.Err. 0.0089 0.0091 0.0092 0.0087 0.0060 0.0061 0.0060 0.0059 0.0078 0.0079 0.0069 0.0070 
t-ratio 3.8196 3.7390 3.6559 3.7316 0.7801 0.5479 0.6772 0.7563 1.6656 1.2303 1.7499 1.7713 
/ vdjusted R squared 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.62 0.62 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.49 
1 • statistic 5.87 5.92 5.93 5.91 6.50 6.18 6.58 6.55 4.30 4.27 4.37 4.31 
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6.1 Summary and conclusions 
This thesis has examined corporate payout policy in the UK. Its objective has been 
twofold, firstly, to determine what motivates firms in the U K to repurchase their 
shares, and then to establish whether total payouts, and the role played by share 
buybacks, can be explained using variations on the traditional corporate dividend 
behaviour models, such as Lintner (1951) and Fama & Babiak (1968). 
This thesis contributes not only to improving our understanding o f the share 
repurchase activity in the U K , but it also offers a viable framework for estimating 
total payouts rather than just dividends, and it provides empirical support for the 
contention that share repurchases must be taken into consideration alongside 
dividends in any corporate payout model. 
We have seen in the literature review that most empirical work on share repurchases 
has been undertaken using only US data. We have also seen that, given its relatively 
tighter regulafions and its shareholder-led corporate governance, the U K provides a 
very interesting alternative research setting for the testing o f the hypotheses that have 
received most empirical support in the US. For instance, the signalling hypothesis, 
which has received considerable support in the US, is unlikely to generate the same 
level o f support in the U K , given that U K managers are less able than their US 
counterparts to exploit their firms' undervaluation and the fact that very large open-
market repurchases, which are the most effective signals o f undervaluation, are very 
rare in the UK. 
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Similarly, we have seen that the corporate governance system in the U K , which 
provides greater powers and incentives for shareholders to monitor and control 
managers' actions, makes it diff icul t for share repurchases to be used as a takeover 
defence mechanism. Shareholders' active involvement in setting up remunerafion 
packages for executive directors also affects the argument o f the stock option 
hypothesis, whereby managers have an incentive to repurchase shares instead o f 
paying dividends in order to avoid the devaluation o f their stock options. 
Given these differences in the corporate governance systems of the US and U K , and 
given that most repurchase studies have been undertaken using US data, we identified 
a gap in the literature, both in terms o f what drives firms in the U K to repurchase, but 
also in terms o f how much corporate governance plays a role in disciplining 
managers' 'motivations' to repurchase. 
The analyses contained in this thesis use the FTSE 350 excluding the financial sector 
to construct an unbalanced panel o f 267 firms, for the period 2001-2004. A 
preliminary analysis o f this sample enabled us to identify some significant differences 
between firms that repurchase and those that do not. For instance, we found that re-
purchasers are significantly larger and earn significantly more than non re-purchasers. 
Re-purchasers also seem to pay significantly more in dividends than non re-
purchasers, which is consistent with the recent finding o f Hsieh & Wang (2006) that 
high earners are also high payers, both in terms o f dividends and repurchases. 
Contrary to findings o f previous studies such as Jolls (1998) and Fenn & Liang 
(1999), we find that re-purchasers grant significantly less options to their executives 
than non re-purchasers. Moreover, when we decompose the sample o f re-purchasers 
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into those that repurchased only once and those that repurchased more than once, we 
f ind that frequent re-purchasers are significantly larger and pay significantly larger 
dividends. 
In addition, using information in their annual reports, we find that most firms in the 
U K say they repurchase to distribute cash to their shareholders, while a few mention 
repurchasing to enhance their eamings-per-share. 
In chapter four, we empirically test these findings; we start by examining the sample 
of re-purchasers, which is made up o f 330 observations. Using OLS estimation, and 
while controlling for fixed and time effects, we regress the value o f shares 
repurchased on a vector o f variables that each controls for a specific factor that has 
been found in the literature to affect share buybacks. Thus, we control for size, debt, 
institutional shareholdings, director shareholdings etc. Given the importance o f the 
differences in corporate governance between the US and U K to our analysis, we pay 
special attention to the stock option hypothesis, and test both the EPS dilution 
argument and the substitution argument. 
The regression results indicate that operating income is the main driver o f share 
repurchases in the U K , with none o f the option variables having any significant effect 
on neither the value nor the fraction o f shares repurchased. We also find that expected 
income is significantly positively related to share repurchases, contrary to the 
argument o f the FCF hypothesis, which contends that repurchases are used to 
distribute excess cash-flow, hence unexpected income. 
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When we use binomial and multinomial logit regressions to estimate the effect o f our 
independent variables on the decision to repurchase, to pay dividends, or to retain 
earnings, we find that the more options a firm has, the less likely it is to repurchase, 
and the more income it earns, the more likely it is to repurchase. Moreover, we find 
that the probability o f retaining earnings increases with options, director and 
institutional holdings and debt, while it decreases with size, operating income and 
return. Consistent with the OLS findings, the relationship between the likelihood o f 
repurchasing and income is driven mainly by expected income. 
These results provide confirmation o f our main predictions that corporate governance 
in the U K has a significant influence upon corporate payout motives. This is 
particularly obvious when we consider that the stock option hypothesis, and in 
particular, the argument that managers repurchase in order to avoid the devaluation o f 
their options, is not supported by the U K evidence. Moreover, the fact that firms that 
retain their earnings seem to grant significantly more options to their executives could 
be simply an indication that these are smaller growth firms that use options to attract 
high calibre employees, in which case these employee options are arguably being 
awarded and used exactly as recommended by every U K corporate governance code 
from Cadbury (1992) to the current "Combined Code" (2004). 
It appears from our findings that the most likely motive for firms in the U K to 
repurchase their shares is to distribute cash to shareholders. Given our finding that 
these repurchases are funded out o f expected income, it is unlikely that repurchases in 
the U K are used to distribute only excess cash. It is very possible that the inherent 
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flexibil i ty o f share repurchases renders them useful even for distributing expected 
increases in cash flows, which allows firms to further stabilise their dividend payouts. 
On that issue, in chapter five we investigate the effect o f using total payouts, instead 
of just dividends, on the predictive power o f traditional corporate dividend behaviour 
models. I f share repurchases are being progressively used as substitutes for increases 
in dividends, then we should expect these models to provide good estimates o f 
changes in total payouts. Our analysis in chapter 5 largely confirms these 
expectations. 
In fact, not only do we find that traditional dividend models such as Lintner (1956) 
and Fama & Babiak (1968) can still produce good estimates when applied to total 
payouts, but we also show that by slightly modifying these models to reflect the 
changes that have occurred over recent years in corporate payout policy, we are able 
to obtain results that better reflect the reality o f U K corporate payout behaviour today. 
Thus, in chapter five we develop an alternative total payout policy model that 
distinguishes between "Expected" and "Unexpected" earnings, which we estimate in 
separate regressions so that they are reflective o f the individual earnings trends o f the 
sample firms. Unlike the Lintner (1956) model, our alternative model assumes that 
dividends or total payout changes are the result o f a ful l adjustment to expected 
earnings and a partial adjustment to unexpected earnings. 
Our results show that lagged dividends (total payouts) are the single most important 
determinant of current dividends (total payouts), followed by expected earnings. This 
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confirms that firms ( U K firms in particular) are still very conservative in their 
dividend payout behaviour, which is reflected in their fu l l adjustment to past 
dividends and expected rather than unexpected earnings. Our findings also show that 
firms that repurchase their shares have smoother dividends, but are more daring in 
their total payout behaviour, as they seem to base payouts on their unexpected 
earnings significantly more than do firms that do not repurchase. This result is partly 
explained by their superior profitability, but also by the added flexibility associated 
with share buybacks. 
Thus, our results provide further evidence that share repurchases are being used by 
some firms as substitutes for dividend increases. This allows them to have a smoother 
dividend policy. It is therefore imperative that, as the popularity o f share repurchases 
is expected to increase (for reasons already mentioned in the text), finance 
academicians and practitioners need to rethink traditional corporate payout models 
such as the Lintner (1956) and Fama & Babiak (1968) formulations, and to develop 
new models that incorporate repurchases within a total corporate payout framework. 
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6.2 Suggestions for future research 
This thesis deals with a very interesting, up-to-date and perhaps controversial topic 
that encompasses several areas in corporate finance. Considering the time constraints 
and difficulties relating to collecting data which, unfortunately, is not available in a 
machine readable format, there are several issues which we touched upon but were 
not able to analyse in more depth. 
For instance, our conclusions about firms' motivations to repurchase their shares in 
the U K reflect our sample firms, large to medium firms, and the time period which we 
focused on. Given the relative lack o f research on share buybacks in the U K , using a 
longer time period may enable us to see their trend. It would also be interesting to see 
i f firms' motivations would be any different fi-om what we found i f the sample is 
extended to include small cap firms. One assumption that can be taken fi-om our 
results in order to reduce the burden o f data collection for fiature researchers is that 
executive options do not lead to a substitution o f dividends for repurchases. Thus, the 
tedious task o f collecting information about executive opfions can be avoided. 
According to the theory and to our results, we should expect smaller firms to 
repurchase for different reasons, and these reasons are unlikely to be related to the 
FCF hypothesis, since they are unlikely to have much free-cash flow. Moreover, given 
that in our sample, share repurchases are more popular with larger firms, it would be 
interesting to confirm whether small cap firms do repurchase at all. 
In addition, in chapter four we found that although in the past firms in the U K did not 
repurchase to fund their employee stock options (before they were exercised), this 
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might be changing. Thus, it would be interesting to see whether this is the case. Three 
years have already passed since the change in the law that made it possible for firms 
in the U K to keep the shares they repurchase in treasury stock, within these three 
years, a new pattern o f share repurchases may have already emerged. 
In addition, our sample was designed to give a fair reflection o f firms operating in the 
U K market (excluding the financial sector); it thus, encompasses both firms that 
repurchased and those that did not. It is possible to look at the repurchase issue fi-om a 
different angle, by focusing only on firms that repurchased their shares, and 
investigating the link between the value o f these repurchases and a set o f control 
variables, which our results have helped to identify. 
In chapter three, where we provide some descriptive statistics o f our sample firms, we 
briefly analysed firms' motives behind their buyback programs, according to the 
reasons that these firms provided in their annual reports. However, we argued that 
using these reasons in a multivariate context would not be very informative since 
categorising re-purchasers according to these motives would result in very small sub-
samples that would not allow any statistical inferences to be made. A n area for future 
research would, thus, be to compile firms' motives for repurchasing their shares 
according to the information reported in their annual reports, and to use this 
informafion empirically to determine how truthful or reliable U K firms are in terms o f 
the reporting of their 'real' reasons for undertaking share repurchases. 
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Furthermore, from our sample o f re-purchasers we were able to disfinguish between 
firms that routinely repurchased their shares and those that only made one-off 
buybacks. A larger sample o f share buybacks can, thus, allow a more detailed analysis 
o f the differences between the motives behind these two types o f buyback. 
We have seen in chapter five that repurchases are not only marginalised as a cash 
distribution method in the existing payout behaviour models, as we have seen 
throughout the thesis other areas where dividends are used to represent total payouts 
also need to be rethought to encompass both dividends and buybacks, including, for 
instance, the dividend discount model. 
This could be an interesting area for fiature research. Some authors such as Randall 
(2000) have already proposed modifications to the dividend discount model to enable 
the estimation o f current and future stock prices o f firms that repurchase their shares. 
However, it does not appear that the academic world is showing enough interest for 
developments in this area, as we can see that most finance text books still advocate 
the use o f the D D M without consideration for the possible bias that would result from 
its use to value firms that repurchase their shares. This thesis can serve to renew 
interest in this area which would give it a new breadth and encourage even more work 
in the direction o f giving share repurchases more importance in different corporate 
payout models. 
Finally, an interesting extension of our analyses would be to investigate whether 
'cash-cows' in the U K have witnessed a significant change in their payout policies 
since the mid nineties, when repurchases first started to grow in popularity. The focus 
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on cash cows would probably involve looking at cash generative industries. Such an 
investigation would help detennine further how share repurchases are being used to 
smooth dividends, and would also contribute to the current substitution debate. More 
specifically, it would be very useful to analyse dividend 'increases' in a panel data 
framework and in conjunction with share repurchases. 
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